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1. INTRODUCTION
African swine fever (ASF) is a dangerous viral disease of  pigs, with a 
devastating impact on the animal health and pig industry. While diagnosis 
of  the disease has a remarkable influence on the international trade of  
live pigs and pig products, it is listed as a notable disease of  the World 
Animal Health Organisation (OIE) and European Commission (EC) 
(OIE, 2017; OIE, 2020; EC, 2002). 
The first description of  ASF was made in 1921, when British pathologist 
Eustace Montgomery published the results of  comprehensive research 
conducted in East Africa. A century has passed since then, knowledge 
about the disease and the causative agent is now much better, but 
despite this, around half  of  African countries still suffer the effects of  
endemically persistent ASF (Penrith et al., 2013; Gallardo et al., 2015c; 
Mulumba-Mfumu et al., 2019; OIE WAHID, 2020).
The first case of  ASF outside of  Africa was reported in Portugal in 
1957 (Sánchez-Vizcaíno et al., 2009). During the period from 1960 to 
1995, several European countries, including Spain, Portugal, France, 
Italy, Malta, Belgium and the Netherlands experienced new incursions 
of  the virus (Sánchez-Vizcaíno et al., 2009). All these aforementioned 
countries managed to eradicate the disease, excluding the Italian island 
of  Sardinia. Eradication took decades in some countries; however, as the 
result of  strict measures, they succeeded. Sardinia was first affected in 
1978 and ASF is still endemic despite numerous attempts to get rid of  it 
(Mur et al., 2016; Jurado et al., 2018; OIE WAHID, 2020). 
In the 1970s, the disease spread across the Atlantic Ocean to South 
America (Brazil) and the Caribbean (Cuba, Dominican Republic and 
Haiti), but was successfully eradicated over the course of  a decade 
(Costard et al., 2009). The most recent and worrying episode of  ASF’s 
global spread has been to China (People’s Republic of), where in August 
2018 the first case of  ASF in Asia was reported (Zhou et al., 2018; Tao 
et al., 2020). The subsequent spread of  the disease in Asia and Oceania 
has been enormous, also reaching Mongolia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Hong 
Kong, North Korea, South Korea, Laos, the Philippines, Timor-Leste, 
Myanmar, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and India (OIE WAHID, 
visited 24. May 2020).
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A new introduction of  the ASF virus to Europe occurred in 2007, 
when it was reported in Georgia in spring 2007 (Rowlands et al., 2008; 
Sanchez-Vizcaino et al., 2012). Following this, rapid spread of  ASF virus 
to neighbouring countries in the North Caucasus region (Azerbaijan, 
Armenia) and the Russian Federation occurred, where the virus is still 
circulating and is endemic over large areas (Rosselkhoznadzor, visited 16. 
April 2020). In 2012, African swine fever virus (ASFV) was reported in 
Ukraine and in 2013 in Belarus. In 2014, the virus entered the European 
Union countries neighbouring Belarus – Lithuania, Poland, and Latvia. 
During the period 2017–2020, the virus entered the Czech Republic, 
Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Belgium, Slovakia, Serbia and 
Greece (OIE WAHID, visited 24. May 2020). All affected EU countries 
(excluding the Czech Republic), as well as Ukraine and Moldova, are still 
reporting ASF cases.
The first case of  ASF in Estonia was diagnosed in a dead wild boar in 
September 2014, near to the Latvian border. As a result of  the extensive 
spread of  the virus in the Estonian wild boar population, covering 14 
counties out of  15, a total of  3,992 ASF-positive wild boar had been 
found among the 48,384 investigated wild boar by the end of  May 
2020. The first case of  ASF in domestic pigs in Estonia was reported in 
the middle of  July 2015 and was followed by 17 further outbreaks. Six 
more outbreaks in 2016, and three more in 2017, were confirmed by the 
veterinary service. No positive cases among domestic pigs were found in 
the years 2018 or 2019, or in early 2020 (up to 31. May 2020).
In Europe, the disease affects both domestic pigs and European wild 
boar (Sus scrofa) and, in general, the course of  the disease does not differ 
when comparing them (Gabriel et al., 2011; Blome et al., 2013; Pikalo et 
al., 2019). Therefore, an infected wild boar population holds the constant 
risk of  infecting domestic pigs and vice versa (Sánchez-Vizcaíno et al., 
2012).
The long-lasting ASF epidemic in both domestic pigs and wild boar in 
Eastern Europe, as well as in domestic pigs on the African continent 
and Asia, poses a continuous infection threat to the rest of  the world 
(Costard et al., 2009; Penrith et al., 2013; Dixon et al., 2020; Tao et al., 
2020; Taylor et al, 2020). In Europe, the disease is expanding towards 
the west step-by-step, approaching regions and countries with very 
large populations of  wild boar and a high density of  domestic pigs. The 
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economic impact of  such a development could be substantial for many 
areas and countries. 
Even nowadays, control and eradication of  ASF is based only on the 
rapid recognition in the field and diagnosis, followed by implementation 
of  strict sanitary measures and a stamping-out policy. No vaccine or 
treatment is available, despite the first attempts to develop a vaccine 
being undertaken already in the 1950s (Penrith et al., 2013; Dixon et al., 
2020).
The general goal of  the work in this thesis has been to improve our 
knowledge regarding the epidemiology of  African swine fever in both 
domestic pigs and wild boar in the north-eastern part of  Europe.
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2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
2.1. Aetiology and clinical manifestation of  African swine fever
African swine fever is caused by a large, enveloped, double-stranded 
DNA virus, which belongs to the genus Asfivirus within the Asfarviridae 
family (Alonso et al., 2018). Up to now, 24 genotypes of  ASFV has 
been determined worldwide based on partial nucleotide sequencing of  
the gene p72 (Boshoff  et al., 2007; Achenbach et al., 2016; Quembo et 
al., 2018). All genotypes are present in Africa, but only two of  them – 
genotypes I and II – have been found on other continents (Bastos et al., 
2003; Gallardo et al., 2009; Arias et al., 2018; Le et al., 2019; Mulumba-
Mfumu et al., 2019; Zhao et al., 2019). In all affected European countries 
ASFV genotype II is circulating, excluding the island of  Sardinia in Italy, 
where genotype I is circulating (Bastos et al., 2003; Rowlands et al., 2008; 
Malogolovkin et al., 2012; Torresi et al., 2020). All currently affected 
Asian countries have reported findings of  ASFV genotype II (Zhou et 
al., 2018; Le et al., 2019; Kim et al., 2020). 
ASF can have an acute, subacute or chronic disease course depending on 
virus factors and the host. Based on virulence, the strains of  the virus are 
divided into three main groups: highly virulent, moderately virulent and 
low virulent strains. Highly virulent ASFV strains produce peracute or 
acute forms of  the disease, moderately virulent strains produce acute or 
subacute forms of  the disease, and low virulent strains produce chronic 
and asymptomatic forms of  the disease (Sánchez-Vizcaíno et al., 2009). 
The genotype of  the isolate is not directly related to its virulence, and 
isolates with different levels of  virulence have even been found for one 
genotype (Gallardo et al., 2015d; Gallardo et al., 2018a; Gallardo et al., 
2018b; Gallardo et al., 2018c; Zani et al., 2018). 
ASF is described as a severe, haemorrhagic disease that causes up to 
100% morbidity in naive pig herds and can result in very high mortality 
(Sánchez-Vizcaíno et al., 2009; Costard et al., 2013). The acute cause of  
ASF is described with a variety of  clinical signs including high fever, 
general depression, anorexia, respiratory and neurological disorders, 
gastrointestinal signs and haemorrhagic lesions (Sanchez-Vizcaıno et 
al., 2009). However, the clinical appearance of  ASF in both field and 
experimental conditions is often confined only to unspecific clinical 
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symptoms like loss of  appetite, depression or listlessness, even in cases 
of  severe cause of  the disease (Gabriel et al., 2011; Pietschmann et al., 
2015; Oelsen et al., 2018b; Gallardo et al., 2018a; Zani et al., 2019; Pikalo 
et al., 2020; Walczak et al., 2020). 
Diseased animals showing clinical symptoms shed the virus in all body 
secretions (Guinat et al., 2014; Pietschmann et al., 2015; Pikolo et al., 
2020), which causes contamination of  the environment and may lead 
to subsequent spread of  the virus within the herd or, in the case of  
wild boar, in the habitat. However, the highest amount of  the virus has 
been found in blood of  infected animals (Gabriel et al., 2011; Carvalho 
Ferreira et al., 2012; Guinat et al., 2014; Gallardo et al., 2015b; Olesen et 
al., 2017).
2.2. Biological characterization of  ASFV genotype II strains in 
Europe
The ASFV genotype II strains circulating within the EU since 2014 all 
have a common origin. They have been shown to originate from those 
genotype II strains causing the ASF epidemic in the Caucasus countries 
(Malagolovkin et al., 2012; Fraczyk et al., 2014; Gallardo et al., 2014; 
Fernandez-Pinero, 2018; Pikalo et al., 2020). Although enormous progress 
has been made in the field of  DNA sequencing over the last few decades, 
just a small number of  ASFV whole-genome sequences are currently 
available for precise characterization of  different ASF virus strains. As 
of  May 2020, whole-genome sequences of  only 29 ASFV genotype II 
strains were publicly available (Forth et al., 2020). The phylogenetic tree 
created by Forth et al., (2020) visualizes the relationships between these 
different ASFV strains and genotypes (Figure 1). 
Because of  the limited DNA sequence data on ASF virus strains to date, 
experimental infections, which allow collection of  detailed information 
about the virus strains, are still extremely important. However, such 
experiments require the availability of  special high-containment facilities 
(L3+), as well as official permission to use live animals; therefore, the 
number of  these studies is very limited.
Experimental infections conducted during the period 2008–2014 
showed that the ASFV genotype II strains circulating in Europe are 
highly virulent and induce an acute form of  the disease in both domestic
16
Figure 1. Phylogenetic tree of  African swine fever virus strains based on all publicly 
available whole-genome sequences of  African swine fever virus (Forth et al., 2020. 
Reproduced with permission from the authors)
pigs and European wild boar (Gabriel et al., 2011; Blome et al., 2012; 
Guinat et al., 2014; Gallardo et al., 2015b; Pikalo et al., 2020). Irrespective 
of  the age of  animals, dose of  the virus or route of  infection, the 
mortality rate of  infected animals was found close to 100% (Gabriel et 
al., 2011; Blome et al., 2012; Gallardo et al., 2015a; Gallardo et al., 2015b). 
After an incubation period of  3 to 5 days infected animals started to 
show clinical symptoms that led to the death of  most animals 5 to 13 
days post-inoculation (dpi) (Gabriel et al., 2011; Guinat et al., 2014; 
Gallardo et al., 2015b). 
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Experimental infections from the period 2015–2019 also describe 
finding less virulent genotype II virus strains (Gallardo et al., 2018a; 
Gallardo et al., 2018b; Pershin et al., 2019; Walczak et al., 2020). In these 
experiments, the recorded mortality rate was between 50 and 100%, and 
it was observed that the same virus strain may cause various clinical 
forms of  the disease including acute, subacute or chronic forms. 
Furthermore, in 2017, an attenuated, non-haemadsorbing virus strain 
was found in a wild boar hunted in Latvia (Gallardo et al., 2019a). The 
Latvian strain caused chronic or unspecific clinical signs in inoculated 
pigs, which did not lead to death of  the animals, and in in-contact pigs 
either mild clinical symptoms appeared or they did not develop any 
detectable clinical symptoms at all (Gallardo et al., 2019a).
2.3. Epidemiology of  ASF in Europe
From 1995 to 2007, the only region affected by ASF in Europe was 
the Italian island of  Sardinia, which has been affected since 1978 as the 
result of  an independent incursion. In contrast to the rest of  Europe, 
p72 genotype I is circulating on Sardinia (Bastos et al., 2003; Giammarioli 
et al., 2011; Jurado et al., 2018; Torresi et al., 2020). 
Highly virulent and lethal ASF virus strains of  p72 genotype II were 
introduced to Europe in 2007 (Blome et al., 2012; Gallardo et al., 2015b; 
OIE WAHID, visited 14. July 2019). During the first two years of  the ASF 
epidemic, the countries in the Caucasus region (Georgia, Azerbaijan and 
Armenia) and the southern regions of  the Russian Federation (Russia) 
were affected. Since the affected countries were not able to control the 
disease, the epidemic expanded within these regions and moved towards 
European Union borders and northern areas of  Russia. In 2011, the 
virus reached the central part of  Russia (Gogin et al., 2013; FAO, 2013; 
http://www.fsvps.ru/fsvps/asf, visited 07. March 2019). However, 
several domestic pig outbreaks had already been diagnosed earlier in the 
north-west of  Russia (St. Petersburg region) in the period 2009–2012; 
the closest of  these to Estonia was reported about 160 km away from 
the border (FAO, 2013). Ukraine reported its first ASF case in 2012, and 
Belarus in 2013. 
In January 2014, the first ASF case in the Baltics, in fact in the European 
Union, was reported by Lithuania (Gallardo et al., 2015b; Mačiulskis et 
al., 2020). In February, Poland reported its first case (Smietanka et al., 
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2016). Latvia confirmed its first ASF cases in June 2014 (Olševskis et 
al., 2016). Several other countries have followed: Moldova in 2016, the 
Czech Republic and Romania in 2017, Hungary, Bulgaria and Belgium 
in 2018, Slovakia and Serbia in 2019, and Greece in 2020 (OIE WAHID, 
visited 24. May 2020).
In total, since 2007 up the end of  May 2020, the disease has spread over 
large areas of  Europe and has been diagnosed in 17 European countries 
(OIE WAHID, visited 5. July 2020). Figure 2 shows the countries in 
Europe and the rest of  the world, which have experienced ASF outbreaks 
in domestic pigs and cases in wild boar the period 2015-2020.
Figure 2. Countries with African swine fever outbreaks in domestic pigs and wild 
boar, 2015–2020 (EFSA, 2021)
2.3.1. Epidemiology of  ASF in European wild boar
2.3.1.1. Transmission of  the virus
In Europe, the transmission cycles of  the virus are somewhat different 
compared to Africa. The ancient sylvatic cycle of  virus transmission is 
absent in Europe. Here in Europe there is only one wild Suidae species 
present – the European wild boar (Sus scrofa) – and soft ticks from the 
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genus Ornithodorus spp. inhabit only limited areas of  the continent. 
Ornithodorus erraticus is the only species of  tick found in Europe that has 
been identified as a reservoir and biological vector of  ASFV (Sánchez-
Vizcaíno et al., 2009). They have been found in Mediterranean countries 
(Portugal, Spain, Italy, Turkey), in the Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan), and in Moldova, Ukraine and Romania. From the affected 
Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) and Poland, there are no 
reports of  the occurrence of  Ornithodorus ticks in nature or their role in 
transmission of  the virus (Sánchez-Vizcaíno et al., 2009; Costard et al., 
2013). All ticks belonging to the Ornithodoros genus live in open and dry 
habitats, commonly associated with rodent burrows. They feed mainly 
on animal species living in burrows, such as rodents and reptiles, as well 
as Suidae in Africa. While wild boar in Europe do not live in burrows, 
but are surface animals, they can be only accidental hosts. Therefore, 
transmission involving soft ticks is not considered to play an active role 
in the geographical spread and transmission of  the virus in Europe 
(Dixon et al., 2020). However, ticks played an important role during a 
long-term epidemic on the Iberian Peninsula in the second half  of  the 
20th century (Bech-Nielsen et al., 1995; Sánchez-Vizcaíno et al., 2009; 
Boinas et al., 2011; Costard et al., 2013). 
ASFV can be shed by oral and nasal secretions, urine, faeces, and 
secretions from the genital tract of  infected animals. However, far the 
best body fluid to shed the virus is blood, as contains large amounts of  
the virus (Gabriel et al., 2011; Carvalho Ferreira et al., 2012; Guinat et 
al., 2014; Gallardo et al., 2015b; Guinat et al., 2016; Olesen et al., 2017; 
Gallardo et al., 2018; Gallardo et al., 2019b). Transmission of  the virus 
in the habitat of  wild boar may occur by direct transmission between 
infected and susceptible wild boar, or by indirect transmission via 
carcasses. Habitat contamination originates from ASFV-positive wild 
boar carcasses or from offal left in the forest after hunting (Chenais 
et al., 2018). However, in the habitat there are many other factors that 
may influence transmission of  the virus, in particular possible intra-
species scavenging, the stage of  carcass decomposition, climate, season, 
the nature of  the soil, and fauna in the area (Probst et al., 2017). Wild 
boar-habitat transmission dominates in those areas where the climate is 
colder than in previously affected areas (in Africa, the Mediterranean and 
Caucasus region), the wild boar population is large, no natural reservoirs 
exist and domestic pigs are kept predominantly indoors (e.g. the Baltic 
countries). The role of  contaminated habitat is far from being completely 
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understood, but it was described as an independent transmission cycle 
and published for the first time by Chenais et al. (2018) (Figure 3).
Figure 3. The epidemiological cycles of  African swine fever and main transmission 
agents. 1) Sylvatic cycle: includes common warthog (Phacochoerus africanuus), bushpig 
(Potamochoerus larvatus), and soft ticks of  Ornithodoros spp. 2) Tick–pig cycle: includes 
soft ticks and domestic pigs. 3) Domestic cycle: includes domestic pigs and products 
originating from pigs (for example: pork, lard, fat, blood, bones, hides). 4) Wild boar–
habitat cycle: includes wild boar; pig and wild boar products and carcasses; and the 
habitat (Chaines et al., 2018. Reproduced with permission from the authors)
The importance of  wild boar as the main reservoir of  ASFV was 
revealed after the virus reached the Baltic countries and Poland between 
2014 and 2015 (Olševskis et al., 2016; Pejsak et al., 2018; Mačiulskis et 
al., 2020). Before this time, when the virus was circulating in Russia and 
the Caucasus region, the domestic pig sector was considered the main 
reservoir of  the virus (FAO, 2013; Oganesyan et al., 2013). Unauthorized 
movement of  live animals, extensive illegal movement of  infected pork 
and pork products from affected regions, and feeding of  food waste to 
pigs without prior heat treatment in the region supported this (Gogin et 
al., 2013; FAO, 2013). 
Transmission of  the virus into disease-free areas including “long-
distance jumps” may occur through fomites. Insufficiently cleaned and 
disinfected livestock trucks and vehicles entering farm territories to 
transport goods and offer different services have been recognized an 
important route of  virus transmission. Active movement and travelling 
of  people between regions, countries and continents poses a transmission 
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risk as well. Personal luggage of  passengers, which may contain infected 
pork products, has been identified as one of  the biggest contributors to 
the risk of  virus introduction to new areas. This risk is particularly high 
in the case of  ASF since the survival time of  the ASF virus in different 
pork products can be very long – weeks or even months (Petrini et al., 
2019; Olesen et al., 2020). Contaminated fomites and movement of  
people and goods pose a risk of  introduction equally to both the wild 
boar population and domestic pig farms.
2.3.1.2. Contagiousity, morbidity and mortality 
Collection of  trustworthy field data to measure ASF frequency in a wild 
boar population is almost impossible, and therefore the information 
collected in animal experiments and printed in textbooks is crucial. Up to 
now, in textbooks, ASF is predominantly described as a highly contagious 
disease with high mortality, especially in cases where the disease is caused 
by highly virulent strains of  the virus (Sánchez-Vizcaíno et al., 2009; 
Blome et al., 2012; Pietschmann et al., 2015; Pikalo et al., 2020). While 
high mortality of  animals has been described in many experimental 
studies, this may easily lead to the wrong conclusion regarding the 
contagiousity of  ASF. However, particularly under field conditions, 
several other factors influence the cause of  the disease and mortality 
rate significantly, such as dose and route of  exposure. If  many animals 
get a high dose of  the virus at the same time, as often in experimental 
conditions, getting trustworthy information about its contagiousity is 
problematic. The same may also occur under field conditions, in the case 
of  high-dose oral infection by feed. However, moderate contagiousity of  
a highly virulent ASF virus strain has been reported by Pietschmann et 
al. (2015). The authors concluded that very low doses of  virus exposure 
oro-nasally may be linked to moderate contagiousity. Furthermore, low 
contagiousity of  ASF has been reported under field conditions in several 
domestic pig outbreak farms in Latvia (Olševskis et al., 2016; Lamberga 
et al., 2018).
Following the results of  recent experimental infections, it can be 
hypothesized that similar scenarios occur under field conditions in both 
domestic pig herds and the wild boar population. Due to the presumed 
oral transmission of  the virus, and particularly with low-dose exposure, 
the initial mortality within a herd or group is rather low even if  the virus 
is highly virulent. 
22
2.3.1.3. Risk factors in wild boar
Experimental studies conducted using European ASFV isolates have 
demonstrated that European wild boar are as susceptible to ASF as 
domestic pigs (Gabriel et al., 2011; Blome et al., 2012; Pietschmann et al., 
2015; Pikalo et al., 2020). Initially, both often develop only non-specific 
clinical symptoms and, depending mostly on the virulence of  the virus 
strain, animals either die or recover. The age and sex of  an animal do not 
influence the course of  the disease.
The role of  habitat as a reservoir of  the virus is far from being completely 
understood since the versatility of  habitats makes comparison and 
collection of  data difficult, even in neighbouring areas. The long 
survival time of  the ASF virus in blood, excretions and other substances 
originating from infected animals, as well as in the probably contaminated 
soil underneath and next to carcasses, supports the long persistence 
of  the disease in affected areas (Probst et al., 2017). Certain climatic 
conditions, such as chilly and damp weather, and a long winter period 
with temperatures below 0°C are also considered contributing factors 
that influence the viability of  the virus. The results of  a comprehensive 
study to clarify possible intra-species scavenging conducted by Probst et 
al. (2017) suggest that about one third of  wild boar visits led to direct 
contact with dead conspecifics. Although intra-species scavenging was 
not observed during the study, frequent reports of  sniffing and poking 
of  carcasses, as well as of  chewing bare bones originating from carcasses, 
represent long-term risks of  transmission. So, the high viability of  ASF 
virus in the habitat and infected carcasses can be considered even more 
important than direct contact with live, infected animals (Chenais et al., 
2018).
The density of  wild boar is also a factor that can substantially influence 
the spread of  the ASF virus. High density affords more contact between 
animals within the group, as well as between groups, supporting 
further spread of  the disease. Conversely, low density of  wild boar may 
contribute to localization of  the disease, especially in cases with a highly 
virulent circulating virus and high mortality. Direct contact between wild 
boar, because of  their high density has been reported in the Caucasian 
countries and in Russia (Gogin et al., 2013). Figure 4 shows density of  
wild boar in Europe in 2015.
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Figure 4. Wild boar population abundance (head per km2) in Europe based on available 
population estimates (EFSA, 2015)
Hunting practices have a significant impact as a causal factor in the ASF 
epidemic in the wild boar population. However, this depends on hunting 
intensity and type, such as whether dogs are used, whether it is a driven 
hunt etc. Intensive hunting supports the active movement of  animals 
and, thereby, the spread of  the disease to new, previously disease-free 
areas. Elements of  biosecurity related to hunting, including the cleaning 
and disinfection of  hunting equipment and vehicles, and removal of  
leftovers and carcasses from the forest, have been identified as critical 
factors in the control of  ASF.
The possible carrier status of  recovered (survived) animals has been 
frequently under discussion, and there is still no single position among 
researchers. Several animal experiments have demonstrated that ASFV 
or the DNA of  the virus can persist in tissues of  clinically recovered 
animals for up to six months (Gallardo et al., 2019b). Thus, it can easily 
be concluded that these animals are carriers. However, the results of  
other animal trials have demonstrated that recovered animals do not 
infect healthy, susceptible animals after commingling (Gallardo et al., 
2018a; Petrov et al., 2018). To clarify this question, Stahl et al. (2019) 
conducted a comprehensive review finding that a clear definition for 
ASF virus carriers is lacking, and therefore it has been quite common 
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for any survivor or seropositive animal to be referred to as a carrier. The 
authors concluded that not enough evidence has been reported to prove 
the existence of  such carriers and their significant role as a reservoir of  
the virus. 
Human behaviour has been identified as an important risk factor for the 
spread of  ASF. Short-distance spread of  ASFV (1–5 km/month) can 
be associated with direct (natural) contact between animals (Podgorski 
et al., 2018; Chenais et al., 2019; Niine et al., 2019), whereas unexpected 
long-distance spread cannot apparently be explained by direct contact 
between animals alone. The most important mechanisms causing the 
spread of  the disease over large areas are human induced. In the EU, 
recent examples of  such long-distance spreading have taken place in 
the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Belgium (Chenais et al., 2019; 
Linden et al., 2020). Each of  these infected areas was several hundred 
kilometres away from previously known infected regions. The main 
threat to the wild boar population is probably related to food waste left 
in the forest or public places by tourists, truck drivers or workers coming 
from affected areas (Pejsak et al., 2018).
2.3.2. Epidemiology of  ASF in domestic pigs in Europe
2.3.2.1. Transmission of  the virus 
Infected animals shed the virus via most secretions of  the body, and 
therefore direct contact between infected and susceptible animals has 
been found as the most effective source of  infection for herds (Guinat 
et al., 2014; Gallardo et al., 2015b; Guinat et al., 2016; Gallardo et al., 
2018a; Gallardo et al., 2019b). However, under field conditions, such 
direct contact can be rare, in particular in areas where domestic pigs are 
kept mostly indoors, such as in the Baltic countries. Direct pig-to-pig or 
wild-boar-to-pig transmission dominates in those regions (the Caucasian 
countries, the Russian Federation, Moldova, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, 
as well as Sardinia) where there is a large backyard farm sector, outside 
keeping is prevalent, and swill-feeding habits exist (Sánchez-Vizcaíno et 
al., 2009; Costard et al., 2013; Gogin et at., 2013). 
Whether or not the virus is transmitted to farms via animal feed has 
been unclear for a long time. However, a recent comprehensive study 
confirms the efficient oral transmission of  ASFV via feed (Niederwerder 
25
et al., 2019), and also reports the potential infectious doses of  different 
types of  feed. Some field reports from Latvia, Lithuania and Poland 
describe feeding of  contaminated fresh grass or hay as a source of  
infection (Jazdzewski, 2017), but in general, knowledge is lacking about 
the role of  plant-based and liquid feed consumption. However, feeding 
of  swill and kitchen waste is a well-known transmission route of  the 
virus to farms, especially in the backyard sector.
Despite the fact that in Northern Europe there are no natural vectors, it 
is still important to identify possible mechanical vectors and clarify their 
role in transmission of  ASFV. The European stable fly (Stomoxys calcitrans) 
has been shown able to mechanically transmit ASFV to pigs up to two 
days post-infective-meal (Baldacchino et al., 2013; de Carvalho Ferreira 
et al., 2014). Oelsen et al. (2018a) reported that ingesta of  S. calcitrans flies 
after a blood meal containing ASFV may be a source of  infection for 
pigs. The authors found it unlikely that blood-sucking files would be a 
common route for transmission of  the virus to a farm. Nevertheless, 
the results indicate that transmission of  the virus over short distances 
is possible, in particular by larger flies, such as blood-feeding horse flies 
(family Tabanidae). The role of  mechanical vectors in transmission of  the 
virus is still not clear and needs further investigation.
Many ASF outbreak investigations from recent years have not identified 
a clear source of  the virus infection or transmission route to the farm. 
It mostly appears that the virus is introduced to farms by indirect 
transmission routes by means of  contaminated fomites (vehicles, people, 
tools etc). Low awareness about the disease among pig owners and 
hunters, inadequate or non-existing biosecurity on pig farms, and illegal 
movement of  infected pigs, pork and pork products, all supported by an 
uncontrolled increase in the wild boar population, may easily lead to the 
transmission of  the virus by fomites to pig farms. Thus, an infected wild 
boar population in an area poses a constant infection risk to domestic 
pigs (Sánchez-Vizcaíno et al., 2012).
2.3.2.2. Contagiousity, morbidity and mortality
ASF is often described as a severe, haemorrhagic and highly contagious 
disease of  pigs with a high mortality (Fenner’s, 2017; Veterinary Medicine, 
2017; Sánchez-Vizcaíno and Arias, 2012). Morbidity rate and mortality 
in the herd depend on the virulence of  the virus strain, as well as the 
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route and dose to which the herd is exposed. In the case of  an acute 
form of  the disease, morbidity may range from 40 to 85% (Sánchez-
Vizcaíno and Arias, 2012), and it may be even higher in cases where it is 
caused by highly virulent virus strains. Highly virulent virus isolates may 
cause mortality rates of  90–100%, moderately virulent strains 20–40% 
in adults and 70–80% in young animals, and low virulent strains result in 
a mortality of  10–30% (Sánchez-Vizcaíno and Arias, 2012).
From outbreak farms in Russia (2007–2012), Oganesyan et al. (2013) 
reported mean values of  mortality and morbidity as 72.4% (64.3–80.4) 
and 37.8% (28.9–46.6), respectively. Based on field observations in Latvia 
from 2014, Olševskis et al. (2016) reported that on several holdings 
only one or a few diseased or dead animals were present at the time 
of  suspicion of  the disease. Other pigs living in the same stable were 
clinically healthy. The authors concluded that virus transmission from 
one animal to the next is a rather delayed process confirming a moderate 
contagiousity. Another case report from a Latvian ASF outbreak farm 
with 5,000 pigs also clearly demonstrated the slow spread of  the virus 
within the farm (Lamberga et al., 2018). During the first week after 
exposure of  the farm to the virus, there was no observed increase in 
the usual mortality rate for the farm; in total, it took over a month until 
ASF was suspected, even despite the presence of  ASF in the region. 
In Lithuania, ASF was diagnosed on a large commercial farm in 2014 
(Anonymous, 2014). On this farm, which had close to 20,000 pigs, 18 
weaners died in one unit showing symptoms of  feed poisoning, and just 
over a week later severe symptoms appeared in a sow unit. Thus, these 
results also indicate low contagiousity of  the disease on the farm. Such a 
slow spread and moderate contagiousity have also been described for a 
Bulgarian backyard farm with seven pigs (Zani et al., 2019).
Evaluation of  ASF frequency parameters on affected backyard farms 
is not relevant in most cases, because every single diseased or dead 
animal influences the results significantly. Therefore, we have to take 
into account that results from backyard farms may not correctly reflect 
the occurrence of  the disease on larger farms. Following available field 
reports from different affected counties, it can be hypothesized that on 
larger production farms operating at higher biosecurity levels, morbidity 
and mortality rates can be low, especially in the first week or weeks after 
introduction; this is concordant with a low or moderate contagiousity. 
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It is an important difference between farm sizes, which may influence 
recognition of  the disease especially on large farms.
2.3.2.3. Risk factors in domestic pigs 
Risk factors for the introduction of  ASF to a pig farm may differ 
markedly between regions, while climate, farming traditions, landscape, 
socio-cultural and economical background, as well as many other factors, 
vary greatly. 
Farm size can be considered a risk factor for ASF, although reports may 
often be contradictory in this regard. It is widely assumed and frequently 
reported, that backyard and small-scale production farms have a higher 
probability of  becoming infected. Reports from Russia and the Caucasian 
countries from the period 2007–2013 found that backyard farms are 
most susceptible to ASF introduction (Oganesyan et al., 2013). Despite 
this, in 2012, Russia reported a large number of  outbreaks on large 
commercial farms with a high level of  biosecurity. Authors of  one study 
concluded that this is possibly due to the underreporting of  outbreaks 
in the backyard sector because of  weak or non-existing supervision 
by veterinary authorities (Gogin et al., 2013). Furthermore, numerous 
owners of  small pig farms in Russia are poor and therefore dependent 
on income from pig sales. On top of  this, when outbreaks occur, an 
important part of  the costs associated with outbreak elimination have 
to be covered by the pig owner; this may also easily lead to hiding of  the 
disease and underreporting (Gogin et al., 2013; FAO, 2013). Olševskis 
et al. (2016) reported from Latvia that in 2014, 30 out of  32 outbreaks 
were confirmed on backyard (up to 10 pigs) or small-scale production 
farms (11–50 pigs). In total, during the period from June 2014 to May 
2018, Latvia confirmed that only three of  53 outbreaks (6%) were on 
large commercial farms (Lamberga et al., 2018). From Lithuania it has 
been reported that during the period 2014–2017, ASFV mostly affected 
backyard holdings (Pautienius et al., 2018). In detail, they reported to the 
EFSA (2018) that in 2017, 28 out of  30 outbreaks were confirmed in 
backyard farms, and in 2018, 43 out of  49 outbreaks were on backyard 
farms. In 2017, Poland reported that 85% of  outbreaks occurred on 
those farms with fewer than 50 pigs, and only 4% were on farms keeping 
over 500 pigs (Jazdzewski, 2017). In July 2019, Romania reported that 
all 210 ASF outbreaks between January and July 2019 were diagnosed 
on backyard or small commercial farms (Anonymous, 2019). However, 
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within European Union countries, there are only a few well recorded 
ASF case reports published up to now (Lamberga et al., 2018; Zani et al., 
2019; Lamberga et al., 2020).
It is not scientifically proven that the type of  farm (multiplier, farrow-
to-finish, fattening) is a significant risk factor for ASF. However, it can 
be assumed that farms with breeding sows are more susceptible, because 
of  more human interactions and the lower immunity of  pregnant or 
nursing sows. Lamberga et al. (2018) reported an outbreak on a large 
breeding farm in Latvia, where the disease appeared first in pregnant 
sows. In 2014, Lithuania reported an outbreak on a large farrow-to-finish 
farm with breeding sows (Anonymous, 2014). In Bulgaria, an outbreak 
of  ASF on a backyard farm in 2018 also started with the death of  a 
pregnant sow (Zani et al., 2019). However, contrary to this, in Sardinia 
it seems that the number of  open fattening farms is a risk factor for 
the occurrence of  ASF. This may be associated with the more frequent 
movement of  new animals to the herds, a higher density of  animals, as 
well as the management practices on these farms (Martínez-López et al., 
2015). The vast majority of  ASF outbreaks still occur on backyard or 
small-scale production farms without clear division of  herds based on 
production type.
Outside or free-range keeping of  domestic pigs is a significant risk factor 
for ASF. Pigs kept outside can easily be in direct contact with wild boar, 
and this has subsequently been identified as an important transmission 
pathway for domestic pig herds (Gulenkin et al., 2011; Gogin et al., 
2013). Over large areas in the Caucasus region, southern Russia, and the 
Mediterranean countries, outside keeping of  pigs is a widely practiced 
tradition (Gogin et al., 2013). Since the early stage of  the ASF epidemic, 
all the Baltic countries prohibited the outside keeping of  domestic pigs. 
As a control measure, free-range keeping was banned in the Caucasian 
countries and in Sardinia. In Romania, the free-range keeping of  domestic 
pigs is strongly discouraged. Contrary to expectations, Martínez-López 
et al. (2015) found in Sardinia that the number of  closed farms was 
associated with a higher risk of  ASF outbreak occurrence compared 
to open farms. However, it was concluded that this might be related 
to better notification of  outbreaks by owners, or a consequence of  
management practices on these farms, particularly on small-scale farms 
where there is generally low biosecurity and a swill-feeding tradition. 
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On Sardinia only a limited number of  closed farms are large production 
farms with a high biosecurity level.
In Europe, the infected wild boar population is an important risk factor 
for infection of  domestic pig herds. During the period 2007–2013, there 
were some reports from initially affected countries (Armenia, Russia) 
about the role of  wild boar in ASFV transmission. The Caucasian 
countries and southern Russia reported the role of  infected wild boar as 
the source of  infection for domestic pigs (Gogin et al., 2013). However, 
the situation changed remarkably, after the virus entered EU countries in 
2014. All the Baltic countries and Poland reported that the affected wild 
boar population posed a major threat to domestic pigs. Olševskis et al. 
(2016) analysed domestic pig outbreaks in Latvia in 2014 and concluded 
that 12 out of  32 outbreaks could be linked to a persistent infection in 
the wild boar population. In the EFSA scientific report (2018) Poland 
presented results of  a statistical analysis of  outbreaks, which indicated a 
relationship between the presence of  ASFV in the wild boar population 
and the occurrence of  the disease in domestic pigs; it was shown that 
almost all (95%) of  ASF outbreaks in domestic pigs occurred in those 
areas where ASF had already been found in wild boars. Similar results 
from Poland were also reported by Wozniakowski in 2017 and 2018. 
In most affected EU countries the first ASF cases were diagnosed in 
wild boar, and then subsequently in domestic pigs (Olševskis et al., 2016; 
Smietanka et al., 2016; Pautienius et al., 2018). The situation seems to 
be different in Sardinia, where results of  studies suggest that the role 
of  wild boar as a source of  ASF outbreaks is not crucial on the island. 
On the contrary, it has been suggested that wild boar are often infected 
from domestic pigs in open grazing areas (Martínez-López et al., 2015). 
However, the potential role of  wild boar as reservoir of  ASFV in Sardinia 
is not clearly known, and therefore wild boar data are not neglected in 
risk factor analyses. 
Feeding of  non-heat-treated swill to pigs is one of  the most frequently 
described risk factors for domestic pigs. In conjunction with poor or 
almost non-existent biosecurity measures on a farm, it may easily lead 
to outbreaks in herds. The use of  food waste to feed pigs has been 
identified as the main route of  ASF introduction to small farms in 
Sardinia (Martínez-López et al., 2015). Together with generally low 
biosecurity levels on most Sardinian small farms, ASFV access to farms 
is easy this way. It has been concluded that swill feeding has been one of  
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the most important factors why the ASF control programme in Sardinia 
has failed in the long term (Martínez-López et al., 2015). The Russian 
Federation reports that use of  non-heat-treated swill to feed domestic 
pigs is a common practice in the domestic pig sector all over the country; 
therefore, contaminated swill is the most important source of  ASFV 
infection for domestic pigs there (FAO, 2013; Gogin et al., 2013; Kolbasov 
et al., 2018). Since the Russia is not an exporter of  pigs and pig products 
out of  the country, the backyard sector in particular is not motivated 
to invest in the improvement of  biosecurity measures on farms (Gogin 
et al., 2013). Gogin et al. (2013) also reported that the presence of  the 
virus in southern Russia in 2008 and 2009 was linked with feeding of  
leftovers of  meat and meat products from infected pigs. Swill feeding 
as a source of  ASF introduction has also been reported from Latvia 
(Olševskis et al., 2016), Lithuania (EFSA, 2018), Poland (Jazdzewski, 
2017; Woziakowski, 2018) and Romania (Boklund et al., 2020). All 
the aforementioned countries have also reported low, non-existent or 
improper biosecurity measures on backyard farms (Jazdzewski, 2017). 
The FAO report summary from 2013 says that backyard farms in most 
Eastern European countries operate at a very low biosecurity level, and 
awareness of  the sector regarding the disease and biosecurity in general 
is very poor.
The illegal trade of  live pigs and pig products is a possible risk factor for 
introduction of  the virus to regions and farms. This has been described 
in many regions, particularly in remote areas where people follow more 
traditional lifestyles and farming practices. Reports from Sardinia, the 
Caucasian countries, Russia, Poland, and other countries describe the 
importance of  such a risk (FAO, 2013; Gogin et al., 2013; Martínez-
López et al., 2015; Jazdzewski, 2017; Kolbasov et al., 2018). However, to 
estimate this as a risk factor is difficult, as not much reliable information 
is available. Costard et al. (2015) used mathematical modelling to estimate 
the risk of  release of  ASF from backyard and small-scale farms via 
the emergency sale of  infected pigs. An emergency sale is defined as 
a situation when farmers do not report the suspected disease to the 
authorities and sell pigs without apparent clinical signs at market or to 
traders with the aim of  reducing economic losses. The authors of  the 
study concluded that emergency selling is a risky practice for farmers 
and contributes to further spread of  the disease. Russia has reported 
that large-scale spread of  the disease, including “long-distance jumps” 
within the country, were caused by unauthorized movement of  infected 
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animals and/or pork sales (Gogin et al., 2013; Kolbasov et al., 2018). 
Infected pork products from affected regions were purchased by food 
supply and catering companies and the food waste was, without prior 
heat treatment, fed to pigs (Gulenkin et al., 2011; Gogin et al., 2013). 
Poland has reported that illegal movement of  infected live pigs and 
infected meat and sausages is a source of  new outbreaks (Jazdzewski, 
2017; Wozniakowski, 2017 and 2018).
A lack of  cooperation between different authorities and services 
responsible for disease eradication can also be defined as a risk factor 
for ASF introduction. Slow, insufficient or inadequate control measures 
taken by the authorities have been reported by Russia as a contributing 
factor of  the disease spread (Gogin et al., 2013).
Finally, season is a common risk factor for ASF in Eastern Europe. 
Olševskis et al. (2016) reported from Latvia that most outbreaks in 2014 
occurred in the period from July to August. A similar trend is described 
in Lithuania, where very clear seasonality was reported in 2018; all 
confirmed outbreaks occurred in the period from June to August 
(EFSA, 2018). The EFSA scientific report from 2018 summarizes input 
from all the Baltic countries and Poland, and shows that 88% (367) of  
all outbreaks for the period 2014–2018 occurred in summer, 9% (38) 
in autumn, and 3% (12) in winter and spring combined. A seasonal 
increase in outbreaks in the period from May to October was also noted 
by Russia in the period 2009–2012 (Oganesyan et al., 2013).
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3. AIMS OF THE STUDY
The general aim of  this work was to analyse the epidemiology of  ASF 
and the course of  the epidemic in the Estonian wild boar population (I, 
II), as well as in domestic pigs (III).
The specific aims were:
1. To analyse the differences in the development of  the ASF 
epidemic among wild boar populations in the north-eastern and 
southern areas of  Estonia (Study I).
2. To clarify the biological characteristics of  the virus strain 
circulating among wild boar in the north-east of  Estonia during 
the year 2014 (Study II).
3. To describe quantitatively the epidemic of  ASF in domestic pigs, 
and to identify herd-level risk factors for infection in Estonian 
pig herds, as well as to evaluate the clinical manifestation of  the 
disease in field conditions (Study III).
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4. MATERIALS AND METHODS
This dissertation consists of  three independent studies. This chapter 
presents an abridged overview of  the materials and methods of  each 
of  them. A complete description of  the materials and methods can be 
found in the original articles (I, II and III), which are presented in the 
corresponding section of  this thesis.
4.1. Study setting and data collection
4.1.1. Study I
Study area. We defined two study areas to compare the characteristics 
of  the epidemic in southern and north-eastern Estonia according to the 
hypothesis that the characteristics of  the epidemic (e.g. spread dynamic, 
mortality, seroprevalence) in these two affected areas were different at 
the start of  the epidemic.
The southern area (area S) comprised four counties: Valga (2,044 km²), 
Viljandi (3,422 km²), Võru (2,305 km²) and Tartu (2,993 km²). The 
infected area in the north-east (area N) included one county, Ida-Viru 
(3,364 km2) (Figure 5).
Figure 5. The study areas of  the south and north-east of  Estonia. Highlighted areas 
illustrate the four counties included in the southern area (area S) and the one county, 
which constituted the north-eastern area (area N)
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Study period. We analysed surveillance data collected from 01. September 
2014 until 30. September 2016 (25 months). We analysed the ASF virus- 
and seroprevalences on a monthly basis for the entire study period, as 
well as separately for the first 12 months and the following 13 months. 
Surveillance data from 2014 were obtained from the database of  the 
Estonian Veterinary and Food Laboratory. Data from 2015 and 2016 were 
extracted from the CSF/ASF wild boar surveillance database of  the EU 
Reference Laboratory (https://public.surv-wildboar.eu/Default.aspx). 
The data set that we finally used for the analyses included information 
on the location (county and municipality level), year and month of  
sampling, the age of  the sampled animal, the type of  the sampled wild 
boar (hunted or found dead), the virological and serological test results, 
and the population density of  wild boar in the sampled municipalities.
Wild boar population data. These data were provided by the Estonian 
Environment Agency (Nature department). Population data were 
available for the hunting years 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15. The 
number of  wild boar was recorded before the breeding season began 
(observation dates: March 2014, 2015 and 2016). The population density 
was estimated at the municipality level. Initial population data were 
available as integer numbers at hunting-ground level. To use the data for 
analyses, we aggregated the hunting ground data at the municipality level 
utilizing the software ArcGIS ArcMap 10.3.1 and calculated the wild 
boar density per km² for each administrative unit (municipality).
Wild boar sampling data. Wild boar were sampled according to the 
Estonian ASF control programme, which included sampling of  both 
wild boar found dead and hunted animals. Passive surveillance of  wild 
boar included animals found dead, as well as animals killed in road traffic 
accidents or shot when sick. Active surveillance was based on sampling 
of  hunted wild boar.
4.1.2. Study II
The animal trial was conducted in the high-containment facilities (L3+) 
of  the Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut (FLI), Germany. The experiment was 
approved by the competent authority of  Germany under reference 
number 7221.3-2-023/15.
35
Animals. The first stage of  the study included a total of  ten and the 
follow-up study a total of  three European wild boar from the breeding 
unit at the FLI. The wild boar were approximately 4 months old at the 
start of  the experiment. 
Virus strain. The virus strain used in the challenge experiment (Est 14/
WB) was isolated from a wild boar found dead in the north-east of  
Estonia (Ida-Viru County) in 2014.
Preparation of  the inoculation material. A spleen suspension from 
infected animals was prepared for inoculation of  experimental animals. 
To obtain the spleen suspension we intramuscularly inoculated three 
young wild boar with an organ homogenate in a standard cell culture 
medium that had been prepared from weakly PCR-positive organ samples 
obtained in the field. After appearance of  clinical signs and confirmation 
of  infection by real-time PCR, the animals were euthanized, and blood 
and organ samples were collected during necropsy. A pooled spleen 
suspension with a titre of  104.5 haemadsorbing units (HAU) units per ml 
was prepared for inoculation.
Inoculation. The animals were inoculated oronasally with 2 ml of  pooled 
spleen suspension with an ASFV titre of  104.5 HAU per ml.
Design of  the experiment. We challenged ten wild boar with the virus 
strain Est 14/WB. The animals were monitored until death or euthanasia 
except for one surviving animal, which was used in the follow-up 
experiment. The aim of  the follow-up experiment was to assess if  the 
recovered survivor animal was able to transmit the virus to susceptible 
healthy animals. The survivor animal was commingled with three sentinel 
wild boar on day 50 post-inoculation (dpi) and they were kept together 
until day 96 dpi. On this day, all the animals in the experiment were 
euthanized and subjected to necropsy as described below.
Data collection. All animals were assessed for clinical parameters every 
day using a harmonized scoring system, which has been previously 
described by Pietschmann et al. (2015). Throughout the course of  the 
trial, level of  viremia, virus distribution, virus shedding, and antibody 
responses were assessed. For this purpose, we collected blood samples, 
and oropharyngeal and faecal swabs at days 0, 4, 7 and 10 dpi, and on 
the day of  necropsy. 
36
We performed necropsies on all animals and collected tissue samples 
(lymph nodes, spleen, tonsil, salivary gland, lung and liver), blood 
(EDTA, serum) and swab samples for reference purposes.
4.1.3. Study III
For this study we used data collected during the epidemiological 
investigations on outbreak farms.
Outbreak definition. We defined an outbreak farm as a holding having an 
individual identification number in the NAR and meeting the criteria of  
infected herd as defined in Council Directive 2002/60/EC (European 
Commission, 2002). In accordance with the EU diagnostic manual, 
all our ASF outbreaks were confirmed by virus genome detection 
(European Commission, 2003).
Outbreak investigations. Epidemiological information was collected 
from all farms on which an ASF outbreak was reported during the 
period 2015–2017 (18 farms in 2015, six farms in 2016 and three farms 
in 2017). However, as a positive diagnosis of  ASF was not confirmed 
in follow-up investigations for one of  the herds in 2015, we excluded 
this farm from further analysis (on this farm all 15 pigs were tested after 
culling and were found to be negative for ASF). 
Epidemiological investigations were conducted either by the local 
veterinary officers responsible for management of  the outbreaks or 
by the epidemiology team of  the Estonian University of  Life Sciences, 
in compliance with Council Directive 2002/60/EC (European 
Commission, 2002), using a structured questionnaire. 
Defining the biosecurity level of  outbreak farms. The biosecurity level 
of  outbreak farms was evaluated based on interview data and data 
collected during farm visits. The final assessment of  biosecurity level 
for every single farm was a two-step consensus decision by a group 
of  three experts. The first step involved evaluating the farms based on 
their compliance to basic biosecurity requirements enforced by national 
legislation, and classifying them as compliant or non-compliant (Riigi 
Teataja, 1999; Riigi Teataja, 2004). In the second step, the experts divided 
the herds into five categories based on the predefined criteria. 
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Defining the high-risk period (HRP) of  outbreak farms. The HRP was 
defined as the length of  time that ASF virus may have existed on a farm 
before its presence was suspected. An HRP was established for every 
outbreak farm based on mortality data, as well as clinical and laboratory 
findings. 
Domestic pig herd data. A database on Estonian pig herds for the period 
2015–2017 was compiled using the information available from the 
National Animal Register (NAR) of  the Estonian Agricultural Registers 
and Information Board and from the Veterinary and Food Board (VFB). 
The final database, which we used for analyses, included all farms and 
households that had kept pigs during the years of  observation. The total 
number of  pigs in a herd was counted as the largest number registered 
in one of  the source databases (NAR or VFB). 
An epidemiological unit was defined as a group of  pigs kept in one 
building or area (one outdoor herd) that had an individual identification 
number in the NAR. It was possible for one owner to have more than 
one production unit (i.e. herd) registered in the NAR. Herds belonging 
to the same owner were considered as connected herds.
Holdings were grouped into four size categories according to the total 
number of  pigs (piglets, weaners, growers, fatteners, gilts, sows and 
boars) in an epidemiological unit: 1–10 pigs (G1); 11–100 pigs (G2); 
101–1000 pigs (G3); > 1000 pigs (G4). G1 holdings were classified as 
backyard or non-commercial farms where pigs were kept mainly for 
domestic consumption. G2, G3 and G4 holdings were classified as 
commercial farms. The herd type was determined as either farrow-to-
finish, multiplier, fattener, or grower based on the information available 
from the NAR. The final database also included the type of  pigs kept on 
a farm (domestic pigs, wild boar or crosses), as well as the location of  
the farm (including the coordinates).
Wild boar surveillance and hunting data. ASF surveillance data for 
wild boar originated from the VFB. This data set covered the period 
from September 2014 until the end of  2017 including date and location 
(coordinates) of  each ASF case in wild boar. For the year 2015, data on 
ASF wild boar cases in northern Latvia were drawn from the Animal 
Diseases Notification System database (ADNS, 2017). 
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We identified the date and location of  the closest wild boar case(s) to 
each outbreak farm, and we recorded the Euclidean distance between 
each affected farm and the closest wild boar case occurring a maximum 
of  one year before the outbreak. This made it possible to characterize 
the infection pressure from wild boar.
Additionally, the Estonian Environment Agency (Nature department) 
provided wild boar hunting data, and data regarding number of  hunters, 
number of  feeding sites and hunting hounds. These data were based 
on regular reports submitted by regional hunting societies to the 
Environmental Board.
4.2. Laboratory analytical methods
In studies I and III, real-time PCR was used for ASFV genome 
detection and was performed according to the protocol published by 
Tignon, et al. (2011). Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) and 
the indirect immunoperoxidase technique (IPT), were both used for 
antibody detection. ELISA tests were performed using a commercially 
available blocking ELISA (Ingezim PPA COMPAC, Ingenasa, Madrid, 
Spain) according to the manufacturer’s instructions. In the case of  an 
inconclusive ELISA result, the sample was retested using the IPT for 
confirmation. For IPT, a protocol provided by the European Union 
Reference Laboratory for ASF was used (CISA-INIA, 2014; Gallardo et 
al., 2015a). All ASF laboratory analyses were conducted at the Estonian 
Veterinary and Food Laboratory, which is the National Reference 
Laboratory for ASF in Estonia. 
In study II, the virus was isolated in PBMC-derived (peripheral blood 
mononuclear cell) macrophages. Blood for the preparation of  cells 
was collected from healthy domestic donor pigs. PBMCs were grown 
according to the standard laboratory protocol. We performed a 
haemadsorption test (HAT) according to a slightly modified standard 
procedure for detecting the virus in serum and tissue samples (Carrascosa 
et al., 2011). 
For viral DNA detection, we extracted viral nucleic acid for qPCR using 
either the QIAamp® RNA Viral Mini Kit (Qiagen) or the NucleoMag 
Vet Kit (MACHEREY NAGEL), and the KingFisher® extraction 
platform (Thermo Scientific). The nucleic acid extraction was performed 
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with 150 µl of  organ homogenate or swab material, and 75 µl of  whole 
blood. Subsequently, we performed qPCR according to the protocol 
published by King et al. (2003) with slight modifications.
For the detection of  antibodies against ASFV we used two commercial 
enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays (Ingezim PPA COMPAC, 
Ingenasa; ID SCREEN African swine fever virus INDIRECT, IDvet). 
Both assays were carried out following the manufacturers’ instructions. 
4.3. Statistical analysis
4.3.1. Study I
We estimated prevalences stratified over time and space and calculated 
and compared odds ratios. Their confidence intervals were calculated 
according to Clopper and Pearson (1935). A p-value of  ≤ 0.05 was 
considered statistically significant. Statistical analyses were conducted in 
R (http://www.r-project.org). 
Using the whole data set we performed a Fisher’s exact test to test for 
statistically significant associations between presumed risk factors and 
positive virological or serological test results for ASF at the animal level. 
Accordingly, the association between age and the laboratory test results 
was evaluated. We attributed animals to the age classes “juvenile” (< 1 
year) and “adult” (> 1 year). Furthermore, we examined associations 
between carcass categories (“hunted” or “found dead”) and laboratory 
test results and analysed the age distribution within the two carcass 
categories (hunted, found dead). 
We tested data for associations between the population density and 
positive ASF laboratory test results. For this purpose we categorized the 
municipalities as the variable of  interest depending on their test results 
(i) 0 = only negative test results within the study period, (ii) 1 = at least 
one positive test result within the study period. We averaged population 
densities over the reported years and assigned to each municipality. For 
analysing this, a Mann-Whitney U test was used.
We examined our hypothesis that the age and carcass-type distribution 
were different between the study areas using a Fisher’s exact test. The 
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same test was used to examine associations between the study areas and 
the virological or serological status of  wild boar.
To test for a temporal and spatial effect within the two study areas, we 
used a hierarchical Bayesian space–time model (Staubach et al., 2002; 
Staubach et al., 2011). However, this model was only applied to examine 
seroprevalence. Variables that we identified as statistically significant 
via univariate analysis we included as fixed effects, whereas space and 
time were treated as random effects. For both study areas we conducted 
separate analyses at the municipality level using BayesX 2.0.1 (http://
www.uni-goettingen.de/de/bayesx/550513.html). To estimate the 
parameters of  the model we applied a Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
algorithm (MCMC). 
4.3.2. Study III
To calculate herd incidences of  ASF we conducted a survival analysis 
in Stata MP14®. Our data set included all pig farms recorded in 
source databases (NAR, VFB) in 2015, 2016 and 2017. For the herds 
in the database, the observation period started from 1st January. 
The observation period lasted either until the end of  the year (right 
censoring), until the day that production ceased (removal of  pigs from 
the farm), or until the outbreak of  ASF occurred. 
We calculated mortality risk (cumulative incidence) for each outbreak 
herd and affected group within the herd for the period including the 
HRP and the timespan from notification to culling. The affected group 
was defined as a physically separated unit in a stable containing one type 
of  pig (sows, fatteners, weaners etc.). 
A Cox proportional-hazard random-effect model was applied to detect 
significant differences in ASF infection hazard across farm types, herd-
size categories and the three study years. In the multivariable model we 
retained variables that were significantly associated with the event of  
interest (p < 0.05). We used Akaike information criterion (AIC) values 
to compare model quality (Dohoo et al., 2009).
We checked the assumption of  proportional hazards by creating log–log 
plots of  survival, and with a statistical test using Schoenfeld residuals 
(Dohoo et al., 2009).
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To assess the association between the occurrence of  ASF cases in wild 
boar and ASF outbreaks in domestic pigs we used a hierarchical Bayesian 
spatio-temporal model (Varewyck et al., 2017). The response variable 
was ‘ASF outbreak in domestic pigs in hunting district’ (set as binary). 
Covariates included by month were as follows: ‘total no. of  ASF-PCR-
positive wild boars’ (from September 2014 to November 2017), and 
‘total no. of  wild boars hunted’ (from March 2015 to November 2017). 
Covariates included by year (2014 to 2017) were as follows: ‘total no. of  
hunters’, ‘total no. of  wild boar feeding sites’, and ‘total no. of  hunting 
hounds’. We chose these last three covariates because we expected 




5.1. Study I. Course of  the ASF epidemic in wild boar 
populations in two affected areas in Estonia 
The observation period of  this study was 25 months (September 2014 – 
September 2016). In total, we used 7,015 data records for analysis. The 
number of  virologically (n = 7,015) and serologically (n = 6,306) tested 
animals is presented in Tables 1 and 2. 
Table 1. Number of  African swine fever virus genome-positive and -negative wild boar 
samples from study areas North and South, and averaged prevalences for different 
time periods 
Areaa Number of  samples
Number 
of  negative 
samples
Number 






95% CI for 
averaged 
prevalence
N 1,174 1,152 22 2.0 1.1–3.0
N1 353 351 2 0.8 0.2–3.5
N2 821 801 20 2.4 1.5–3.7
S 5,841 5,039 802 13.7 12.8–14.6
S1 2,670 2,301 369 13.8 12.5–15.2
S2 3,171 2,738 433 13.7 12.5–14.9
a The study areas and observation periods (N = study area North, N1 = first 12 months 
of  the observation period, N2 = second 13 months of  the observation period; S = 
study area South, S1 = first 12 months of  the observation period, S2 = second 13 
months of  the observation period)
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Table 2. Number of  African swine fever antibody-positive and -negative wild boar 
samples from study areas North and South, and averaged prevalences for different 
time periods
Areaa Number of  samples
Number 
of  negative 
samples
Number 






95% CI for 
averaged 
prevalence
N 1,142 1,098 44 3.9 2.8–5.1
N1 338 313 25 7.4 4.8–10.7
N2 804 785 19 2.4 1.4–3.7
S 5,164 4,977 187 3.6 3.1–4.2
S1 2,315 2,281 34 1.5 1.0–2.0
S2 2,849 2,696 153 5.4 4.6–6.3
a The study areas and observation periods (N = study area North, N1 = first 12 months 
of  the observation period, N2 = second 13 months of  the observation period; S = 
study area South, S1 = first 12 months of  the observation period, S2 = second 13 
months of  the observation period)
5.1.1. Factors influencing the course of  the ASF epidemic in the 
wild boar population 
5.1.1.1. Results of  statistical analysis 
A statistically significant association was found between age and the 
positive laboratory test results for both real-time PCR and serology 
by ELISA/IPT (p < 0.001). The probability of  detecting an ASFV- or 
antibody-positive animal was higher in the group of  young animals (< 1 
year) (real-time PCR: OR = 1.57, 95% CI = 1.35–1.83; serology: OR = 
1.89, 95% CI = 1.45–2.47). In addition, we found a statistically significant 
association (p < 0.001) with regard to the carcass category (hunted or 
found dead). For animals found dead there was a higher probability of  
finding a real-time-PCR- or antibody-positive result (real-time PCR: OR 
= 69.60, 95% CI = 56.89–85.15; serology: OR = 4.53, 95% CI = 2.83–
7.25). We did not detect a statistically significant difference (p = 0.420) 
in the distribution of  the two age classes within carcass categories. There 
were more old animals than young animals in both categories (Figure 6).
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Figure 6. Number of  samples from animals hunted or found dead (carcass categories) 
stratified by age category
We detected a significant association between the wild boar population 
density and the test results regarding both ASFV genome detection and 
serology (real-time PCR: p < 0.001; serology, p = 0.009). In the ASFV-
positive municipalities we found a higher wild boar population density. 
(Figure 7). 
Figure 7. Population density (number of  wild boar/km²) in the municipalities of  the 
study areas stratified by virological and serological test results at the municipality level. 
Ag: African swine fever virus genome detection, Ab: antibody detection
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The age distribution of  sampled animals was similar in both areas (p 
= 0.566) (Figure 8). However, the distribution of  hunted animals and 
wild boar found dead was different (p < 0.001). In area S, there was 
a significantly higher proportion of  animals found dead than in area 
N (Figure 9). In area S, there was, in addition, a significantly higher 
population density compared to area N (p < 0.001) (Figure 10). 
Figure 8. Number of  samples of  juvenile (< 1 year) and adult (> 1 year) animals 
stratified by study area North (N) and South (S)
Figure 9. Number of  samples from animals hunted or found dead (carcass categories) 
stratified by study area North (N) and South (S)
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Figure 10. Population density (number of  wild boar/km2) in the study areas North 
(N) and South (S) 
We found the prevalence of  ASFV-genome-positive wild boar to be 
significantly higher in study area S compared to area N (p < 0.001). 
We did not detect a significant difference in seroprevalence between the 
areas (p = 0.728).
5.1.1.2. Results of  model analysis 
We included carcass category, age and population density as fixed 
effects in the hierarchical Bayesian space–time model, because we 
found a significant association between these factors and the results of  
serological tests using univariable analyses.
In area N, age and population density showed a significant effect on the 
serological test result, but carcass category did not (Table 3). In area S, 
age and carcass category showed a significant effect on the serological 
test result, but population density did not (Table 4).
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Table 3. Parameter estimates obtained from the hierarchical Bayesian space–time 
model for analysed risk factors (carcass category, age, population density) in area North 
Variable Mean SD Median (95% BCI) Mean/SDa
Constant -2.735 0.938 -2.687 (-4.678; -0.842)
Carcass -0.732 1.292 -0.620 (-3.708; 1.424) 0.567
Age 0.737 0.348 0.741 (0.062; 1.394) 2.122
Population 
density -5.713 2.899 -5.573 (-11.841; -0.274) 1.971
DIC (deviance information criterion): 323.82; Deviance: 291.558; pD (posterior 
distribution): 16.135; BCI (Bayesian credible intervals)
a Mean/SD (standard deviation) > 1.96 indicates statistical significance
Table 4. Parameter estimates obtained from the hierarchical Bayesian space–time 
model for analysed risk factors (carcass category, age, population density) in area South 
Variable Mean SD Median (95% BCI) Mean/SDa
Constant -4.370 0.344 -4.371 (-5.081; -3.737)
Carcass 1.533 0.342 1.544 (0.820; 2.100) 4.480
Age 0.580 0.173 0.579 (0.244; 0.924) 3.357
Population 
density 0.443 0.604 0.446 (-0.734; 1.600) 0.733
DIC (deviance information criterion): 1,344.465; Deviance: 1,269.215; pD (posterior 
distribution): 37.625; BCI (Bayesian credible intervals)
a Mean/SD (standard deviation) > 1.96 indicates statistical significance
The sample sizes differed considerably over time among municipalities 
in both study areas (Figures 11 and 12). Spatial analysis confirmed a 
different trend in seroprevalences within study areas. In area N, the 
highest prevalences over the entire observation period were detected 
in one municipality located in the western part of  Ida-Viru County. In 
2015 (data for 12 months), the prevalences were higher in some other 
municipalities located farther east, but in 2014 (data for four months) 
it was not possible to obtain reliable prevalence estimates for these 
municipalities as the sample sizes were too small. In 2016 (data for 
nine months), the infection also spread to municipalities located in the 
southern part of  area N (Figure 11). 
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Figure 11. Seroprevalences and 95% confidence intervals for sampled wild boar per 
municipality in study area North in 2014 (Sept–Dec), 2015 (Jan–Dec) and 2016 (Jan–
Sept) 
In area S, over 25 months, the infection spread within the wild boar 
population. In 2014, we detected high prevalences in some municipalities 
bordering Latvia, during the following years, the disease spread 
northwards and over the entire study area (Figure 12). 
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Figure 12. Seroprevalences and 95% confidence intervals for sampled wild boar per 
municipality in study area South in 2014 (Sept–Dec), 2015 (Jan–Dec) and 2016 (Jan–
Sept)
The spatial analyses showed a clear median spatial effect on the logit 
prevalence per municipality in the northern part of  area N, however, 
in some municipalities we found a negative spatial effect. The wild 
boar population density was higher in the western part of  study area N 
throughout entire observation period (Figure 13).
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Figure 13. Median-structured spatial effect on the logit prevalence per municipality in 
study area North for the observation period of  25 months from 2014 to 2016. Maps 
in the lower row show the population density for each municipality in study area North
In area S, we observed a different infection dynamic between 
municipalities, shown by a structured spatial effect (Figure 14). The 
strongest infection dynamics were found in some municipalities 
bordering Latvia, as well as those located further north (Figure 14). In 
both areas (S and N), we observed a decrease in the wild boar population 
density over time (Figures 13 and 14).
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Figure 14. Median-structured spatial effect on the logit prevalence per municipality in 
study area South for the observation period of  25 months from 2014 to 2016. Maps in 
the lower row show the population density for each municipality in area South
The results of  temporal analyses showed a significant difference in the 
median temporal effect on the logit prevalence between the two study 
areas. In area S, we found a significant increasing trend over the whole 
25-month observation period. In area N, we did not observe a temporal 
effect at all during the observation period (Figure 15). 
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Figure 15. Median temporal effect on the logit seroprevalence in area North (N) and 
in area South (S) for the observation period of  25 months from 2014 to 2016. 95% 
Bayesian credible intervals (BCI) are included
5.2. Study II. Biological characteristics of  the ASF virus strain  
Est 14/WB
5.2.1. Clinical course of  the disease and pathomorphological 
findings in wild boar
During the trial, all ten wild boar inoculated in the first stage of  the 
experiment using the virus strain Est 14/WB developed unspecific 
clinical signs starting from 4 to 6 dpi, including lack of  appetite, general 
depression, respiratory distress and huddling. Between 7 and 13 dpi, 
nine out of  ten inoculated animals showed worsening clinical signs with 
dyspnea and ataxia, and were euthanized in a moribund state or died 
overnight (#16). One remaining wild boar (#19) showed decreasing 
severity of  clinical signs starting approximately 14 dpi and recovered 
completely over the following week.
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Figure 16. Pathological findings observed during necropsy of  acutely, lethally infected 
wild boar following infection with the African swine fever virus strain Est 14/WB. 
(a) Haemorrhagic intestinal lymph nodes and striate bleedings in the gut. (b) Ebony-
coloured, haemorrhagic lymph nodes in the gastrohepatic area. (c) Lung oedema, 
fibrinous pleuritis and haemorrhages. (d) and (e) Petechiae in the kidney. (f) Kidney 
petechiae and infarction (Photos: Sandra Blome)
During necropsy we observed typical ASF lesions in all animals that 
succumbed to infection (Figure 16). Severity of  lesions increased with 
time. Lesions ranged from slight lung oedema and ebony-coloured 
gastrohepatic lymph nodes to multiple haemorrhages in several organs, 
haemorrhagic and oedematous lymph nodes in all parts of  the body 
and severe lung oedema. In addition, we observed infrequent findings 
including renal infarction, gall bladder oedema, arthritis and gastritis.  
The wild boar (#19) that survived infection and recovered completely 
was commingled for the follow-up study with three sentinel pigs at 50 
dpi. Neither sentinels nor survivor developed clinical signs. All animals 
remained in good health until the end of  the trial at 96 dpi. No ASF-
related lesions were observed any of  these animals during necropsy.
5.2.2. Development of  viremia in challenged animals
At 4 dpi, seven out of  ten animals were ASFV-positive in a qPCR from 
the blood, five animals from oropharyngeal swabs, and also five animals 
from faecal swabs (Figure 17). At 7 dpi, all available blood and swab 
samples gave a positive qPCR result (Figure 17). At 10 dpi, all remaining 
animals gave strong positive qPCR results from blood samples (Figure 
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17a), and only one oropharyngeal swab sample (#19) gave any positive 
result, but this was weak (Figure 17b). Samples collected during necropsy 
(spleen, tonsil, lung, salivary gland and lymph nodes) all gave positive 
results in qPCR (see Table 5), and all spleen samples gave positive results 
in HAD tests.
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Figure 17. Detection of  African swine fever genome by qPCR from samples collected 
from animals after inoculation. (a) Blood. (b) Oral swabs. (c) Fecal swabs. Results are 
depicted as cycle quantification (cq) values
During necropsy (at 96 dpi), nine different lymph nodes – mandibular, 
parotideal, lung-associated, renal, gastrohepatic, intestinal (from both 
the large and small intestines), inguinal, popliteal – were collected from 
the survivor (#19) and the sentinel pigs. All collected samples gave 
negative result for the viral genome (in qPCR) and ASF virus (in HAD 
test) (Table 5).
5.2.3. Development of  immune response in challenged animals
During the entire experiment, we found three animals that were 
antibody-positive (#14; #17; #19) and two that showed doubtful results 
(#11; #13); all remaining animals, including sentinels, were found to 
be antibody-negative. A summary of  antibody detection results in both 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.3. Study III. Epidemiological characteristics and risk factors of  
ASF for domestic pigs in Estonia 
5.3.1. Reporting and laboratory findings
ASF was immediately suspected on 12 out of  the 26 outbreak farms, 
while on the other 14 farms the first suspicion was some other disease 
(Table 6). The reason for reporting was sickness (n = 19) or death (n = 
7) of  one or several animals. 
Table 6. First suspicions on 26 African swine fever outbreak farms in Estonia, 2015–
2017





Heat or stress 2
Salmonellosis 1
All outbreaks were confirmed by virus genome detection (PCR). ASF-
virus-specific antibodies were detected in animals on seven farms using 
ELISA. All antibody-positive animals were also PCR-positive. 
The estimated high-risk period varied in time span from seven to 20 days 
with a median of  11 days (Figure 18).
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Figure 18. Length of  estimated high-risk period (the length of  time that African swine 
fever virus may have existed on the farm before it was suspected) on 26 pig farms 
affected by African swine fever in Estonia, 2015–2017
5.3.2. Characteristics of  affected farms
Table 7 shows the number of  outbreaks across farms of  different size 
and type categories. 
Table 7. Distribution of  Estonian African swine fever-positive domestic pig farms 
across herd type and size, 2015–2017










Multiplier 0 0 1 2 3
Farrow-to-finish 1 1 3a 5 10
Fattening 7 0 1 5 13
Total 8 1 5 12 26


























5.3.3. Clinical signs in pigs and virus spread within farms
The first clinical signs in animals were mostly mild and not specific to 
ASF. A severe course of  the disease was recorded on 13 farms, mostly 
after longer circulation of  the virus on the farm. A summary of  recorded 
clinical signs in pigs on affected farms before and after reporting is given 
in Table 8.
Table 8. Clinical symptoms in pigs recorded before and after reporting on 26 African 
swine fever outbreak farms in Estonia, 2015–2017
Clinical manifestation No. of  farms
Loss of  appetite 19
Listlessness 19
Sudden death without prior signs in animal 14







a On six farms, fever was not detected; on 10 farms, temperature was not measured 
b Vomiting (n = 2); decrease in milk yield of  sows (n = 1); diarrhoea (n = 1); blood in 
urine (n = 1)
Table 9 presents the observed mortality estimates. The average mortality 
was lowest in the largest herd-size category (0.7%) and highest in the 
smallest one (29.7%), being strongly dependent on the herd size.
61




(no. of  pigs)
Mortality in the herd
Mortality in the affected 
group
n Average Min Max Average Min Max
G1 (1–10) 8 29.7% 0.0% 100.0%a NA NA NA
G2 (11–100) 1 25.0%b NA NA NA NA NA
G3 (101–1000) 5 7.5% 0.4% 25.0% 13.8% 3.8% 25.0%c
G4 (> 1000) 12 0.7% 0.04% 2.5% 7.2% 0.1% 43.6%d
NA – not applicable as pigs were kept in one group
a Mortality on a backyard farm with one pig 
b At the moment of  outbreak there were four pigs on the farm
c Herd of  126 crosses kept in one group
d Mortality in a group of  39 nursing sows
5.3.4. Probable routes of  virus entry into farms and biosecurity 
level of  the outbreak farms
We found that on all 26 outbreak farms, the virus was most likely 
introduced by some indirect transmission pathway, though we could not 
verify any specific route of  introduction. On all eight non-commercial 
farms that experienced an outbreak we defined the cause of  introduction 
as “lack of/insufficient biosecurity measures”. For commercial herds, 
possible virus introduction pathways were identified more specifically by 
our epidemiology team. The results of  the analysis are shown in Table 
10.  
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Table 10. Most probable pathways of  African swine fever virus introduction to 
commercial pig farms (n = 18) in Estonia, 2015–2017




G3          
(101–1000)
G4         
(> 1000) Total
Multiple errors in execution of  
biosecurity procedures (introduction 
by fomites) 1 0 4 5
Inadequate disinfection of  vehicles 0 0 2 2
Minor errors in execution of  
biosecurity procedures (introduction 
by fomites) 0 0 2 2
Movement of  people or vehicles 
from an infected farm (secondary 
outbreak) 0 1 1 2
Contamination of  cereal feed during 
storage or processing 0 3 2 5
Feeding of  grass 0 1 0 1
Contamination of  bedding material 0 0 1 1
Total 1 5 12 18
 
From the presented data, it appears that on the majority of  commercial 
farms (n = 11), the virus was most likely introduced via contaminated 
fomites (people, vehicles, tools) as a result of  errors in the execution 
of  biosecurity procedures. The biosecurity levels of  all outbreak farms 
across different herd-size categories are presented in Table 11. 
Table 11. Biosecurity levels of  Estonian African swine fever outbreak farms according 
to herd size, 2015–2017
Herd-size
category (no. of  pigs)













G3 (101–1000) 0 0 1 0 4
G4 (> 1000) 2 1 6 2 1
Total 2 1 7 3 13
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5.3.5. Incidence of  ASF outbreaks in pig herds
Tables 12 and 13 present the data on the occurrence of  ASF outbreaks, 
as well as the cumulative herd incidence (presented as outbreak risk 
estimates), for the years 2015 and 2016 by farm size and type categories. 
In 2017, all outbreaks occurred in large commercial (G4) herds (outbreak 
risk = 4.5%, 95% CI 1.5-12.4). The overall outbreak risk in 2017 for all 
herd-size categories was 2.0% (95% CI 0.7-5.6). 
Table 12. Number of  African swine fever outbreaks and cumulative herd incidence 


























finish 13/ 0 44/ 1 22/ 3 31/ 3 110/ 7
6.4%
(3.1–12.6)
Fattening 456/ 4 39/ 0 13/ 1 46/ 2 556/ 7
1.3%
(0.6–2.6)
















Number of  pigs: G1 (1–10); G2 (11–100); G3 (101–1000); G4 (> 1000)
CI- confidence intervals
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Table 13. Number of  African swine fever outbreaks and cumulative herd incidence 
(outbreak risk) for different farm types and herd-size categories in 2016 
Production 
type






















finish 6/ 1 24/ 0 17/ 0 28/ 1 75/ 2
2.7%
(0.7–9.2)
Fattening 80/ 3 21/ 0 11/ 0 40/ 1 152/ 4
2.6%
(1.0–6.6)
















Number of  pigs: G1 (1–10); G2 (11–100); G3 (101–1000); G4 (> 1000)
NC-not calculated; CI- confidence intervals
The total herd-incidence rates obtained from survival analysis are 
presented for the whole three-year period, as well as per year, in Table 
14.   
Table 14. The herd-incidence rates of  African swine fever outbreaks among domestic 
pig herds in Estonia for the years 2015–2017 
Year
No. of  
outbreaks








2015 17 646.7 2.6 1.6–4.2
2016 6 229.8 2.6 1.2–5.8
2017 3 140.2 2.1 0.7–6.6
2015–2017 26 1,016.7 2.6 1.7–3.8
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The overall yearly incidence rates did not differ significantly (p > 0.05) 
from each other.
The final Cox proportional-hazard random-effect model included 
county as a random variable and the only evaluated variable was ‘herd-
size category’. Larger herds (G3, G4) had a significantly higher risk of  
becoming infected with the ASF virus, compared to the two smaller 
herd-size categories (G1, G2) (Table 15).
Table 15. Results of  the Cox proportional-hazard random-effect model showing the 
effect of  herd size on the incidence of  African swine fever outbreaks in Estonian 
domestic pig herds for the period 2015–2017. ‘County’ was included as a random 
variable
Herd-size category 
(no. of  pigs)
Na





P 95% Confidence 
interval for HR
G1 (1–10) 607 (8) 1 X X
G2 (11–100) 185 (1) 0.36 0.342 0.05–2.92
G3 (101–1000) 90 (5) 4.22 0.013 1.36–13.14
G4 (> 1000) 220 (12) 4.31 0.002 1.72–10.80
Wald Chi squared = 14.71 (p = 0.002)
a Number of  herds after splitting the observation period into three years
5.3.6. Spatial and temporal distribution of  outbreak farms
The geographical locations of  outbreak farms changed during the period 
2015–2017. As shown in Figure 19, domestic pig outbreaks appeared in 
those areas where ASF virus was circulating actively in the wild boar 
population.
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Figure 19. Location of  African swine fever domestic pig outbreak farms and virus-
positive wild boar cases in Estonia in 2015, 2016 and 2017
The distances between the outbreak farm and their nearest case of  ASF 
in wild boar no more than a year before an outbreak are presented in 
Figure 20. 
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Figure 20. The distance between domestic pig outbreak farm and the closest tested 
African swine fever-positive wild boar case no more than a year before the outbreak 
in Estonia, 2015–2017
Each year, all ASF outbreaks were seen in the warm summer period, 











































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 21. Occurrence of  African swine fever outbreaks in Estonia from June 2015 
to September 2017
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5.3.7. Results of  the hierarchical Bayesian spatio-temporal 
analysis
The results of  the Bayesian model analysis indicate a significant positive 
association with the total number of  ASF-positive wild boars detected 
per month in a hunting district. The total number of  feeding sites, 
hunted wild boar, number of  hunters and hunting hounds in a hunting 
district were not significantly associated with outbreaks in domestic pigs 
(Table 16).
Table 16. Fixed estimated parameters of  the hierarchical Bayesian spatio-temporal 
model on a natural logarithmic scale
Prediction interval (quantile)
Variable Mean SD 2.5% 50% 97.5%
Intercept -6.775 0.41 -7.598 -6.764 -6.012
No. of  wild boar 
hunted (monthly)
-0.024 0.026 -0.081 -0.022 0.022
No of  ASF-PCR-
positive wild boar 
detected (monthly)
0.132a,b 0.058 0.002 0.138 0.230
No. of  hunters in a 
district (yearly)
0.012 0.009 -0.006 0.012 0.029
No. of  feeding sites 
(yearly)
0.015 0.024 -0.036 0.016 0.058
No. of  hunting hounds 
(yearly)
0.015 0.067 -0.122 0.017 0.141
a Prediction intervals in bold indicate statistically significant parameter
b Mean effect of  African swine fever-positive wild boar detection in a hunting district 
on the occurrence of  a domestic pig outbreak on the territory of  a hunting district was 
estimated to be 0.132. This means that for a one unit increase in African swine fever-
positive wild boar detection, the log odds of  having a domestic pig outbreak increases 




Up to the year 2014, when ASF reached EU member states, it was widely 
assumed that the reservoir of  ASFV in Eastern Europe was the domestic 
pig sector and that wild boar played only a secondary role (Laddomada 
et al., 1994; Mur et al., 2012; FAO, 2013; Oganesyan et al., 2013; Sánchez-
Vizcaíno et al., 2013; EFSA, 2014). Already within the first year of  the 
ASF epidemic in Estonia, there was enough field evidence suggesting 
that the role of  wild boar was much more substantial compared to 
previously affected areas. In addition, the course of  the epidemic in wild 
boar appears to differ markedly in different European regions as well 
as within the countries. In relation to domestic pig outbreaks, on our 
medium size and large commercial farms we observed low or very low 
mortality as well as low contagiousity, both of  which were in contrast 
with previous reports (Sánchez-Vizcaíno et al., 2009; Costard et al., 
2013). To fill some knowledge gaps related to the epidemiology of  ASF 
in both wild boar as well as domestic pigs these extensive studies were 
conducted. The intention was to collect scientific evidence and provide 
new knowledge for the international researcher’s community and EU 
decision makers. 
6.1. Differences between the areas regarding the course of  the 
epidemic
The first ASF-positive wild boar in Estonia was found dead on 02. 
September 2014 in Valga County near the Latvian border. A week 
later, the virus was detected in wild boar in Viljandi County, bordering 
both Valga County and Latvia. The wild boar cases found close to the 
southern border of  Estonia were most likely epidemiologically linked 
with the epidemic in northern Latvia, where circulation of  the virus had 
been confirmed several weeks before (Olševskis et al., 2016). On 14. 
September 2014, an ASF-positive wild boar was found in the north-east 
of  Estonia (Ida-Viru County) not far from the border with the Russian 
Federation, in an area more than 200 km away from the affected area in 
the south. 
During the first year of  the ASF epidemic in Estonia (2014-2015) the 
observed epidemiological characteristics (e.g. mortality, case fatality, etc.) 
in the wild boar population apparently varied considerably between the 
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infected areas. In the southern affected area, high mortality (up to 16 dead 
animals found in one place) was reported and mainly ASF-virus positive 
animals were found. In the north-eastern affected area, mortality among 
wild boar was low or almost non-existent, and among hunted wild boar, 
clinically healthy, antibody-positive animals were found. Detection of  
ASF-virus or viral genome in the north-eastern area was rare. Moreover, 
the spread of  the disease in the southern area appeared to be more rapid 
compared to in the north-east, where the infection seemed to remain 
within one area. 
The results of  analyses support the field observations. We found that 
in the south the proportion of  the sampled wild boar found dead was 
significantly higher compared to the north-east. In addition, in the south, 
there was a significantly higher ASFV genome prevalence and higher 
chance of  animals being detected as ASFV-genome-positive. 
The Bayesian model was applied only to analyse serology, as the virus is 
detectable only over a limited period of  time (Gallardo et al., 2015d) and 
because no measurable memory effect was available. A trend analysis 
was not feasible with regard to the results of  ASFV genome detection.  
Despite the fact that we adjusted space and time data for the model, 
the results we obtained using the univariable analyses and Bayesian 
modelling differed only slightly. Also, for the univariable analyses, 
we used the whole data set independently of  the study area, whereas 
for the Bayesian model we analysed the data for area North and area 
South separately. Still, we were able to confirm a significant association 
between age and serological result in both areas. In area South, we 
found a significant association between carcass category (found dead or 
hunted) and serology, which might be due to the higher relative number 
of  animals found dead in the area. In area North, population density 
showed a significant effect on seroprevalence, but not in area South. 
This may be explained by the larger size of  area South compared to area 
North and the associated heterogeneity of  the population densities in 
the municipalities.
The spatial effect on the logit prevalence indicates a difference between 
the courses of  the epidemics in the study areas. In area North the 
infection seemed to be stable in one limited area. In area South, in 2014, 
the prevalences were high in the areas bordering Latvia and the infection 
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seemed to move over time to the north. The spread of  the virus in area 
South was most probably supported by the higher population density of  
wild boar, which made a higher transmission rate likely (Depner et al., 
2016). The findings of  the spatial analysis also support the hypothesis 
that the infection was already present in area North for a longer period 
of  time, whereas it was still spreading in area South at the time that the 
study was conducted. 
The average seroprevalence did not differ significantly between the 
areas over the study period of  25 months; however, the result of  the 
temporal trend analysis showed a significant difference in the course of  
infection. In area South we observed an increase in the temporal logit 
prevalence, which led us to assume that ASF was newly introduced into 
the area, naive animals became infected, and the proportion of  animals 
developing antibodies subsequently grew. By contrast, in area North 
we could not see a temporal effect. Our assumptions were supported 
by the results of  the descriptive analyses. In area South, the average 
seroprevalence showed an increase over time, whereas in area North, 
the average prevalence of  antibody-positive wild boar was even lower 
in the second part of  the study period. We therefore hypothesized that 
the infection may have been present in area North for a longer time, and 
it could have been there even before the first case of  the disease was 
officially confirmed in the country. This hypothesis is supported by the 
fact that in the neighbouring St. Petersburg area (Russian Federation) 
several outbreaks of  ASF had occurred between 2009 and 2012 (FAO, 
2013). Furthermore, the very small sample sizes at the beginning of  the 
epidemic (September 2014) and in the period before ASF was officially 
detected in Estonia (2012–2014) made earlier detection of  the disease 
virtually impossible. So, if  an undetected epidemic had started in the 
north-east of  Estonia earlier, this may explain the different courses of  
the epidemics in the north-east and in the south. However, in both study 
areas, the small sample sizes have to be considered when interpreting the 
results.
In the follow-up study, the course of  the ASF epidemic in the Estonian 
wild boar population over 44 months was analysed. This study included 
an additional 22 months (October 2016–July 2018), as well as a larger 
affected area (nine additional counties). The result of  this study 
demonstrated the decrease in temporal logit antibody prevalences in 
those areas that were affected shortly after the start of  the epidemic. 
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At the same time, in those areas that were affected in the later stages of  
the epidemic, we were able to observe an increase in antibody-positive 
wild boar (Schulz et al., 2019a). Thus, in the first three to four years of  
the ASF epidemic we observed an increasing prevalence of  antibody-
positive wild boar, and subsequently this started to decrease, suggesting 
a decrease in the amount of  ASF virus circulating. As of  now (23. June 
2020), the most recent ASFV-positive wild boar in Estonia was found in 
February 2019, and from August 2018 to February 2020 the decrease in 
antibody prevalence in wild boar continued across the country (Schulz 
et al., 2020).
6.2. Factors influencing the course of  the epidemic in wild boar
We found that the probability of  detecting an ASF-positive animal (both 
genome- or antibody-positive) was higher in the young age group of  
wild boar. This finding was in contrast to results of  several experimental 
studies where no age-dependency for infection was observed (Blome et 
al., 2012; Pietschmann et al., 2015; Zani et al., 2018; Pikalo et al., 2020). 
However, as the field results from Latvia correlate with Estonian findings 
(Schulz et al., 2019b; Olševskis et al., 2020), this may suggest that despite 
no age-dependency of  infection the chance of  becoming infected is 
higher in young wild boar. Young animals need more food for rapid 
growth, and therefore they are probably more attracted to carcasses 
(including infected ones) as well as to feeding sites in the habitat, which 
might be contaminated. Probst et al. (2017) describe wild boar having a 
significantly higher interest in approaching carcasses of  dead wild boar 
during the summer period because young animals have a higher need for 
protein-rich food to help growth. Since, in this period, young animals 
still live in the same group together with sows, the infection can easily 
be transmitted within the group. The second explanation may be that 
in the summer period the size and density of  the wild boar population 
is at its highest, which support contact between animals, spread of  the 
virus and mortality. Cukor et al. (2020) conducted a carcass experiment 
in the Czech Republic during the winter period. They observed that wild 
boar had direct contact with the carcass in 81% of  all recorded visits 
and cannibalism was recorded in 9.6% of  all recorded visits. An age-
dependency of  wild boar approaching the carcasses was not detected. 
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The age distribution of  hunted wild boar was the same in both study 
areas. This similar structure of  hunted animals may be the result of  
similar hunting practices in use all over the country. 
There was a higher probability of  finding ASF-positive wild boar found 
dead than hunted. This finding is in accordance with later results from 
other affected EU countries (Schulz et al., 2019b; Frant et al., 2020; 
Mačiulskis et al., 2020; EFSA, 2020; Olševskis et al., 2020). This is 
probably because of  the high virulence of  circulating virus strains and 
high lethality of  ASF. Such a strong association between animals found 
dead and a positive ASF result emphasizes the importance of  passive 
surveillance (Schulz et al., 2017; EFSA, 2020), which includes rapid 
finding of  carcasses and immediate disposal of  them. This is crucial and 
one of  the most effective measures for successful eradication of  ASF in 
the wild boar population.
Most experts agree that a low population density of  wild boar reduces 
the risk of  ASF spread (Smietanka et al., 2016; Jurado et al., 2018; EFSA, 
2018; Mur et al., 2018; Podgórski et al., 2019). Our study demonstrates 
a positive association between population density of  wild boar and 
the municipality status regarding ASF (by ASFV genome detection or 
serology). Direct contact between animals promotes the transmission 
of  the virus (Gallardo et al., 2015d; Depner et al., 2016; Guinat et al., 
2016). Thus, it can be assumed that in densely populated areas contact 
between wild boar is more frequent, the transmission rate is higher, and 
this supports the spread of  the virus. 
6.3. Characteristics of  circulating virus strains 
The ASF virus strains circulating in Eastern Europe since 2007 are of  
genotype II and in experimental conditions have shown mostly high 
virulence for both domestic pigs and European wild boar (Gabriel et al., 
2011; Blome et al., 2012; Guinat et al., 2014; Vlasova et al., 2014; Gallardo 
et al., 2015b; Pietschmann et al., 2015; Olesen et al., 2017; Pikalo et al., 
2020). This means, under field conditions, high mortality and obvious 
clinical signs can be expected as the virus enters a disease-free area. 
Interestingly, as described earlier (section 6.1), during the real epidemic 
situation, there was almost no mortality in wild boar in the north-eastern 
part of  Estonia. This led to the hypothesis of  circulation of  an attenuated 
virus strain in the area. To clarify how virulent the local virus strain (Est 
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14/WB) isolated from an infected wild boar in Ida-Viru County was, an 
animal experiment was conducted. The results demonstrated that this 
ASFV strain was still highly virulent for young wild boar; nevertheless, 
one animal recovered completely. While we compared some parameters 
with previous experimental studies (Gabriel et al., 2011; Blome et al., 
2012; Pietschmann et al., 2015; Tauscher et al., 2015), we found genome 
loads to be slightly lower and detectable antibody responses to be more 
frequent. However, these differences could also be due to variability in 
extraction methods and slight differences between PCR machines. The 
clinical course of  infection and the pathomorphological signs did not 
differ for the animals that succumbed to infection. 
6.4. Contagiousness and transmission of  the virus 
The virological data collected during the experiment indicated that at 
least one animal (#17) became infected later. This suggests that oral 
infection can be error prone and therefore needs a quite high dose for 
infection. Based on previously reported data, virus titres > 104 HAU are 
usually necessary for oral infection and the ratio of  viral titres needed 
for infection of  a susceptible animal via the intramuscular/intravenous 
inoculation versus the oral/nasal route is 1:140.000, with less than 1 HAU 
for the parenteral route (McVicar, 1984). The fact that for oral infection 
a relatively high dose of  the virus is needed might explain why the natural 
spread of  the epidemic in Europe is rather slow (EFSA, 2017; Niine et 
al., 2019). One supporting factor for the slow spread of  the disease may 
also be moderate or low contagiousity of  the disease, which has been 
described in some experiments (Pietschmann, et al., 2015) and in the 
field (Lamberga et al., 2018).
Recovery and survival of  one infected animal gave the opportunity to 
study the long-term fate of  recovered animals and clarify their potential 
role in transmission of  the virus on a limited scale. Prior to the current 
study, reliable data were missing regarding this issue. It was widely 
supposed that survived animals might remain as virus carriers (Bech-
Nielsen et al., 1993; Sanchez-Vizcaıno et al., 2012; Gallardo et al., 2019b) 
and so contribute to the long-term persistence of  ASF in a region. The 
results of  the experimental study did not confirm this hypothesis. The 
survivor did not shed the virus, and did not transmit this to sentinels, 
even under conditions with low-intensity hierarchical fights upon 
introduction of  new animals. Thus, carrier status is not guaranteed for 
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all surviving animals, as also concluded in a recent, thorough review 
(Stahl et al., 2019).
6.5. Virulence of  the virus
The results of  the animal experiment did not explain why the disease 
dynamics differ between defined regions in Estonia. Moreover, no 
evidence of  attenuation of  the virus strain was found. However, 
subsequent animal trials using the same virus strain (Est 14/WB) for the 
infection of  mini pigs and domestic pigs have demonstrated a less severe 
course of  the disease (Zani et al., 2018). Both domestic pigs and mini 
pigs showed mostly mild and non-specific clinical signs characteristic of  
a subacute or chronic form of  the disease. In that study, all five domestic 
pigs and 13 mini pigs included in the trials recovered from the disease 
completely. Furthermore, based on the sequence data of  the viral genome, 
we were able to report the discovery of  the first attenuated genotype 
II ASFV strain (Est 14/WB) circulating in eastern Europe, starting 
from 2007 (Zani et al., 2018). The second attenuated genotype II ASFV 
strain (Lv17/WB-Rie1) in Europe (which was also non-haemadsorbing) 
was isolated from hunted wild boar in Latvia in 2017 (Gallardo et al., 
2019a). The Latvian strain caused chronic or unspecific clinical signs in 
two inoculated pigs, which did not lead to death of  the animals; in two 
other in-contact pigs mild clinical symptoms appeared, and in two more 
in-contact pigs no detectable clinical symptoms developed (Gallardo et 
al., 2019a).  
In 2015 and 2016, in different regions in Estonia (Figure 22), three 
additional moderately virulent genotype II ASFV strains were isolated 
from wild boar (Est15/WB-Valga-6; Est15/WB-Tartu-14; Est16/
WB-Viru-8) (Gallardo et al., 2018a; Gallardo et al., 2018b). The recorded 
mortality rate in all these experiments was 66.7%; however, survivors 
were recorded only within groups of  in-contact pigs. Pershin et al. (2019) 
recently reported a probable change in the virulence of  ASFV strains in 
the Russian Federation. This comprehensive paper summarizes the results 
of  15 experimental infections of  pigs with various Russian genotype II 
ASFV strains isolated the period 2013–2018. In five out of  15 challenge 
experiments there were survivors and the reported mortality under 
100% (50–90%). Similar results are reported from Poland (Walczak et al., 
2020), where different parameters of  the disease were investigated and 
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it was found that the same virus strain (Pol18_28298_O111) may cause 
various clinical forms of  ASF (acute, subacute, chronic).
Figure 22. Locations where moderately virulent and attenuated African swine fever 
virus strains isolated from wild boar in Estonia and Latvia were found (2014–2017)
In summary, based on the results of  these experimental studies, we can 
assume that changes in the virulence of  the virus strains of  genotype 
II are not as rare as previously expected. Reduction in the virulence 
of  the virus is an important event, since virus strains with moderate 
or low virulence, or attenuated strains may induce less severe forms 
of  the disease. Circulation of  such strains may cause a decrease in 
mortality and may lead to hidden circulation of  the virus in the wild boar 
population, as well as in domestic pig herds. However, it is also possible 
that such virus strains just die out naturally as has recently occurred with 
two Estonian ASFV strains (Est14/WB; Est15/WB-Tartu-14), which 
circulated regionally for only a limited time and then disappeared (data 
not published). Thus, we may conclude that virulent strains of  ASFV are 
probably more viable, especially if  there are enough susceptible animals 
in the region. 
Furthermore, such an endemic situation may also require a different 
approach to ASF surveillance. From the perspective of  early detection, 
the most important tool for detection of  ASF is virus genome detection 
(by PCR). The presence of  antibodies is a good marker in the later stage 
of  epidemics, especially in case of  subacute or chronic infection. So 
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parallel testing of  samples to detect both the virus genome (PCR) and 
antibodies (ELISA, IPT, IB) should become the norm. 
6.6. Detection of  the disease on farms
ASF occurrence on domestic pig farms was generally reported at a 
relatively early stage of  an outbreak in Estonia. This can be concluded 
based on the fact that the spread of  the disease within farms was limited, 
and seroconverting (antibody-ELISA-positive) animals were found only 
on 27% of  outbreak farms. Since all antibody-positive animals were also 
PCR-positive, this indicates that the virus should not have been present 
in the herd for more than four weeks (Gallardo et al., 2018a; Petrov et al., 
2018; Zani et al., 2018). 
One reason for early reporting may be the relatively high awareness 
of  farm owners regarding ASF. Furthermore, it is the habit of  animal 
owners to involve veterinarians in the case of  morbidity or mortality of  
animals. Estimated mortality was generally low in the two largest farm-
size categories (medium-size and large commercial farms), at both herd 
and production-unit levels. However, this finding does not support early 
detection of  an outbreak. In larger herds, the monitoring of  general 
mortality is not sufficient for early detection of  an ASF outbreak. In 
smaller farm-size categories (backyard and small commercial farms), the 
average mortality was considerably higher, as every death of  an animal 
influenced the mortality estimate substantially. However, we have to take 
into account that the estimates of  mortality reported here are arbitrary 
because the time periods during which mortality for every affected herd 
was calculated differed considerably (reporting 0–14 days from first 
symptoms, culling 1–3 days after reporting). At the same time, case 
fatality rate was considered high in all farm-size categories, as most of  
the affected pigs died 1 to 5 days after the appearance of  the first clinical 
signs. Thus, we may conclude that an ASF epidemic can result in high 
mortality if  there is enough time for the virus to spread within the herd. 
6.7. Farms at risk
Outbreaks were confirmed in herds of  all size categories and production 
types. However, we observed a tendency for more outbreaks to occur 
in herds with breeding animals. We can assume differences in the 
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management of  breeding animals compared to growers and fatteners, 
and presume that breeding animals need more interaction with humans. 
In addition, pregnant and nursing sows may be more susceptible to the 
virus due to immune suppression, and thus lower doses of  the virus 
might be able to initiate the infection. Although Latvia has reported a 
small number of  outbreaks on large commercial farms, at least two of  
them started in a unit of  breading sows (Lamberga et al., 2018; Lamberga 
et al., 2020). 
The number of  ASF outbreaks in commercial herds exceeded the 
number of  outbreaks on backyard farms in Estonia. This may indicate 
that large commercial farms are more exposed to the virus due to more 
frequent and intensive contact with the external environment through 
movement of  vehicles and people. The higher number of  outbreaks on 
commercial farms can also be explained by the rapid reduction in the 
number of  backyard pig holdings in Estonia, which dropped from 696 
in 2014, to 25 by 2017 and resulted from strict biosecurity requirements, 
which are equal for all pig farms. The latest information from other 
affected European countries does not support our finding that large 
commercial farms are more exposed. Although, the large commercial 
farms in other European countries suffer outbreaks (Lamberga et al., 
2018; EFSA, 2020; Anonymous, 2020; OIE WAHID, 2020), it seems 
that backyard farms are more exposed to virus introduction (FAO, 2013; 
Olševskis et al., 2016; Lamberga et al., 2018; Zani et al., 2019; EFSA, 2020; 
OIE WAHID, 2020). However, so far, a complete overview regarding 
this issue is missing. 
6.8. Clinical course of  the disease and spread of  the virus on 
farms
On outbreak farms, we often found ASF cases with mild clinical 
signs. Severe clinical signs (apart from sudden death), including the 
haemorrhagic form of  the disease, were seldom observed and often 
limited to a few animals only. This might be result of  the relatively early 
detection of  outbreaks. A severe clinical course and higher morbidity 
were seen in pregnant or nursing sows, or where the virus had been 
circulating for longer on a farm. In 2018, Lamberga et al. described 
similar findings on a Latvian large breeding farm. Mild and non-specific 
clinical signs at the beginning of  an outbreak could also be one reason 
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why diseases other than ASF were suspected at first in more than half  
of  the outbreak herds in Estonia. 
We observed that the spread of  the virus within outbreak farms was 
generally slow. In most affected farms, the infection was detected only 
in one unit or even in one pen, and in affected pens some pigs were 
still ASFV-negative at the time of  reporting. Previous studies have 
shown that the stability of  the virus is found to be higher in protein-rich 
materials (e.g. in blood or in a carcass) when compared to other materials 
such as urine, faeces, and various other secretions and excretions. High 
viral load is always detected in blood from infected pigs (Gabriel et al., 
2011; Carvalho Ferreira et al., 2012; Guinat et al., 2014; Gallardo et al., 
2015b; Olesen et al., 2017). Viral load in swab samples (incl. nasal, oral, 
conjunctival, urogenital) have been reported to be considerably lower 
than those detected in blood (Greig & Plowright, 1970; Gabriel et al., 
2011; Carvalho Ferreira et al., 2012; Blome et al., 2013; Guinat et al., 
2014; Olesen et al., 2017; Walczak et al., 2020). Lower virus load is also 
observed for urine and faeces, and the excretion of  the virus in urine and 
faeces is reported to be inconsistent (Greig & Plowright, 1970; Gabriel 
et al., 2011; Davies et al., 2017; Walczak et al., 2020). These findings 
may explain why the spread of  the virus within a pen or unit can be 
rather slow. Until some infected animals start to show clinical signs with 
bleeding or they die, the amount of  the virus in the pen environment 
may not be high enough to infect healthy animals. It has been shown 
that in an epidemiological situation without tick involvement, direct 
parenteral inoculation is rather unlikely, and for oral infection, virus 
titres > 104 HAU are usually needed (Petrov et al., 2018); in addition, 
low-dose ASFV infections may lead to prolonged incubation times and 
altered clinical courses (Pietschmann et al., 2015). Slow spread of  the 
virus on farms has also been reported for Latvian outbreaks (Olševskis 
et al., 2016; Lamberga et al., 2018; Lamberga et al., 2020).
6.9. Introduction of  the virus to farms
The introduction of  the virus to outbreak farms is likely to have occurred 
mainly by indirect transmission routes. Direct contact with potentially 
infected wild boar could not be completely excluded in two outbreak 
farms in our investigation (an organic farm using a single fence with 
a walking area connected to the barn, and an outdoor farm of  crosses 
80
with double fencing). However, even in these cases, we considered direct 
contact unlikely as no direct evidence of  damage to the fences was found. 
Feeding of  contaminated swill has often been considered as one of  the 
main risk factors for indirect transmission of  ASF (Mur et al., 2012; FAO, 
2013; Gogin et al., 2013; FAO, 2013; Oganesyan et al., 2013; Sánchez-
Vizcaíno et al., 2013; Olševskis et al., 2016; Kolbasov et al., 2018). In 
Estonia, feeding of  swill to pigs is illegal. We excluded this transmission 
route for all affected commercial farms. On backyard farms, the feeding 
of  kitchen leftovers could not be completely excluded. However, we 
did not consider swill feeding as the main possible route of  virus 
introduction, as meat from pigs on these farms is mainly consumed by 
the owners. Introduction of  the virus with purchased meat products 
from local shops would assume hidden circulation of  the virus in 
Estonia or contamination of  imported products. We also considered 
this scenario unlikely. Furthermore, according to interview results, none 
of  the farmers or farm workers had contact with affected countries. 
One other possible source of  infection could have been contaminated 
wild boar meat, the uncontrolled consumption of  which we cannot 
completely exclude. However, most likely, the virus entered affected 
herds by means of  contaminated fomites – vehicles, clothing, feed and 
bedding – due to inadequate biosecurity measures on farms or errors in 
the implementation of  these measures. 
Our analysis showed that in most cases there was no single obvious 
event that could link the introduction of  the virus to a farm. On most 
affected backyard farms, there were several biosecurity inadequacies at 
the time of  virus entry (e.g. no separation of  inside and outside zones, 
lack of  functional disinfection barriers, feeding grass to pigs, pet access 
or housing other farm animals together with pigs, unsafe storage of  
feed and bedding material etc.). Therefore, it is difficult to single out one 
particular cause. On commercial farms, which followed relatively high 
biosecurity protocols, the route of  virus introduction was also difficult 
to trace. Apparently, minor errors in the implementation of  (generally 
adequate) biosecurity procedures must have led to the introduction of  
the virus.
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6.10. Biosecurity on farms
The majority of  outbreaks occurred on farms operating at a low 
biosecurity level. Based on available data, we could not estimate whether 
herds with low biosecurity were at higher risk or not as we did not have 
information about the distribution of  biosecurity levels for all farms. 
However, assuming that the biosecurity level is higher on commercial 
farms than on backyard farms, our data on herd incidence do not 
support the general opinion that a higher biosecurity level per se ensures 
a lower risk of  ASF introduction. This may mean that the biosecurity 
measures applied so far (disinfection and physical barriers) are not fully 
effective against the incursion of  ASF infections (Anonymous, 2014). 
Furthermore, based on the results of  our study we may assume that the 
risk of  herds becoming infected depends on the size of  the farm. Thus, 
it may be relevant in future to evaluate the efficiency of  biosecurity 
measures taking into account the size of  the farm. However, even farms 
operating at a high or very high biosecurity level are depending on 
the human factor, which, to some extent, is not fully predictable. ASF 
is mostly a long-lasting epidemic, which is a challenge for each farm 
owner and worker. Based on field observations, we can still assume that 
a high biosecurity level is the most important tool for preventing ASF 
introduction to a farm (Bellini et al., 2016).  
6.11. Incidence of  ASF outbreaks in pig herds
We observed significantly higher herd incidence risk in the group of  
commercial farms in the years 2015 and 2017, whereas in 2016 it did not 
differ significantly from the incidence risk on non-commercial (backyard) 
farms. Since the herd incidence estimates are dependent on the accuracy 
of  reporting, this led us question whether the reporting in the group of  
backyard farms was as good as for commercial farms. Considering the 
general socio-cultural background and the usual habits of  smallholders 
to invite a veterinarian to check diseased animals, we assumed only a 
slightly lower level of  reporting within backyard herds compared to 
commercial farms. Furthermore, surveillance data (PCR and serological 
testing) of  herds located in restriction zones did not reveal any case of  
undetected infection in domestic pigs (data not shown). 
The herd incidence risk in commercial herds (all size groups) decreased in 
2016 and 2017 compared to 2015. This is probably due to improvements 
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in biosecurity measures on farms, as well as more stringent surveillance 
by the veterinary authorities regarding the fulfilment of  the legal 
biosecurity requirements. However, the small number of  outbreaks 
has to be taken into account as a limitation in interpreting these results. 
Interestingly, in the period 2015–2017, the total herd incidence across all 
herd groups did not change significantly. 
6.12. Infection pressure from wild boar
The majority of  outbreaks in Estonia were confirmed in areas where 
ASF had been found in wild boar prior to detection of  the virus in 
domestic pigs. In 23 out of  26 outbreaks, the virus had been circulating 
among wild boar within a radius of  15 km from the affected farm, and 
in 16 outbreaks, within a radius of  5 km. The results of  spatio-temporal 
analysis indicate that the occurrence of  outbreaks in domestic pigs was 
associated with the intensity of  the infection in the wild boar population. 
The outbreaks occurred in areas where more virus-positive (detected 
by PCR) cases were registered in wild boar prior to the outbreak. At 
the same time, we did not find a significant association of  outbreaks 
in domestic pigs with hunting intensity, which can be explained by the 
minimal interaction between hunters and pig producers. A similar trend 
was also observed in Latvia in 2014 where all 32 outbreaks in domestic 
pigs were detected in areas where ASF was present in the wild boar 
population (Olševskis et al., 2016).
6.13. Seasonality 
All outbreaks in Estonia occurred in the warmest period of  the year, 
from June to September (81% in July and August). A similar seasonal 
trend has also been reported by Latvia and other EU countries (Olševskis 
et al., 2016; EFSA, 2020). One explanation for this could be the more 
frequent contact between farms (both people and vehicles) and the 
surrounding environment at this time of  year because of  the seasonal 
nature of  field work. The high-risk period for introduction of  the virus 
to domestic pig farms coincides with the harvest and field work period; 
this is also the period when wild boar move to feed in the fields. In 
addition, this is the period when the wild boar density is highest (period 
after breeding season) and the number of  infected wild boar is also at its 
highest level, which represents infection pressure. Thus, all these factors 
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may increase the probability of  transmission of  the virus to the farm via 
contaminated fomites. 
The high season of  ASF outbreaks also coincides with the high season 
of  blood-sucking insects in Estonia. This might suggest that they 
have a potential role in the transmission of  the virus from wild boar 
to domestic pigs. However, there is still not enough scientific evidence 
regarding the capacity of  mechanical insect vectors to transmit the ASF 
virus. Besides, if  this would have been an important transmission route, 
many more outbreaks should have been expected in domestic pig herds, 
and a faster spread of  infection within affected herds should also have 
been expected. Nevertheless, the role of  insect vectors in transmission 
of  the virus is still not clear and needs further investigation.  
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7. CONCLUSIONS
The pattern of  the ASF epidemic among wild boar in the north-east of  
Estonia was significantly different from the pattern of  the disease in the 
south of  Estonia during the first 25 months of  the epidemic (I).  
The temporal and spatial differences in the course of  the ASF epidemic 
in the wild boar population between the two areas suggest that the first 
introduction of  ASF took place in the north-east of  Estonia and not, 
as reported officially, in the south. Additionally, it was possible that the 
epidemic in the north-east was caused by a virus strain with different 
properties (I).
The biological properties of  the ASF virus strain spreading in the north-
east of  Estonia in 2014 did not notably differ from those of  other virulent 
genotype II strains in an experiment with young wild boar; however, one 
animal survived the infection and recovered completely (II).
The carrier status of  this survivor animal (mentioned above) could not 
be demonstrated. In an experiment, the wild boar surviving ASF did not 
shed the virus after recovering and did not transmit it to sentinel animals 
(II). 
The spread of  ASF virus in wild boar populations surrounding pig farms 
was the main risk factor for infection of  domestic pigs (III).
Introduction of  the virus to farms occurred most likely by indirect 
transmission pathways, such as via contaminated fomites (people, 
vehicles, tools). This, presumably, was a result of  errors in the execution 
of  biosecurity procedures, even in those cases where the general 
biosecurity level of  a farm was high (III). 
This study has shown that transmission of  ASF virus between herds was 
rare indicating that the domestic pig transmission cycle of  the virus has 
largely been avoided in Estonia (III). 
Large commercial farms, and also possibly farms with breeding animals, 
were shown to be at higher risk of  becoming infected. Thus, biosecurity 
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measures have to be at the highest possible level on these farms to 
prevent outbreaks in ASF-affected areas (III). 
The first clinical signs of  ASF in herds were unspecific. Thus, in ASF-
affected and endangered regions, whenever there is the sudden death of  
a pig with an unclear cause, or an abortion or loss of  appetite, even in 
one pen, ASF should be considered as a possible cause (III).
In this study, the spread of  the virus within farms was shown to be slow, 
which indicates that the contagiousness of  the virus was low during the 
initial phase of  the outbreaks. Thus, monitoring only general morbidity 
and mortality of  a herd is not sufficient for early detection of  ASF 
outbreaks (III).
Investigation of  sick and dead domestic pigs and wild boar for ASF 
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9. SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN
Sigade Aafrika katku epidemioloogia Eestis ja ühe viirustüve 
iseloomustus
Sissejuhatus
Sigade Aafrika katk (SAK) on ohtlik sigade viirushaigus, mis põhjustab 
tõsiseid tagajärgi nii loomade tervisele kui ka majanduslikku kahju 
sektorile. Kuna diagnoositud haigus mõjutab märkimisväärselt elussigade 
ning sealiha ja lihatoodete rahvusvahelist kaubandust, on haigus Maailma 
Loomatervise Organisatsiooni (OIE) ning Euroopa Komisjoni ohtlike 
haiguste nimekirjas (OIE, 2017, 2020; EC, 2002).
Sigade Aafrika katku kirjeldas esimesena Briti patoloog Eustace 
Montgomery 1921. aastal, kui publitseeris Ida-Aafrikas läbi viidud 
ulatusliku uuringu tulemused. Sajand on möödas ning teadmisi haiguse 
ja selle tekitaja kohta märksa rohkem, kuid siiski kannatab SAK-i tõttu 
endiselt umbes pool Aafrika kontinendist (Penrith jt, 2013; Gallardo jt, 
2015c; Mulumba-Mfumu jt, 2019; OIE WAHID, 2020).
1957. aastal teatas Portugal SAK-i esmakordsest leiust väljaspool Aafrika 
mandrit (Sánchez-Vizcaíno jt, 2009). Aastatel 1960–1995 esines SAK 
mitmes Lõuna-Euroopa riigis, nagu Hispaania, Portugal, Prantsusmaa, 
Itaalia, Malta, Belgia ja Holland (Sánchez-Vizcaíno jt, 2009). Kõik need 
riigid, välja arvatud Itaalia saar Sardiinia, suutsid haigusest vabaneda. 
See nõudis paljudes riikides aastakümneid, kuid tänu karmidele 
tõrjemeetmetele saavutasid nad edu. Sardiiniasse jõudis viirus 1978. 
aastal ja see on vaatamata korduvatele katsetele nakkust tõrjuda endiselt 
endeemiline piirkond (Mur jt, 2016; Jurado jt, 2017; OIE WAHID, 2020).
20. sajandi 70-ndatel aastatel levis haigus üle Atlandi ookeani 
Lõuna-Ameerikasse (Brasiilia) ning Kariibidele (Kuuba, Dominikaani 
Vabariik ja Haiti), kuid seal suudeti see kümnendi jooksul likvideerida 
(Costard jt, 2009). 2018. aasta augustis diagnoositi SAK esimest korda 
Aasias Hiina Rahvavabariigis (Zhou jt, 2018; Tao jt, 2020). Praeguseks 
on haigust Aasias ning Okeaanias diagnoositud Mongoolias, Vietnamis, 
Kambodžas, Hongkongis, Lõuna-Koreas, Põhja-Koreas, Laoses, 
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Filipiinidel, Timor-Lestes, Myanmaris, Indoneesias, Paapua Uus-Guineal 
ja Indias (OIE WAHID, vaadatud 24. mai 2020).
SAK leidis uuesti tee Euroopasse 2007. aasta kevadel, kui see diagnoositi 
Gruusias (Rowlands jt, 2008; Sanchez-Vizcaino jt, 2012). Haigustekitaja 
levis edasi Põhja-Kaukaasia teistesse riikidesse (Aserbaidžaan, Armeenia) 
ja Venemaa Föderatsiooni. 2012. aastal diagnoositi SAK Ukrainas ja 
2013. aastal Valgevenes. 2014. aastal jõudis viirus Euroopa Liitu (EL) 
ning haigus tuvastati Leedus, Poolas ja Lätis. Aastatel 2017–2020 
on SAK-i viirust (SAKV) leitud veel Tšehhi Vabariigis, Moldaavias, 
Rumeenias, Bulgaarias, Ungaris, Belgias, Slovakkias, Serbias ning Kreekas 
(OIE WAHID, vaadatud 24. mai 2020). Kõik viirusest tabandunud 
EL-i liikmesriigid (v.a Tšehhi Vabariik) ning ka Moldaavia ja Ukraina 
teavitavad endiselt haiguse leidudest riigis.
Esimene SAK-i juhtum Eestis diagnoositi 2014. aasta septembri alguses 
Läti piiri lähistelt surnuna leitud metsseal. Perioodil epideemia algusest 
kuni 2020. aasta mai lõpuni leiti viirust metssigadel 14 maakonnas 15-st. 
SAK-i suhtes uuritud 48 384 metsseast andsid 3992 positiivse tulemuse. 
Esimene haiguse puhang kodusigade farmis diagnoositi 2015. aasta 
juulis, millele järgnesid sama aasta suvel puhangud veel 17 farmis. 2016. 
aastal kinnitati SAK-i diagnoos kuues ning 2017. aastal kolmes farmis. 
Aastatel 2018–2020 (kuni 31. mai 2020) ei ole kodusigade farmides 
SAK-i diagnoositud.
Haiguse vastu puudub ravi ning vaktsiin, mistõttu põhineb selle tõrje 
kiirel diagnoosimisel, millele järgnevad ranged kontrollimeetmed ning 
loomade hukkamine.
Kirjanduse ülevaade
Sigade Aafrika katku põhjustab DNA viirus, mis kuulub Asfarviridae 
sugukonna Asfivirus’e perekonda (Alonso jt, 2018). SAKV-i geeni p72 
osalise nukleotiidide järjestuse põhjal on tuvastatud viiruse 24 erinevat 
genotüüpi (Boshoff  jt, 2007; Achenbach jt, 2016; Quembo jt, 2018). 
Kõik genotüübid esinevad Aafrikas, aga ainult I ja II genotüüpi on 
leitud ka teistel kontinentidel (Bastos jt, 2003; Gallardo jt, 2009; Arias 
jt, 2017; Le jt, 2019; Mulumba-Mfumu jt, 2019; Zhao jt, 2019). Euroopa 
riikides levib genotüüp II, välja arvatud Sardiinias, kus ringleb genotüüp 
I (Bastos jt, 2003; Rowlands jt, 2008; Malogolovkin jt, 2012; Torresi jt, 
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2020). Kõik alates 2018. aastast viirusest tabandunud Aasia riigid on 
samuti teavitanud ainult II genotüübi leidudest (Zhou jt, 2018; Le jt, 
2019; Kim jt, 2020).
SAK kulgeb ägeda, alaägeda või kroonilise haigusena sõltuvalt 
viiruse iseloomust ja peremehest. Viirustüved on jagatud virulentsuse 
järgi kõrge, mõõduka või madala virulentsusega tüvedeks. Kõrge 
virulentsusega tüved põhjustavad üliägeda ja ägeda kuluga haigestumist, 
mõõduka virulentsusega tüved ägeda või alaägeda kuluga haigestumist 
ning madala virulentsusega tüved kroonilist ja asümptomaatilist 
haigestumist (Sánchez-Vizcaíno jt, 2009). Viirustüve genotüüp ei ole 
otseses seoses selle virulentsusega, sest sama genotüübi sees esineb 
erineva virulentsusega tüvesid (Gallardo jt, 2015d; Gallardo jt, 2018a; 
Gallardo jt, 2018b; Gallardo jt, 2018c; Zani jt, 2018).
SAK-i kirjeldatakse käsiraamatutes kui ägeda kuluga hemorraagilist 
haigust, mis põhjustab kuni 100% haigestumust ning väga suurt 
suremust (Sánchez-Vizcaíno jt, 2009; Costard jt, 2013). Haiguse ägeda 
kulu puhul esinevad haigustunnuseid, nagu kõrge palavik, depressioon, 
anoreksia, hingamis-, seede- ja närvisümptomid ning hemorraagia 
(Sanchez-Vizcaıno jt, 2009). Siiski kirjeldatakse haiguse avaldumist nii 
eksperimentaalsetes kui ka puhangu tingimustes sageli vaid ebatüüpiliste 
kliiniliste tunnustega, nagu isutus, loidus, kurnatus (Gabriel jt, 2011; 
Pietschmann jt, 2015; Oelsen jt, 2017; Gallardo jt, 2018a; Zani jt, 2019; 
Pikalo jt, 2020; Walczak jt, 2020).
Haigestunud loomad, kellel avalduvad kliinilised tunnused, eritavad 
viirust kõigi kehasekreetidega (Guinat jt, 2014; Pietschmann jt, 2015; 
Pikolo jt, 2020). See põhjustab farmikeskkonna saastumist ja võib viia 
nakkuse levikuni karjas või metssigade puhul väliskeskkonnas. Siiski 
on leitud, et kõige suurem viiruskogus esineb nakatunud looma veres 
(Gabriel jt, 2011; Carvalho Ferreira jt, 2012; Guinat jt, 2014; Gallardo jt, 
2015b; Olesen jt, 2017).
SAKV-i II genotüübi tüved, mis ringlevad EL-i riikides alates 2014. aastast, 
on sama päritolu kui Kaukaasia riikides haigust põhjustanud viirustüved 
epideemia alguses (Malagolovkin jt, 2012; Fraczyk jt, 2014; Gallardo jt, 
2014; Fernandez-Pinero jt, 2018; Pikalo jt, 2020).
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Aastatel 2008–2014 läbi viidud loomkatsed näitasid, et Euroopas SAK-i 
epideemiat põhjustava II genotüübi viirustüved on kõrge virulentsusega 
ning põhjustavad nii kodu- kui ka metssigadel haiguse ägedat vormi 
(Gabriel jt, 2011; Blome jt, 2012; Guinat jt, 2014; Gallardo jt, 2015b; 
Pikalo jt, 2020). Nakatatud loomadel avaldusid kliinilised tunnused 
pärast 3–5 päeva kestnud inkubatsiooniperioodi ja 5–13 päeva pärast 
nakatamist loomad surid (Gabriel jt, 2011; Guinat jt, 2014; Gallardo 
jt, 2015b). Sõltuvalt katseloomade vanusest, viiruse hulgast ning 
nakatumisteest oli suremus peaaegu 100% (Gabriel jt, 2011; Blome jt, 
2012; Gallardo jt, 2015a; Gallardo jt, 2015b).
Aastatel 2015–2019 läbi viidud loomkatsetes leiti II genotüübi 
viirustüvede hulgas ka vähenenud virulentsusega SAKV-i tüvesid 
(Gallardo jt, 2018a; Gallardo jt, 2018b; Pershin jt, 2019; Walczak jt, 
2020). Nendes katsetes oli suremus 50–100% ja kliiniliselt avaldus 
haigus ägeda, alaägeda või kroonilise vormina. 2017. aastal isoleeriti 
Lätis kütitud metsseal atenueerunud viirustüvi (Gallardo jt, 2019), mis 
põhjustas eksperimentaalsel nakatamisel loomadel haiguse kroonilist 
või asümptomaatilist vormi. See viirustüvi ei põhjustanud katseloomade 
surma ja osal kontaktloomadest puudusid kliinilised tunnused täiesti 
(Gallardo jt, 2019).
SAK-i epideemia kulgeb piirkonniti erinevalt, sõltudes oluliselt viiruse 
ülekandemehhanismidest ja kaasatud loomaliikidest. Euroopas on 
ainuke SAK-i haigestuv koduloomaliik kodusiga (Sus scrofa domestica) 
ja samamoodi kulgeb haigus ka metssigadel (Sus scrofa scrofa). Erinev 
on olukord Aafrikas, kus tüügassiga (Phacochoerus africanus) on viiruse 
looduslik reservuaar ja haiguse suhtes resistentne. Lisaks esinevad Aafrika 
ja Lõuna-Euroopa teatud piirkondades Ornithodorus’e perekonna puugid, 
kellel võib sõltuvalt liigist olla oluline roll nii viiruse reservuaari kui ka 
vektorina (Jori and Bastos, 2009; Sánchez-Vizcaíno jt, 2009; Costard 
jt, 2013). Viirusest tabandunud Balti riikidest (Eesti, Läti, Leedu) ning 
Poolast ei ole Ornithodorus’e perekonna puuke leitud (Sánchez-Vizcaíno 
jt, 2009; Costard jt, 2013).
Peale viiruse otsese ülekande kodusealt koduseale, metssealt koduseale, 
aga ka puugilt kodu- või metsseale on viiruse levikus olulised kaudsed 
tegurid, näiteks viirusega saastunud söödad, sõidukid, inimesed, 
töövahendid, samuti elukeskkond (Costard jt, 2013; Guinat jt, 2016; 
Chenais jt, 2018; Niederwerder jt, 2019). Viiruse ülekandemehhanismide 
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mõistmine on väga tähtis, sest see aitab töötada välja tõhusaid 
tõrjeprogramme.
Käsiraamatutes kirjeldataks SAK-i enamasti kui väga nakkavat haigust, 
mis põhjustab eriti kõrge virulentsusega viirustüvede puhul loomade 
suurt suremust (Sánchez-Vizcaíno jt, 2009; Blome jt, 2012; Pietschmann 
jt, 2015; Pikalo jt, 2020). Siiski võib nii haiguse kulgu, haigestumust, 
suremust kui ka nakkavust farmis ja looduses mõjutada märkimisväärselt 
mitte ainult viirustüve virulentsus, vaid ka selle kogus ning nakatumistee. 
Kuna suurt suremust kirjeldatakse paljude eksperimentaalsete 
nakatamiste puhul, siis võib see viia eksliku järelduseni haiguse kõrge 
nakkavuse kohta. Kummatigi on erinevad autorid kirjeldanud praeguseks 
ka mõõduka ja madala nakkavusega viirustüvede esinemist (Pietschmann 
jt, 2015; Olševskis jt, 2016; Lamberga jt, 2018).
Loomkatsed, mis on viidud läbi Euroopas ringlevate SAK-i viiruse 
II genotüübi tüvedega on näidanud, et metssiga on SAK-ile sama 
vastuvõtlik kui kodusiga ning looma vanus ega sugu ei mõjuta haiguse 
kulgu (Gabriel jt, 2011; Blome jt, 2012; Pietschmann jt, 2015; Pikalo 
jt, 2020). Mõlemal liigil kujunevad kõigepealt välja mittespetsiifilised 
haigustunnused ja sõltuvalt tüve virulentsusest loomad paranevad või 
surevad.
Metssigade puhul on leitud mitu riskitegurit, mis soodustavad viiruse 
populatsioonisisest levikut. Näiteks loomade suur asustustihedus 
põhjustab rohkem kontakte nii karja sees kui ka karjade vahel, 
soodustades nakkuse levikut. Loomade küttimine ning jahipidamisviis 
(nt ajujaht) ja praktikad (nt koerte kasutamine) soodustavad metssigade 
tavapärasest aktiivsemat liikumist ning viiruse levikut haigusvabadele 
aladele. Nakkuse leviku tõkestamisel on tähtis roll jahipidamisele 
kehtestatud bioturvalisuse nõuete täitmisel ning lihakehade ja jäätmete 
käitlemisel.
Metssigade elupaik kui viiruse võimalik reservuaar on praeguseks veel 
vähe tuntud riskitegur. Selle üks põhjusi on elupaigatüüpide paljusus, aga 
ka märgatavad klimaatilised erinevused isegi lähedaste piirkondade vahel. 
Jahe ja niiske kliima ning pikad talved soodustavad korjuste pikaajalist 
säilimist keskkonnas ning seeläbi viiruse püsimist.
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Siiski loetakse tänapäeval üheks kõige tähtsamaks SAK-i laialdast levikut 
soodustavaks teguriks inimtegevust ja inimeste käitumist. Viiruse otsese 
loomalt loomale leviku kiiruseks on hinnatud 1–5 km kuus (Podgorski 
jt, 2018; Chenais jt, 2019; Niine jt, 2019), mistõttu ei ole võimalik, et 
uusi, sadu kilomeetreid eemal asuvaid haiguskoldeid põhjustavad ainult 
loomad. Euroopa Liidus on sellised hiljutised SAK-i kolded avastatud 
Tšehhi Vabariigis, Poolas (Varssavi ja Lubuskie piirkond), Ungaris ja 
Belgias (Chenais jt, 2019; Linden jt, 2020). Kõik nimetatud alad olid 
varem nakatunud aladest mitusada kilomeetrit eemal.
Kodusigade nakatumise riskitegurid erinevad samuti piirkonniti. Erinev 
on nii kliima, maastik, loomapidamistavad kui ka sotsiaal-kultuuriline 
ja majanduslik taust. Farmi suurusest lähtuvalt hinnatakse, et kõige 
vastuvõtlikumad on nakkusele kodumajapidamised ning väikefarmid, 
kus bioturvalisuse nõuete täitmine ei ole enamasti tagatud. Sigade 
väljaspidamist loetakse SAK-i levikul tähtsaks riskiteguriks, sest see 
soodustab otsest kontakti metssigade või vabalt peetavate sigadega 
(Gulenkin jt, 2011; Gogin jt, 2013). Nakatunud metssigade populatsioon 
on kodusigadele oluline ja püsiv riskiallikas, seda ka siis, kui loomi peetakse 
ainult siseruumides. Eriti selgelt on see näha viirusest tabandunud Balti 
riikides ja Poolas, kus sageli on teatatud nakkuse levikust metssigadelt 
farmi (Olševskis jt, 2016; Wozniakowski, 2017, 2018; EFSA, 2018).
Kodusigade nakatumise riskitegur on ka kuumtöötlemata toidujäätmete 
söötmine. Seda on kirjeldatud enamasti kodumajapidamiste ja väikeste 
farmide puhul piirkondades, kus elatustase on madalam ning inimesed 
järgivad rohkem traditsioonilist elukorraldust (FAO, 2013; Gogin jt, 
2013; Martínez-López jt, 2015; Olševskis jt, 2016; Jazdzewski, 2017; 
Kolbasov jt, 2018; Wozniakowski, 2018). Sarnaselt metssigadega on 
ka kodusigadel märkimisväärseks riskiteguriks inimtegevus ja inimeste 
käitumine, nagu näiteks illegaalne elusloomade ja sealiha müük, mis aitab 
kaasa nakkuse laialdasele ja kontrollimatule levikule (FAO, 2013; Gogin 
jt, 2013; Martínez-López jt, 2015; Jazdzewski, 2017; Wozniakowski, 
2017, 2018; Kolbasov jt, 2018).
Uurimistöö eesmärgid
Uurimistöö peaeesmärk oli analüüsida SAK-i epidemioloogiat ning 




1. Analüüsida SAK-i epideemia arengu erinevusi Eesti kahe 
erineva piirkonna metssigade populatsioonis, Kirde-Eestis ja 
Lõuna-Eestis (I).
2. Selgitada Kirde-Eesti metssigade populatsioonis 2014. aastal 
ringelnud SAK-i viiruse tüve bioloogilisi omadusi (II).
3. Kirjeldada kvantitatiivselt SAK-i epideemiat kodusigadel ja 
tuvastada nakkuse riskitegurid Eesti seakarjades karja tasandil 
ning kirjeldada taudiolukorras haiguse kliinilist avaldumist (III).
Materjal ja metoodika
Väitekiri koosneb kolmest uuringust. Esimeses uuringus selgitati 
SAK-i epideemia kulgu kahes eraldiasuvas nakatunud metssigade 
populatsioonis ajavahemikul septembrist 2014 kuni septembrini 2016. 
Uuriti kaht ala: Lõuna-Eesti nakatunud ala (10 764 km2), mis koosnes 
neljast maakonnast (Valga, Võru, Viljandi ja Tartu), ning Kirde-Eesti 
nakatunud ala (3364 km2), mis hõlmas üht maakonda (Ida-Viru). Kokku 
analüüsiti 7015 metssea andmeid.
Metssigade uurimine viidi läbi Eestis kehtiva SAK-i tõrjeprogrammi 
kohaselt, mis hõlmas nii kütitud kui ka surnuna leitud metssigade 
uuringuid. SAKV-i genoomi tuvastamiseks kasutati reaalaja PCR-i (ik. 
real-time polymerase chain reaction; ek. reaalaja polümeraasi ahelreaktsioon) 
meetodit (Tignon jt, 2011), viirusvastaste antikehade tuvastamiseks 
ELISA (ik. enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay; ek. ensümaatiline 
immunosorptsioon analüüs) (Ingezim PPA COMPAC, Ingenasa, Madrid, 
Hispaania) ning IPT (ik. indirect immunoperoxydase technique; ek. kaudne 
immuunoperoksüdaastest) (CISA-INIA, 2014; Gallardo jt, 2015a) 
meetodit. Kõik analüüsid viidi läbi Veterinaar- ja Toidulaboratooriumis.
Andmed metssigade populatsiooni tiheduse kohta jahiaastatel 2012/13, 
2013/14 ja 2014/15 saadi Keskkonnaagentuurilt. Kuna algseid andmeid 
kogusid jahindusorganisatsioonid jahiala kohta, siis geograafiliseks 
analüüsiks teisaldati need ArcGIS ArcMap 10.3.1 tarkvara kasutades 
omavalitsuse (vald) tasemele.
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Statistiliseks analüüsiks kasutati programmi R (http://www.r-project.
org). Levimus määrati erinevatel ajaperioodidel ja piirkondades, 
usaldusvahemikud (UV) ning šansside suhted (ŠS) arvutati Clopperi 
ja Pearsoni järgi. P-väärtus ≤ 0,05 loeti statistiliselt oluliseks. Fischeri 
täpset testi kasutati, et hinnata statistilisi seoseid erinevate riskitegurite 
vahel, nagu vanus ja uuritav loomarühm (kütitud, surnuna leitud) ning 
laboranalüüsi tulemused (PCR-positiivne (viropositiivne), ELISA-/IPT-
positiivne (seropositiivne)). Loomad jagati vanuserühmadesse: noored 
(< 1 aasta) ja täiskasvanud (> 1 aasta).
Geograafiliste ja ajaliste muutuste hindamiseks uuritavates piirkondades 
kasutati hierarhilist Bayesi mudelanalüüsi (Staubach jt, 2002; Staubach 
jt, 2011). Mudel oli kohandatud vaid serolevimusele (ELISA-/IPT-
positiivsed). Andmeid analüüsiti omavalitsuse (vald) tasandil mõlemas 
uuritavas piirkonnas eraldi.
Teises uuringus selgitati Kirde-Eestis 2014. aastal ringelnud SAK-i 
viirustüve bioloogilisi omadusi. Selleks viidi läbi eksperimentaalne 
nakatamine Saksamaal (Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut) spetsiaalses kõrge 
turvatasemega (L3+) hoones. Uuringus kasutatud viirus oli isoleeritud 
Ida-Viru maakonnast surnuna leitud metssealt ning sellega nakatati 
oronasaalselt kümme umbes nelja kuu vanust metssiga. Katse käigus 
hinnati iga päev loomadel avalduvaid kliinilisi näitajaid, kasutades varem 
kirjeldatud harmoniseeritud hindamissüsteemi (Pietschmann jt, 2015), 
ja koguti erinevaid proove. Kõik katseloomad lahati ja neilt koguti 
uurimismaterjali.
Kuna üks metssiga (nr 19) elas nakkuse üle ja tervenes täielikult, viidi 
sellega läbi jätku-uuring eesmärgiga hinnata viiruse võimalikku ülekannet 
tervenenud loomalt tervetele loomadele. Selleks pandi tervenenud 
metssiga (nr 19) 50 päeva pärast esialgset nakatamist (dpi; ik. days post- 
inoculation) kokku kolme sama vana terve metsseaga. Loomi hoiti koos 
96. dpi-ni, mille järel kõik loomad eutaneeriti (hukati heaolu kaalutlustel) 
ja lahati. Eksperimentaalse nakatamise läbiviimine oli heaks kiidetud 
Saksamaa pädeva asutuse loaga nr 7221.3-2-023/15.
Loomkatse käigus kogutud proove analüüsiti laboratoorselt. SAK-i 
viiruse isoleerimiseks kasutati hemadsorbtsiooni testi (Carrascosa jt, 
2011), viiruse genoomi tuvastamiseks reaalaja PCR-i testi (King jt, 2003) 
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ning viirusvastaste antikehade tuvastamiseks ELISA testi (Ingezim PPA 
COMPAC, Ingenasa; ID SCREEN ASFV INDIRECT, IDvet).
Kolmandas uuringus selgitati SAK-i epidemioloogiat kodusigadel. 
Selleks viidi epidemioloogiline uuring läbi kõigis (n = 26) seafarmides, 
kus ajavahemikul 2015–2017 diagnoositi SAK-i puhangud. 2015. aastal 
kinnitati SAK-i puhang 18 farmis, 2016. aastal kuues ning 2017. aastal 
kolmes. Kuna ühes 2015. aastal SAK-i diagnoosi saanud seafarmis ei 
leidnud diagnoos järeluuringute käigus kinnitust (kõiki 15-t farmis olnud 
siga uuriti, kõik negatiivse tulemusega), siis seda edasisse analüüsi ei 
kaasatud.
Puhangufarmi defineeriti kui farmi, millel on Põllumajanduse Registrite 
ja Informatsiooni Ametis (PRIA) identifitseerimisnumber ning mis 
vastab Euroopa Nõukogu direktiivi 2002/60/EÜ (Euroopa Komisjon, 
2002) kriteeriumidele. Epidemioloogiline uuring viidi läbi vastavuses 
nõukogu direktiiviga 2002/60/EÜ (Euroopa Komisjon, 2002), 
kasutades struktureeritud küsimustikku. Farmide bioturvalisuse tase 
määrati farmidest kogutud andmete põhjal lähtuvalt Eesti seadusandluse 
nõuetest (Riigi Teataja, 1999; Riigi Teataja, 2004).
Iga puhangufarmi puhul määrati kõrgriski perioodi (HRP), defineeritud 
kui ajavahemik, mille jooksul võis SAK-i viirus olla farmis enne, kui selle 
esinemist kahtlustati. Hindamisel võeti aluseks suremusnäitajad farmis 
ning kliinilised ja laborianalüüside tulemused.
Seakarjade andmed pärinesid PRIA andmebaasist ning Veterinaar- ja 
Toiduametilt (VTA). Analüüsimiseks jagati seafarmid sigade arvu järgi 
suurusrühmadesse: 1–10 siga (G1), 11–100 siga (G2), 101–1000 siga 
(G3), > 1000 sea (G4). G1 farme käsitleti mitte tootmisfarmide, vaid 
kodumajapidamistena, kus loomi peeti isikliku tarbimise eesmärgil ja G2, 
G3 ja G4 farme kui tootmisfarme, kus loomi kasvatati müügi eesmärgil. 
Lisaks jagati farmid tootmistüübi (aretusfarm, täistsükliga farm ja 
nuumafarm) ja peetavate loomade (kodusead, metssead, ristandid) alusel.
Metssigade seireandmed pärinesid VTA-lt ning hõlmasid teavet uuritava 
rühma (kütitud, surnuna leitud), loomade leidmise/küttimise kuupäeva 
ja asukoha (koordinaadid) kohta. Koordinaatide põhjal tuvastati igale 
puhangufarmile kõige lähemal asunud SAK-positiivne metssiga (kuni 
ühe aasta jooksul enne puhangut) eesmärgiga kirjeldada nakkuse survet 
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metssigade poolt. Analüüsimisel kasutati lisaks Keskkonnaagentuuri 
edastatud andmeid metssigade küttimismahtude, jahimeeste arvu, 
söötmiskohtade arvu ja jahikoerte arvu kohta.
Andmete analüüsiks kasutati programmi Stata (StataCorp, College 
Station, Texas, USA) ja Bayesi hierarhilist mudelanalüüsi (Varewyck jt, 
2017).
Tulemused ja arutelu
SAK-i epideemia esimesel aastal (2014–2015) ilmnes, et kahes eraldi 
asuvas metssigade populatsioonis (Kirde-Eestis ja Lõuna-Eestis) on 
haiguse epidemioloogia erinev. Lõuna-Eestis kulges haigus loomade 
suure suremusega ja peamiselt SAK viirusele positiivsete (reaalaja PCR-i 
testiga) loomade leidudega. Samal ajal oli Kirde-Eestis suremus väga 
väike või peaaegu olematu ning kliiniliselt tervete kütitud metssigade 
uuringutel leiti enamasti seropositiivseid (ELISA/IPT testiga viiruse 
vastaste antikehadega) loomi. Viropositiivsete metssigade leiud Kirde-
Eestis olid harvad. Lisaks võis täheldada, et viiruse levik Lõuna-Eestis 
oli võrreldes Kirde-Eestiga kiire ja laialdane, samas kui Kirde-Eestis 
esines haigus vaid ühes väikeses piirkonnas. 
Esimese uuringu tulemused kinnitasid varasemaid tähelepanekuid. 
Selgus, et Kirde-Eesti metssigadelt 25 esimese epideemiakuu jooksul 
kogutud 1174 proovist olid keskmiselt 2,0% (95% usaldusvahemik (UV) 
1,1–3,0%) viropositiivsed, samal ajal kui Lõuna-Eestis 5841-st uuritud 
loomast oli viropositiivseid 13,7% (95% UV 12,8–14,6%). Veelgi 
enam, selle perioodi täpsemal analüüsimisel ilmnes, et 12 esimesel 
epideemiakuul oli viropositiivseid metssigu Kirde-Eestis keskmiselt vaid 
0,8% (95% UV 0,2–3,5%) ning järgmisel 13 kuul 2,4% (95% UV 1,5–
3,7%). Lõuna-Eestis ei muutunud sel kahel perioodil viropositiivsete 
hulk, olles vastavalt 13,8% (95% UV 12,5–15,2%) ja 13,7% (95% UV 
12,5–14,9%).
Serolevimuse oluline erinevus piirkonniti tuleb välja, kui vaatame eraldi 
25 kuu pikkuse perioodi esimest 12 ja järgnevat 13 kuud. Kirde-Eestis 
oli serolevimus vastavalt 7,4% (95% UV 4,8–10,7%) ja 2,4% (95% 
UV 1,4–3,7%) ning Lõuna-Eestis 1,5% (95% UV 1,0–2,0%) ja 5,4% 
(95% UV 4,6–6,3%). Kuigi viiruse laialdasemat levikut Lõuna-Eestis 
võis soodustada sealne suurem metssigade asustustihedus, toetavad 
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need tulemused uuringu hüpoteesi, et SAK-i viirus võis Kirde-Eesti 
metssigade populatsioonis esineda juba varem, kui see Lõuna-Eestis 
ametlikult diagnoositi (esimest korda diagnoosis VTA Eestis SAK-i 
08. septembril 2014).
Statistilise analüüsi tulemusel selgus, et Lõuna-Eestis oli virolevimus 
oluliselt kõrgem kui Kirde-Eestis (p < 0,001), samas ei tuvastatud 
serolevimuse osas erinevust (p = 728). Statistiliselt oluline seos 
(p < 0,001) leiti metssigade vanuse ja SAK-positiivse (nii viropositiivse 
kui ka seropositiivse) leiu vahel. Tõenäosus tuvastada SAK-positiivne 
metssiga oli kõrgem noorte (vanus < 1 aasta) (viropositiivne: šansside 
suhe (ŠS) = 1,57, 95% UV 1,35–1,83; seropositiivne: ŠS = 1,89, 95% 
UV 1,45–2,47) ning surnuna leitud loomade rühmas (viropositiivne: 
ŠS = 69,60, 95% UV 56,89–85,15; seropositiivne: ŠS = 4,53, 95% UV 
2,83–7,25).
Statistiliselt olulist erinevust (p = 0,420) ei tuvastatud loomarühmade 
uurimisel vanuserühmiti ehk nii kütitud kui ka surnuna leitud metssigade 
seas oli täiskasvanud loomade osakaal veidi suurem. Uuritavate loomade 
vanuseline jaotus oli nii Kirde- kui ka Lõuna-Eestis sarnane (p = 0,566). 
Kütitud ning surnuna leitud loomade jaotus oli Kirde- ja Lõuna-Eestis 
oluliselt erinev (p < 0,001). Lõuna-Eestis oli surnuna leitud metssigade 
osakaal märksa suurem kui Kirde-Eestis, ka oli seal palju suurem 
loomade asustustihedus. Leidsime statistiliselt olulise seose metssigade 
asustustiheduse ja positiivse testitulemuse vahel, vastavalt viropositiivne 
p < 0,001 ja seropositiivne p = 0,009. 
Bayesi mudelanalüüsi tulemusel ilmnes, et Kirde-Eestis avaldasid 
seroloogilisele uurimistulemusele olulist mõju loomade vanus ja 
populatsioonitihedus ning Lõuna-Eestis loomade vanus ja uuritav 
loomarühm (kütitud/surnuna leitud). Uuritavate proovide geograafilise 
jaotumise analüüs näitas, et nii Kirde- kui ka Lõuna-Eestis erines proovide 
arv piirkonna sees omavalitsuste kaupa märgatavalt. Mudelanalüüs 
kinnitas erinevat serolevimuse suundumust ajas piirkonniti ning 
piirkondade sees. Kui Kirde-Eestis esines kõrge serolevimus kogu 
uuringuaja jooksul peamiselt vaid ühes omavalitsuses, siis Lõuna-Eestis 
esines see mitmetes omavalitsustes. Siiski tuleb tulemusi tõlgendades 
pidada silmas suhteliselt väikest proovide arvu mõlemas piirkonnas. 
Seroloogiliste tulemuste ajaline analüüs näitas, et mediaanaja mõju 
levimusele oli oluliselt erinev uuritavates piirkondades. Kui Kirde-Eestis 
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ei tuvastatud aja mõju serolevimusele uuritava 25 kuu jooksul, siis Lõuna-
Eestis võis kogu perioodi jooksul näha levimuste olulist tõusu. 
Uurimistulemused näitasid, et SAK-i epideemia kulges esimesel 25 kuul 
kahes eraldiasuvas metssigade populatsioonis erinevalt. Lõuna-Eestis 
võis täheldada klassikalist nakatumise algstaadiumit, kus haiguse leviala 
laienes, surnud ja haiged loomad olid peamiselt viropositiivsed ning 
seropositiivsete loomade leidude arv suurenes. Samal ajal oli Kirde-
Eestis metssigade suremus ning viropositiivsete loomade osakaal väga 
väike, nakatunud loomi leiti vaid piiratud alalt ja seropositiivsete loomade 
arv oli kohe epideemia alguses suhteliselt suur. Sellest tulenevalt võib 
eeldada, et SAK-i viirus ringles Kirde-Eestis enne, kui see Eestis ja 
piirkonnas ametlikult diagnoositi.
Teises uuringus kontrolliti hüpoteesi, et Kirde-Eestis ringleva SAK-i 
viiruse tüve virulentsus on vähenenud (tüvi on atenueerunud) ja seetõttu 
kulges haigus piirkonnas teistmoodi kui Lõuna-Eestis.
Paljud alates 2007. aastast läbi viidud loomkatsed näitasid, et Ida-Euroopas 
ringlev SAK-i viiruse II genotüüp on nii kodu- kui ka metssigadele kõrge 
virulentsusega (Gabriel jt, 2011; Blome jt, 2012; Guinat jt, 2014; Vlasova 
jt, 2014; Gallardo jt, 2015b; Pietschmann jt, 2015; Olesen jt, 2017; Pikalo 
jt, 2020). Seega oli eelduseks, et haigus kulgeb ka Eestis tervikuna suure 
suremuse ja ilmsete kliiniliste tunnustega nagu Lõuna-Eestis.
Uuringu raames teostatud loomkatses kujunesid kõigil kümnel nakatatud 
metsseal 4–6 päeva pärast nakatamist (dpi) mittespetsiifilised kliinilised 
tunnused. Üheksal nakatunud loomal haigus süvenes ja nad surid või 
eutaneeriti 7–13 dpi. Üks loom (nr 19) elas haiguse üle. Alates umbes 
14 dpi tema haigustunnused taandusid ja ta tervenes täiesti. Kõigilt 
eksperimendis osalenud loomadelt koguti katse jooksul perioodiliselt 
proove ja kõik kümme olid SAK-i viiruse suhtes (PCR-i testiga) 
positiivsed. SAK-i viiruse vastased antikehad (ELISA testiga) tuvastati 
kolmel loomal ja kahe proovid andsid antikehade suhtes kahtlase 
tulemuse.
Katses tervenenud metssiga pandi 50 dpi kokku kolme terve sentinell-
loomaga (terve loom, kes ei ole enne haigustekitajaga kokku puutunud). 
Järgmise 46 päeva jooksul ei kujunenud ühelgi neist välja kliinilist 
haigestumist, samuti ei tuvastatud kogutud proovidest SAK-i viiruset 
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(kõik proovid PCR-negatiivsed). Kõik kolm sentinell-looma olid katse 
lõpus ka SAK-i antikehade suhtes (ELISA) negatiivsed.
Loomkatse tulemusel ei tuvastatud ringleva viirustüve atenueerumist ega 
saadud vastust, miks erineb haiguse dünaamika Kirde-Eesti metssigade 
populatsioonis. Siiski näitasid järgnevalt sama viirustüvega kodusigadel 
ja minisigadel läbi viidud eksperimentaalsed nakatamised haiguse vähem 
ägedat kulgu, mis viitas haiguse alaägedale või kroonilisele vormile (Zani 
jt, 2018).
Kolmandas uuringus selgitati SAK-i epidemioloogiat Eesti kodusigadel. 
Uuringu tulemustest ilmneb, et loomade haigestumisest või suremusest 
teavitati loomapidajate poolt üsna varases staadiumis. Kõrgriski periood 
jäi farmides vahemikku 7–20 päeva, mediaanaeg 11 päeva. Kõigis 26 
puhangufarmis leiti SAK-i viiruse suhtes (PCR) positiivseid loomi, 
samas vaid 27% farmidest antikehade suhtes (ELISA) positiivseid loomi.
Tabel 1 annab ülevaate nende Eesti seafarmide suurusest ja tootmistüübist, 
kus aastatel 2015–2017 diagnoositi SAK-i puhangud.
Tabel 1. Sigade Aafrika katku puhangud Eesti seafarmides aastatel 2015-2017 farmide 
suuruse ja tootmistüübi järgi










Aretusfarm 0 0 1 2 3
Täistsükliga 
farm 1 1 3a 5 10
Nuumafarm 7 0 1 5 13
Kokku 8 1 5 12 26
a Kahes karjas peeti mets- ja kodusea ristandeid (neist üks väljaspidamisega) ning üks 
oli mahekari
SAK-i puhangute arv tootmisfarmides ületas nende arvu 
kodumajapidamistes. Selle põhjus võib olla, et suurtes farmides toimub 
rohkem inimeste, kaupade ja teenuste liikumist ning seetõttu on 
need nakkusele vastuvõtlikumad. Samas võib põhjus olla ka selles, et 
rangete bioturvalisuse nõuete kehtestamise tõttu vähenes sigu pidavate 
kodumajapidamiste arv 696 farmilt 2014. aastal 25 farmile 2017. aastal. 
Siiski on märkimisväärne, et SAK-i esinemus Eesti seafarmides ei 
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erinenud (p > 0,05) märkimisväärselt 2015., 2016. ja 2017. aastal farmide 
suurusrühmade põhjal, olles vastavalt 2,4%, 2,4% ja 2,0%.
Nakatunud loomadel ilmnenud esmased kliinilised tunnused olid 
haigusele mittespetsiifilised (isutus, loidus, kurnatus, üksikute loomade 
äkksurmad, abordid jm) ja leebed. Loomade ägedast haigestumisest 
teatati vaid 13 farmis ja sedagi enamasti pärast viiruse pikemaajalist 
ringlemist farmis. Loomade suremus erineva suurusrühma farmides 
oli erinev. Kui suurtes tootmisfarmides (> 1000 looma) oli keskmine 
suremus 0,7% (min 0,04; max 2,5%), siis kodumajapidamistes (< 10 
looma) 29,7% (min 0,0 ja max 100%). Haiguse ebatüüpiline kliiniline 
avaldumine ning madal haigestumus ja suremus võisid olla põhjuseks, 
miks SAK-i kahtlus püstitati esmase diagnoosina vaid 12 farmis.
Kõigi 26 puhangufarmi puhul leiti, et kõige tõenäolisemalt jõudis 
viirus farmi mõne kaudse ülekandetee (inimesed, sõidukid, vahendid 
jm) vahendusel. Kaheksa kodumajapidamise puhul hinnati nakkuse 
farmi toomise põhjuseks väga madalat või olematut bioturvalisuse 
taset. Tootmisfarmide puhul üritati täpsemalt välja selgitada nakkuse 
farmi sisenemise teed. Neis hinnati kõige tõenäolisemateks põhjusteks 
saastunud allapanu (n = 1), saastunud rohusööta (n = 1), teravilja 
saastumist selle hoiustamisel või töötlemisel (n = 5) ning kõige 
sagedamini saastunud vahendajaid (inimesed, sõidukid, vahendid jm) (n 
= 11). Tulemustest ilmnes selgesti, et bioturvalisuse nõuete täitmisel on 
tähtis osa farmi kaitsmisel SAK-i ja ka muude haigustekitajate sissetungi 
eest.
Puhangufarmid asusid erinevatel aastatel erinevates maakondades. Leiti, 
et enamasti diagnoositi haiguspuhangud nende piirkondade sigalates, 
kus SAKV ringles eelneva aasta jooksul metssigade populatsioonis. 
Kahekümne kolmel juhul leiti SAK-positiivseid metssigu puhangufarmist 
kuni 15 km kaugusel, kusjuures neist 16 farmi puhul lähemal kui 5 km. 
See näitab püsivalt suurt nakatumisriski seafarmides, kus iga väiksemgi 
viga bioturvalisuse nõuete täitmisel võib viia puhangu tekkimiseni.
Kõik SAK-i puhangud Eesti seafarmides diagnoositi suveperioodil 
ajavahemikus juunist septembrini (neist 81% juulis ja augustis). Sarnast 
sesoonsust täheldati ka Lätis ning teistes EL-i riikides (Olševskis jt, 
2016; EFSA, 2020). Selle põhjuseks võib olla rohkem kontakte farmide 
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ja ümbritseva keskkonna vahel, kuivõrd tegemist on kõige intensiivsema 
põllutööde ajaga.
Järeldused
SAK-i epideemia kulg Kirde-Eesti metssigade populatsioonis erines 
epideemia 25 esimese kuu jooksul oluliselt selle kulust Lõuna-Eesti 
metssigade populatsioonis (I).
SAK-i epideemia ajaline kulg ja geograafiline levik kahe erineva Eesti 
piirkonna metssigade populatsioonis viitab sellele, et SAK-i esmane 
sissetung Eestisse toimus Kirde-Eestis, mitte Lõuna-Eestis, nagu 
ametlikult kinnitati. Lisaks oli võimalik, et Kirde-Eestis epideemia oli 
põhjustatud teistsuguste omadustega viirustüve poolt (I). 
Kirde-Eestis 2014. aastal ringelnud SAK-i viirustüve bioloogilised 
omadused ei erinenud märkimisväärselt teistest SAKV-i II genotüübi 
suure virulentsusega viirustüvede bioloogilistest omadustest (võttes 
aluseks loomkatsete tulemused, mis viidi läbi noorte metssigadega). 
Vaatamata Kirde-Eesti SAKV-i tüve kõrgele virulentsusele elas üks noor 
metssiga haiguse loomkatses üle ja tervenes täielikult (II).
Haiguse läbi põdenud loomal ei tuvastatud haigustekitaja hilisemat 
kandvust. Eksperimentaalse nakatamise tulemusel haiguse läbi põdenud 
loom ei eritanud pärast täielikku tervenemist viirust ega kandnud seda 
üle tervetele sentinell-loomadele (II).
SAKV-i levik kodusigade farmide ümbruskonna metssigade 
populatsioonis oli peamine riskitegur kodusigade nakatumiseks (III).
SAKV jõudis farmi suure tõenäosusega kaudse ülekande teel saastunud 
ülekandjate (inimesed, sõidukid, seadmed ja riistad) vahendusel. 
Tõenäoliselt oli tegemist vigadega bioturvalisuse nõuete täitmisel, seda 
ka juhtudel, kui farmi üldine bioturvalisuse tase oli kõrge (III).
SAKV-i ülekanne ühest farmist teise oli erandlik, viidates SAK-i 
kodusigade tsükli puudumisele Eestis (III).
Suurtes tootmis- ja aretusfarmides oli suurem risk nakatumiseks. 
Seega peavad farmide bioturvalisuse meetmed olema kõige kõrgemal 
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võimalikul tasemel, et vältida SAK-i haiguspuhanguid nakatunud aladel 
(III).
SAK-i esimesed kliinilised tunnused nakatunud karjades olid 
ebatüüpilised. Seega peaks SAK-i nakatunud või SAK-ist ohustatud 
aladel iga ebaselge põhjusega äkksurm, abort või ka söögiisu kaotus kas 
või seafarmi ühes aedikus olema nakkuskahtluse põhjus (III).
Viiruse levik puhangufarmis oli aeglane, viidates, et SAK-i viiruse 
nakkavus on puhangu algfaasis väike. Seega ei ole loomade üldise 
haigestumuse ega suremuse näitajate seire seafarmis SAK-i puhangu 
varaseks avastamiseks piisav (III).
Haigete ning surnud kodu- ja metssigade uurimine SAK-i suhtes 
(passiivne seire) on tähtis meede haiguse varaseks avastamiseks (I, III).
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Development of African swine 
fever epidemic among wild boar in 
Estonia - two different areas in the 
epidemiological focus
Imbi Nurmoja1,2, Katja Schulz  3, Christoph Staubach3, Carola Sauter-Louis3, Klaus Depner3, 
Franz J. Conraths3 & Arvo Viltrop2
African swine fever (ASF) in wild boar emerged in Estonia for the first time in September 2014. 
The first affected region was located in the South of Estonia close to the border with Latvia. It was 
considered to be epidemiologically connected to the outbreaks in the North of Latvia. About two 
weeks later, cases were detected in the North of Estonia, close to the Russian border. In the present 
study, we aimed to investigate the epidemiological courses of the disease in the South and in the 
North of Estonia. Potential associations between risk factors and the laboratory test results for ASF 
were examined. A hierarchical Bayesian space–time model was used to analyze the temporal trend of 
the ASF seroprevalence in the two areas. Young wild boar were statistically significant more likely to 
be ASF-positive by both, serology and virus detection, than older animals. A statistically significant 
difference between the two areas in the temporal course of the seroprevalence was found. While the 
seroprevalence clearly increased in the South, it remained relatively constant in the North. These 
findings led to the hypothesis that ASF might have been introduced earlier into the North of Estonia 
then into the South of the country.
African swine fever (ASF) is a notifiable viral pig disease whose emergence usually entails huge economic con-
sequences for the pig industry1. In Europe, the disease affects both domestic pigs and European wild boar (Sus 
scrofa). Therefore, an infected wild boar population holds the constant risk to infect domestic pigs and vice versa2.
Apart from Sardinia, where ASF has been endemic since 1978, Europe was officially free from ASF since 19951. 
However, ASF was newly introduced into Georgia in 2007. From there the virus spread to neighboring countries 
such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Belarus.
The spread of the ASF virus p72 genotype II in eastern Europe has involved both domestic pigs and wild boar3. 
In 2011, the virus entered the central part of the Russian Federation, where it is now endemic3,4. In addition, sev-
eral outbreaks in domestic pig were confirmed in Northwest Russia in the region of St. Petersburg between 2009 
and 2012, about 160 km away from the Estonian border4.
In January 2014, the first ASF wild boar case was reported from Lithuania5. Subsequently, in the course of the 
year, Poland as well as Latvia confirmed ASF cases in wild boar6,7. Finally, Estonia officially reported the first ASF 
case in wild boar in September 2014.
The first ASF-positive dead wild boar in Estonia was reported on 2nd September 2014 in Valga county, six km 
from the Latvian border8 (Fig. 1). One week later, the virus was detected in wild boar in Viljandi county, which 
is also bordering Latvia. The outbreaks in the South were most likely epidemiologically connected with the epi-
demic in the North of Latvia, which had started few weeks before7. On 14th September 2014, an ASF-positive 
wild boar was found in Ida-Viru county, located in the Northeast of Estonia next to the border with the Russian 
Federation and more than 200 km away from the affected areas in the South9. The third county bordering Latvia, 
Võru county, was found infected by the end of October 2014.
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and requests for materials should be addressed to K.S. (email: katja.schulz@fli.de)
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By the end of 2014, 73 infected wild boar had been detected in Estonia; 69 of them in the southern region and 
four in the Northeast. In the first half of 2015, the disease largely remained in the infected areas. However, in the 
mid of 2015, it spread to previously uninfected areas. A total of 1,530 ASF cases in wild boar have been officially 
reported in Estonia until the end of September 201610.
There was evidence suggesting that the course of the epidemic differed between the areas in the South and 
in the Northeast of Estonia. In the Northeast, the proportion of hunted animals that were virologically negative 
but seropositive was relatively high and almost no findings of dead wild boar were reported, while in the South a 
high mortality among wild boar was observed. In addition, in the South hunted animals found infected with ASF 
were mainly virologically positive, but seronegative, while in the North also seropositive wild boar were found11 
(Table 1). Moreover, the spread of the disease in the South appeared to be more rapid as compared to the North, 
where the infection seemed to remain within one area. We found no obvious factors that may have caused differ-
ences in the reporting of fallen or hunted wild boar in these two regions. Hunting practices are similar and the 
ASF surveillance system as well as the reporting regulations are the same everywhere in Estonia.
In the present study, we aimed to analyze available data and therefore improve our understanding of the epi-
demiology of ASF and the course of the epidemic in Estonia. We tested potential associations between risk factors 
such as age, population density and carcass category (i.e. wild boar found dead or hunted) and positive virological 
or serological laboratory test results as the outcome variable. However, our main aim was to evaluate the apparent 
epidemiological differences between the infected areas in the North and the South of Estonia. To ensure the com-
parability of these two areas, we tested the hypothesis that there was a difference in the age of wild boar or in the 
carcass distribution between the different study areas.
Figure 1. The study areas and the bordering countries in the South and East. Highlighted areas illustrate 
the four included counties in the South (area S) and the one in the Northeast of Estonia (area N). Map was 








Averaged prevalence within 
the study period (%) 95% CI
N 1,174 1,152 22 2.0 1.1–3.0
N1 353 351 2 0.8 0.2–3.5
N2 821 801 20 2.4 1.5–3.7
S 5,841 5,039 802 13.7 12.8–14.6
S1 2,670 2,301 369 13.8 12.5–15.2
S2 3,171 2,738 433 13.7 12.5–14.9
Table 1. ASFV genome positive and -negative wild boar samples, averaged prevalences and 95% confidence 
intervals (calculated using R) for the study areas (N = study area North, N1 = first 12 months of the study 
period, N2 = second 13 months of the study period; S = study area South, S1 = first 12 months of the study 
period, S2 = second 13 months of the study period).
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Material and Methods
Study area. Estonia is administratively divided into 15 counties (first level administrative division). The local 
governance is on municipality level (second level administrative division). Each county comprises of several 
municipalities (cities or towns and rural municipalities). During the study period 183 rural municipalities existed 
in Estonia.
We defined two different study areas in Estonia based on county level. The southern region (area S) comprised 
four counties (50 municipalities), namely Valga (2,044 km²), Viljandi (3,422 km²), Võru (2,305 km²) and Tartu 
(2,993 km²), of which the latter is the only one not bordering Latvia. The infected region in the Northeast (area 
N) bordering the Russian Federation included only one county (21 municipalities), Ida-Viru (3,364 km2) (Fig. 1).
Sampling and sample analysis. Wild boar were sampled based on the Estonian animal disease control 
program and included both wild boar found dead and hunted animals. Wild boar found dead, including animals 
killed in road traffic accidents or shot sick, were sampled in the whole country irrespectively of the ASF status of 
the area (passive surveillance). However, the sampling scheme of hunted wild boar (active surveillance) changed 
several times depending on the ASF status of the affected area. These changes were due to updates of European 
Commission Implementing Decision 2014/709/EU. In practice, in areas where wild boar were affected by ASF 
(Decision 2014/709/EU, Part II), all hunted wild boar were sampled, whereas in areas at risk of getting infected, 
but without previous detection of ASF cases (Decision 2014/709/EU, Part I), approx. 2% of hunted wild boar were 
tested.
From hunted wild boar, blood samples were collected for ASFV genome and antibody detection by hunters 
immediately after hunting, whereas organ (kidney, spleen, lymph node) or bone marrow samples from animals 
found dead were collected for virus genome analysis by official veterinarians shortly after detection of the animals 
had been reported (within 24 hours). Although the quality of samples varied among all sample types, this had no 
significant impact on the performance of the PCR test. The test result was only reported as valid if correct test per-
formance was confirmed, also by using an appropriate internal control. A total of 30 bone marrow and 57 serum 
samples were found unfit for PCR testing and therefore excluded.
Real-time PCR (used for virus genome detection), enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) and the 
indirect immunoperoxydase technique (IPT) (both used for antibody detection) were conducted at the Estonian 
Veterinary and Food Laboratory the National Reference Laboratory for ASF in Estonia. Real-time PCR was per-
formed according to the protocol published by Tignon, et al.12. Although specific values for the diagnostic sensi-
tivity and specificity of this protocol have not been published, a high sensitivity and a specificity of almost 100% 
can be assumed after extensive validation of the method12,13. A commercially available blocking ELISA (Ingezim 
PPA COMPAC, Ingenasa, Madrid, Spain) was used according to the manufacturer’s instructions (sensitivity: 98%, 
specificity: 100%). In the case of an inconclusive ELISA result, the sample was re-tested in the IPT for confirma-
tion. If samples were tested by both ELISA and IPT, the outcome of the IPT was considered as the final result.
For IPT, a protocol provided by the European Union Reference Laboratory for ASF (CISA-INIA, Valdeolmos, 
Spain) with a sensitivity of 98.2% and specificity from 99.0% to 100% (when used as an individual test), was used. 
If samples were sent to the European Union Reference Laboratory, this test was also used for the detection of 
antibodies in organ and bone marrow samples14,15.
Data. For the analyses, surveillance data from 1st September 2014 until the 30th September 2016 (25 months) 
were used. In addition, the study period was divided into two parts for the prevalence analyses in each study area 
(N and S). The virus prevalences and seroprevalences were not only analyzed for entire duration of the study 
period (25 months), but also separately for the first 12 and the last 13 months. Surveillance data of 2015 and 2016 
were extracted from the CSF / ASF wild boar surveillance database of the EU Reference Laboratory (https://pub-
lic.surv-wildboar.eu/Default.aspx). The data for 2014 were obtained from the database of the Estonian Veterinary 
and Food Laboratory. It comprised 1,957 data records in total. In the final set, data from counties outside the 
study area were removed. The data set finally used included information on the place (county and municipality 
level), year and month of sampling, age (assessed by the hunters) and the origin of wild boar (carcass: hunted or 
found dead), the virological and serological test results and the population density.
We used wild boar population data provided by the Estonian Environment Agency (Nature department). The 
data were collected using different methods, such as hunting bag statistics, snow-track counts and hunter esti-
mation16–18. Population data were available of the hunting years 2013, 2014 and 2015. The numbers of wild boar 
were recorded at the end of the according hunting year in the pre-reproductive time (observation dates: march 
2014, 2015 and 2016). Data were available as integer numbers per hunting district. A hunting district is defined 
as an area for big game hunt with a size of at least 5,000 hectares according to the Estonian Hunting Act19. To use 
the data for analyses, we aggregated them at the municipality level. Utilizing the software ArcGIS ArcMap 10.3.1 
(ESRI, Redlands, CA, USA, http://www.esri.com/), the wild boar density per km² was calculated based on the 
estimated number of wild boar per hunting ground. The area of hunting grounds that overlapped with the terri-
tories of at least two municipalities, were proportionally attributed to the territory of each municipality. By means 
of the wild boar density per km² and the adapted hunting grounds, the total number of wild boar per municipality 
was calculated. Finally, wild boar densities were determined for each municipality.
Statistical analyses. All statistical analyses were performed using the software package R (http://
www.r-project.org)20. We estimated stratified period prevalences over time and space and calculated confidence 
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To test for statistically significant associations between presumed risk factors and a positive virological or 
serological test results for ASF on the animal level, the Fisher’s exact test was performed using the whole data set. 
Accordingly, the potential association between age and the laboratory test results was investigated. The animals 
were attributed to the age classes “juvenile” (<1 year) and “adult” (>1 year). Potential associations between the 
carcass categories (“hunted” or “found dead”) and the laboratory test results were also examined. Furthermore, 
the age distribution within the two carcass categories was analyzed.
When testing for potential associations between the population density and positive ASF laboratory test 
results, the municipalities as the variable of interest were categorized depending on their test results (0 = only 
negative test results within the study period, 1 = at least one positive test result within the study period). Since the 
distribution of the data was not known, the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test was used for statistical analy-
sis. For this purpose, population densities were averaged over the reported years and assigned to each municipal-
ity. Due to lack of knowledge on the distribution of the data, the hypothesis that the population densities differed 
between the two study areas was also tested using the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test.
The hypothesis that the age or carcass distribution was different between the study areas was examined using 
Fisher’s exact test. This test was also used to examine potential associations between the study areas and the viro-
logical or serological status of wild boar.
Model analyses. To test for a temporal and spatial effect within the two study areas, a hierarchical Bayesian 
space–time model was used22,23. The model was only applied for the seroprevalence. The period for detecting 
the viral genome in hunted animals is generally short, which is likely to lead to false-negative results, i.e. animals 
that were ASF-positive, but not at the time of sampling or not in the available sample, have to be regarded as 
uninfected. Therefore, a stable trend analysis can only be performed with the serological results. The implemen-
tation of the model was adapted from the one described by Staubach, et al.22. Variables identified as statistically 
significant by univariable analyses were included as fixed effects, whereas space and time were treated as random 
effects. The analyses were conducted separately for each of the study areas (area N and area S) on municipality 
level using BayesX 2.0.1 (http://www.uni-goettingen.de/de/bayesx/550513.html). A Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
algorithm (MCMC) was applied to estimate the parameters of the model. Figures were generated by using the 
software package R (http://www.r-project.org)20 and maps created using the software ArcGIS ArcMap 10.3.1 
(ESRI, Redlands, CA, USA, http://www.esri.com/).
Results
Data. After removing data from other counties then the study area, 7,015 data records were available for anal-
yses. Within the study period of 25 months, 7,015 samples had been investigated virologically (Table 1) and 6,306 
samples also serologically by ELISA. Only 319 samples were tested by IPT because the method had not yet been 
implemented in the beginning of the epidemic (Table 2).
Statistical analyses. A statistically significant association between age and the positive laboratory test 
results was found for both, real-time PCR and serology by ELISA/IPT (p < 0.001). Based on the results, the prob-
ability to detect an ASFV- or antibody-positive animal was higher in young animals ( < 1 year) (real-time PCR: 
OR = 1.57, 95% CI = 1.35–1.83; serology: OR = 1.89, 95% CI = 1.45–2.47). Also, regarding the carcass category 
(hunted or found dead), a statistically significant association was found (p-value < 0.001). The probability to find 
a real-time PCR- or antibody-positive animal was higher in animals found dead (real-time PCR: OR = 69.60, 
95% CI = 56.89–85.15; serology: OR = 4.53, 95% CI = 2.83–7.25). No statistically significant difference in the 
distribution of the two age classes within the carcass categories was detected (p-value = 0.420). In both, hunted 
wild boar and those found dead, the proportion of old animals was slightly higher (see Supplementary Figure S1).
A significant association was found between the wild boar population density and the test results regarding 
both ASFV genome detection by real-time PCR and serology (real-time PCR, p < 0.001; serology, p = 0.009). 
ASFV-positive municipalities had a higher population density than ASFV-negative ones (Fig. 2).
The age distribution of sampled wild boar was similar in areas S and N (p-value = 0.566) (see Supplementary 
Figure S2). However, the distribution of wild boar found dead and hunted animals was different (p-value < 0.001); 








Averaged prevalence within 
the study period (%) 95% CI (%)
N 1,142 1,098 44 3.9 2.8–5.1
N1 338 313 25 7.4 4.8–10.7
N2 804 785 19 2.4 1.4–3.7
S 5,164 4,977 187 3.6 3.1–4.2
S1 2,315 2,281 34 1.5 1.0–2.0
S2 2,849 2,696 153 5.4 4.6–6.3
Table 2. ASF antibody-positive and -negative wild boar samples, averaged prevalences and 95% confidence 
intervals (calculated using R) for the study areas (N = study area North, N1 = first half of the study period (12 
months), N2 = second half of the study period (13 months); S = study area South, S1 = first 12 months of the 
study period, S2 = second 13 months of the study period).
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Figure S3). In area S, the population density was significantly higher than in area N (p-value < 0.001) (see 
Supplementary Figure S4).
The prevalence of ASFV genome-positive wild boar was significantly higher in study area S as comped to 
area N (p-value < 0.001). However, there was no significant difference in the seroprevalence between these areas 
(p-value = 0.728).
Model analyses. Due to the results of the univariable analyses, namely the significant association between 
age, carcass category, population density and the serological test results, these factors were included in the hier-
archical Bayesian space–time model as fixed effects. In area N, age and population density showed a significant 
effect on the serological test result, whereas in area S, age and carcass category, but not population density resulted 
in a significant effect on the test results (Table 3 and Table 4).
The analyses of sample sizes resulting from active surveillance at municipality level showed in both study areas 
that the sample sizes differed considerably among municipalities and over time (Figs 3 and 4). Spatial analysis 
on the basis of the Bayesian model confirmed a different trend of the seroprevalences within the two study areas, 
which was already evident from the raw prevalence data. In area N, the highest prevalences were observed in one 
municipality in the western part of Ida-Viru county over the entire study period. In 2015 (data of all 12 months 
were included in the analyses), the prevalences were also higher in municipalities located more east, but in 2014 
(data of four months were included) the sample sizes were too small to obtain reliable prevalence estimates for 
these municipalities. In 2016 (data of nine months were included), the infection expanded also to municipalities 
located in the South of area N (Fig. 3). In area S, the infection spread over time within the wild boar population. 
In contrast to area N, the prevalences were high in the municipalities bordering Latvia in 2014 and in the course 
of the following years, an expansion of the affected areas towards the North occurred (Fig. 4).
In both areas, N and S, the small sample sizes have to be considered when interpreting the results.
The spatial analyses yielded a clear median spatial effect on the logit prevalence per municipality in the North 
of area N. In the eastern and very southern part of the county, a negative spatial effect was found. The wild boar 
population density was higher in the western part of area N as compared to the eastern area bordering Russia 
(Fig. 5).
In area S, the strongest dynamic of infection, shown by a structured spatial effect (Fig. 6), became evident in 
some of the municipalities bordering Latvia and the ones located further north. Negative spatial effects were seen 
in the municipalities in the West and the East of the study area (Fig. 6). In area S, the average population density 
was higher than in area N. In both areas, the population density decreased over time (Figs 5 and 6).
The temporal analyses resulted in a significant difference of the median temporal effect on the logit prevalence 
between the two study areas. In contrast to area N, where no temporal effect was observed, a significant increasing 
trend during the whole study period of 25 months was seen in area S (Fig. 7).
Figure 2. Population density (number of wild boar/km²) in the municipalities of the study areas stratified by 
the virological and serological test result at the municipality level. Ag: ASFV genome detection, Ab: antibody 
detection. Figure was generated by using the software package R (http://www.r-project.org)20.
Model Mean SD Median (95% BCI) Mean/St.Dev.*
Constant −2.735 0.938 −2.687 (−4.678; −0.842)
Carcass −0.732 1.292 −0.620 (−3.708; 1.424) 0.567
Age 0.737 0.348 0.741 (0.062; 1.394) 2.122
Population density −5.713 2.899 −5.573 (−11.841; −0.274) 1.971
Table 3. Parameter estimates obtained from the Bayesian model for three factors in area North (N); BCI: 
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Discussion
When ASF emerged in Estonia in 2014, two different areas, namely in the North and in the South, were affected. 
Although the events in the South were connected with ASF outbreaks in the North of Latvia7, only Estonian data 
were analyzed. Variations in the course of the ASF epidemic in the two areas led to the hypothesis that the events 
might be independent and differ in their epidemiology. The aim of this study was to test this hypothesis and to 
describe the epidemiology of the ASF epidemic in wild boar in defined areas of Estonia.
The study area in the South comprised four counties with a total area of 10,764 km², whereas the study area 
in the North consisted only of one county with a size of 3,364 km². In the South, not only the area under inves-
tigation was bigger but also in that area the wild boar density was higher. Therefore, the number of investigated 
samples was higher in the South. Confidence intervals therefore need to be considered when interpreting the 
results. Furthermore, the observed incidence per spatial unit and time step is not a useful estimate of the underly-
ing disease prevalence due to different sample sizes as well as temporal spatial dependencies between neighboring 
areas. By applying a hierarchical Bayesian space–time model, the extra-sample variation and spatial/temporal 
correlations in the data were accounted for. The chosen model is suitable to analyze data with gaps and particu-
larly variable sample sizes per spatial and temporal unit22,23. To estimate the fitness of the model the deviance 
information criterion (DIC) was used24.
It was found that the probability to detect an ASFV genome- or antibody-positive animal was higher in young 
wild boar. This stands in contrast to the results of experimental studies, where no age-dependent degree of sus-
ceptibility could be detected25,26. However, recent experiments with a small number of animals showed that young 
animals survived long enough to develop antibodies, even in the case of acute-lethal courses of ASF. All these ani-
mals were also tested PCR positive27. Further field and experimental studies are therefore needed for clarification. 
Statistical analyses resulted also in a higher probability to find virologically and serologically positive animals in 
wild boar found dead than in hunted wild boar. This is very likely to be due to the high lethality of ASF. These 
findings once more emphasize the need of an increased effort to support passive surveillance and to encourage 
hunters to focus on the detection and sampling of dead wild boar28,29.
The present study demonstrated a statistically significant positive association between population density 
and the municipality status regarding ASF (by ASFV genome detection or serology). This may be due to the fact 
that in densely populated regions the transmission rate between wild boar is higher, since it is known that direct 
contact between wild boar is strongly beneficial for transmission of ASF30–32.
The findings regarding the association between age, carcass and population density and the serological test 
results were supported by analyses of virological data and the appropriate result, which showed the same associa-
tions. (IPT: specificity approximately 100%)5. Only 22 samples originating from 22 animals found dead showed a 
serologically positive test result, because laboratory routine procedures did not include antibody detection from 
organ and bone marrow samples. However, the strong association between animals found dead and a positive 
virological test result still point at the importance of detecting and sampling wild boar found dead29.
To be able to include the factor population density in the analyses, data had to be transferred from the hunting 
district level to the municipality level. The applied method certainly led to a slight deviation from true wild boar 
densities. However, the density data at the hunting district level are mere estimates of hunters, based on their 
account of the hunting bag. In addition, the population density is subject to constant change. The reliability of 
these data is therefore always a challenge. The available hunting data originated from the pre-reproductive period 
before most females give birth. Accordingly, it can be assumed that at another time point of data capture, the 
number of wild boar per km² would be clearly higher.
It was not surprising that the age distribution was the same in the area N and S. This result demonstrates that 
the population structure was similar in the two areas, which may be due to similar hunting practices. This jus-
tifies comparing the results of the laboratory investigations for N and S. The proportion of the sampled animals 
found dead was significantly higher in area S. The significantly higher average ASFV genome prevalence in area S 
may be seen as a result of the significantly higher number of animals found dead in study area S and their higher 
chance to be positive by ASFV genome detection.
The Bayesian model was only applied for serology. Due to the fact that ASFV in wild boar samples is only 
detectable over a very limited period of time32 and that no measurable memory effect is available, a trend analyses 
was not feasible with regard to the results of ASFV genome detection.
The results of the univariable analyses differed slightly from the ones obtained by Bayesian modelling. For the 
univariable analyses, this may be explained by the inclusion of the whole data set, independently of the study area 
whereas for the Bayesian model the data were analyzed for area N and area S separately. Also, data were adjusted 
for space and time in the model. Still, in both areas, the significant association between age and the serological 
result could be confirmed. In contrast to the univariable analyses, in area S, a significant association was shown 
between carcass category and serology. This might be due to the higher relative number of animals found dead in 
Model Mean SD Median (95% BCI) Mean/St.Dev.*
Constant −4.370 0.344 −4.371 (−5.081; −3.737)
Carcass 1.533 0.342 1.544 (0.820; 2.100) 4.480
Age 0.580 0.173 0.579 (0.244; 0.924) 3.357
Population density 0.443 0.604 0.446 (−0.734; 1.600) 0.733
Table 4. Parameter estimates obtained from the Bayesian model for three factors in area South (S); BCI: 
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area S and accordingly their greater importance in the epidemics. Population density showed a significant effect 
on the seroprevalence in area N, which is consistent with the results of the univariable analyses. In area S, popula-
tion density had no significant effect, which may be explained by the bigger size of study area S as compared to N 
and the associated heterogeneity of the population densities in the single municipalities.
The spatial effect on the logit prevalence indicates a difference between the respective courses of infection in 
the two study areas. In area N, the infection seemed to be stable in one area. In contrast, in area S, in 2014 the 
prevalences were high in the areas bordering Latvia and the infection seemed to move North over time. This 
Figure 3. Seroprevalences and 95% confidence intervals for sampled wild boar per municipality in study area 
N (Ida-Viru county) in 2014 (Sept. – Dec.), 2015 (Jan. – Dec.) and 2016 (Jan. – Sept.). Maps were generated by 
using ArcGIS ArcMap 10.3.1 (ESRI, Redlands, CA, USA, http://www.esri.com/).
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spread may have been supported by the higher population density in area S, which makes a higher transmission 
rate likely30. Although the prevalence seemed to increase in the center of study area S, the width of the 95% CI 
was also increasing. This is probably due to the ASF-related decrease of the wild boar population in these munic-
ipalities over time and thus to the lower number of investigated samples. The findings of the spatial analysis also 
support the hypothesis that the infection was already present in area N for a longer period of time, whereas it was 
still spreading in area S at the time when the study was conducted. Accordingly, since the epidemic in the South 
did not reach its climax and did not stop spreading, it is impossible to prove these hypotheses at the moment. 
Figure 4. Seroprevalences and 95% confidence intervals for sampled wild boar per municipality in study area 
S (Viljandi, Tartu, Valga and Voru county) 2014 (Sept. – Dec.), 2015 (Jan. – Dec.) and 2016 (Jan. – Sept.). Maps 
were generated by using ArcGIS ArcMap 10.3.1 (ESRI, Redlands, CA, USA, http://www.esri.com/).
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However, it would be advisable to re-analyze the situation in the two areas in one or two years again. The inci-
dence of ASF currently seems to level off and no increase of seroprevalence is observed anymore, we expect that 
the situation in area S will then result in a similar picture as now observed in area N.
Although the average seroprevalence over the study period of 25 months did not differ significantly between 
the two areas, the temporal trend analysis showed a significant difference in the course of infection. The number 
of data sets per municipality and per analyzed time point was relatively small, but our data suggest that the trend 
varied between the two areas, also when on the Bayesian credibility intervals were taken into account.
The increase of the temporal logit prevalence in area S led to the assumption that ASF was newly introduced 
into that area, that naïve animals got infected and that the proportion of animals developing antibodies subse-
quently grew. By contrast, no temporal effect was seen in area N. These assumptions were supported by the results 
of the descriptive analyses. In study area S, the average seroprevalence showed an increase over time, whereas in 
Figure 5. Median-structured spatial effect on the logit prevalence per municipality in study area N (Ida-Viru 
county) for the study period of 25 months. Maps in the lower row show the population density (number of wild 
boar/km²) for each municipality in study area N. Maps were generated by using ArcGIS ArcMap 10.3.1 (ESRI, 
Redlands, CA, USA, http://www.esri.com/).
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area N the average prevalence of antibody-positive wild boar was even lower in the last 13 months of the study 
period. We therefore hypothesize that ASF may have been present a longer time period in area N before the start 
of the study period, i.e. before the first case was officially confirmed. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that 
several outbreaks had occurred in the St. Petersburg area4, located only 160 km away from the Estonian border 
and connected with Ida-Viru county through a highly frequented highway between 2009 and 2012. Furthermore, 
the very small sample sizes at the beginning of the study period (September 2014) and the ones of 2012, 2013 
and of the beginning of 2014, i.e. before ASF was officially detected in Estonia, made an earlier detection virtually 
impossible. In the study of Nurmoja et al.11, two different hypotheses were formulated. As in the present study, the 
authors postulated that an undetected epidemic may have occurred in the North of Estonia, which had started 
earlier. This may explain the different courses of the epidemics in the North and in the South. However, Nurmoja 
Figure 6. Median-structured spatial effect on the logit prevalence per municipality in study area S (Viljandi, 
Tartu, Valga and Voru county) for the study period of 25 months. Maps in the lower row show the population 
density (number of wild boar/km²) for each municipality in area S. Maps were generated by using ArcGIS 
ArcMap 10.3.1 (ESRI, Redlands, CA, USA, http://www.esri.com/).
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et al.11 also tested the hypothesis that the ASF strain in the North might be less virulent. Although one animal had 
recovered from an infection with the ASFV strain circulating in the North of Estonia, this virus still proofed to 
be highly virulent.
Active ASF surveillance in wild boar in Estonia started in 2012. In 2012 and 2013, according to the annual sur-
veillance plan, it was obligatory to investigate serologically 0.5–1% of hunted wild boar, while virological investi-
gations were not performed. In 2012, the total number of investigated wild boar in the whole of Estonia was 122; 
three samples were taken in area N and 21 in area S. In 2013, the total number of investigated wild boar in Estonia 
was 279, including six samples from area N and 65 samples from area S. Our analyses showed that even at the 
beginning of the epidemics in Estonia, the sample sizes in the area bordering Russia in the North were too small 
to have a reasonable chance of detecting ASF infections. By assuming an unknown population size and perfect 
specificity, it had been necessary to test at least 66 samples with a negative result to show that ASFV prevalence 
was below 5%. To detect the virus with a design prevalence of 1% the required sample size would have been over 
300 samples (http://epitools.ausvet.com.au/content.php?page=home). When the true sample sizes mentioned 
above are taken into consideration, it becomes obvious, that the infection would have remained undetected, if it 
had been present already in 2013 or 2012. However, it must be assumed that a new emergence of ASF in a naïve 
wild boar population should have led to an increased mortality in wild boar. Such incidences were not reported in 
the years before the official outbreak in 2014. However, detecting dead wild boar might be difficult in areas with 
such a low population density as reported for area N28. In addition, the population density was even lower in the 
Eastern part of area N than in the other parts of the area. Accordingly, it might be practically impossible to reach 
the required sample sizes in areas with such a small wild boar population.
In summary, we studied the epidemiology of ASF in two areas in Estonia. The temporal and spatial differ-
ences in the course of the epidemic in the two areas suggest that the first introduction of ASF took place in the 
Northeast of Estonia and not, as previously assumed, in the South. This first introduction may have happened 
several months before Estonia was officially declared as affected by ASF.
These findings may initiate a revision and adaptation of current surveillance activities in countries that are at 
risk of ASF introduction, to prevent an unnoticed introduction of the disease and its spread29.
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Supplementary Figure S1: Number of samples from animals hunted or found dead (carcass categories) stratified by age 




Supplementary Figure S2: Number of samples from juvenile and adult animals stratified by study area (area North [N], area 
South [S]). 
 
Supplementary Figure S3: Number of samples from animals hunted or found dead (carcass categories) stratified by study 
area (area North [N], area South [S]). 
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Summary
Due to its impact on animal health and pig industry, African swine fever (ASF) is
regarded as one of the most important viral diseases of pigs. Following the ongoing
epidemic in the Transcaucasian countries and the Russian Federation, African swine
fever virus was introduced into the Estonian wild boar population in 2014. Epidemi-
ological investigations suggested two different introductions into the southern and
the north-eastern part of Estonia. Interestingly, outbreak characteristics varied
considerably between the affected regions. While high mortality and mainly virus-
positive animals were observed in the southern region, mortality was low in the
north-eastern area. In the latter, clinically healthy, antibody-positive animals were
found in the hunting bag and detection of virus was rare. Two hypotheses could
explain the different behaviour in the north-east: (i) the frequency of antibody
detections combined with the low mortality is the tail of an older, so far undetected
epidemic wave coming from the east, or (ii) the virus in this region is attenuated
and leads to a less severe clinical outcome. To explore the possibility of virus atten-
uation, a re-isolated ASFV strain from the north-eastern Ida-Viru region was biologi-
cally characterized in European wild boar. Oronasal inoculation led to an acute and
severe disease course in all animals with typical pathomorphological lesions. How-
ever, one animal recovered completely and was subsequently commingled with
three sentinels of the same age class to assess disease transmission. By the end of
the trial at 96 days post-initial inoculation, all animals were completely healthy and
neither virus nor viral genomes were detected in the sentinels or the survivor. The
survivor, however, showed high antibody levels. In conclusion, the ASFV strain from
north-eastern Estonia was still highly virulent but nevertheless, one animal recov-
ered completely. Under the experimental conditions, no transmission occurred from
the survivor to susceptible sentinel pigs.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
African swine fever (ASF) is one of the most important and com-
plex notifiable diseases of domestic and wild pigs. It is caused by
the eponymous virus which belongs to the genus Asfivirus within
the Asfarviridae family (Takamatsu et al., 2011). Depending on host
and virus factors, the disease can run acute, subacute and chronic
courses. The former is especially linked to highly virulent virus
strains and is characterized by severe clinical signs including high
fever, general depression, anorexia, gastrointestinal signs, neurolog-
ical disorders and haemorrhagic lesions in the final stage of the
disease (Sanchez-Vizcaıno et al., 2009). In general, the disease
course does not differ when comparing European wild boar
and domestic pigs (Blome, Gabriel, & Beer, 2013; Gabriel et al.,
2011).
In 2007, a highly virulent genotype II ASF virus (ASFV) was
introduced into Georgia and subsequently into several
Transcaucasian countries, the Russian Federation and, in 2014, into
the European Union (OIE WAHID, visited 18 September 2016).
Among the currently affected countries is Estonia. Estonian authori-
ties reported the first outbreaks in wild boar in September 2014,
and in this year, a total of 41 ASF cases in wild boar were found in
four different counties of fifteen. In the first 4 months of 2015, 52
new wild boar cases were reported from four previously infected
counties in the southern (three affected counties) and north-eastern
part (Ida-Viru county) of the country (see Figure 1). By December
2015, the number of ASF cases in wild boar had risen to 723, and
11 counties were affected almost all over the territory of Estonia.
Apart from the wild boar population, 18 ASF outbreaks were
reported from the domestic pig sector in 2015. Interestingly, out-
break characteristics varied considerably between the southern
introduction and the north-eastern introduction. While high mortal-
ity (up to 16 dead animals found in one place) and mainly virus-
positive animals were observed in the southern affected region,
F IGURE 1 ASF cases in Estonia, the other
Baltic EU Member States, and Poland from
September 2014 to end of April 2015
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mortality was low in the north-eastern outbreak area. In the latter,
clinically healthy, antibody-positive animals were found in the hunt-
ing bag and detection of virus or viral genome was rare. To explain
the different behaviour of the virus in the north-east, two hypothe-
ses were phrased: (i) the frequency of antibody detections com-
bined with the low mortality is the manifestation of an older, so far
undetected epidemic wave coming from the east; that is, we see its
tail represented by surviving animals, or (ii) the virus in this region
is attenuated and leads to less severe courses. An attenuated virus
could significantly complicate disease detection and may facilitate
long-term endemicity.
To test hypothesis (ii) we made an attempt to re-isolate the virus
from PCR-positive organ samples from the Ida-Viru region. While
isolation in macrophage cultures failed, the virus could be re-isolated
by animal passage. Subsequently, the resulting virus was biologically
characterized in terms of disease course, virology and serology in
ten young wild boar at the Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut (FLI), Isle of
Riems, Germany.
2 | MATERIALS AND METHODS
2.1 | Experimental design
To re-isolate the causative ASFV strain from weak PCR-positive
organ samples from Ida-Viru, three young wild boar were intramus-
cularly inoculated with an organ homogenate in standard cell culture
medium (no viral growth in macrophage cultures). Upon onset of
clinical signs and confirmation of infection by real-time PCR (qPCR),
the animals were euthanized and standardized blood and organ sam-
ples were collected during necropsy. A pooled spleen suspension
with a titre of 104.5 haemadsorbing units (HAU) per ml was subse-
quently used for the trial detailed below.
The main study included a total of ten European wild boar from
the breeding unit at the FLI aged approximately 4 month at the start
of the trial. The animals were moved from the FLI quarantine stables
into the high containment facilities (L3+) where they were kept in
one pig pen. All animals were individually ear-tagged with numbers
#11 to #20. Over the course of the trial, the animals were fed a
commercial pig food with corn and hay–cob supplement and had
access to water ad libitum. After an acclimatization phase, the wild
boar were inoculated oronasally with 2 ml of the above-mentioned
spleen suspension. Clinical parameters of all animals were assessed
daily based on a harmonized scoring system as previously described
(Pietschmann et al., 2015). In brief, parameters anorexia, recum-
bency, joint lesions, breathing, ocular discharge, digestive findings
and neurological disorders were assigned points according to the
severity of findings. The sum of the points was recorded as the clini-
cal score (CS) that was also used to define humane endpoints. Over
the course of the trial, levels of viremia, virus distribution, virus
shedding and antibody responses were assessed. For this purpose,
blood samples were collected along with oropharyngeal and faecal
swabs at days 0, 4, 7 and 10 post-inoculation (dpi), and at the day of
necropsy. Animals reaching the humane endpoint or that were
suffering unacceptably without reaching the endpoint were eutha-
nized through intracardial injection of embutramide (T61, Merck)
after deep anaesthesia with tiletamine/zolazepam (Zoletil, Virbac).
Necropsy was performed on all animals, and at the same time, tissue
samples (lymph nodes, spleen, tonsil, salivary gland, lung and liver),
blood (EDTA, serum) and swab samples were collected for reference
purposes.
At the end of the initial trial, one wild boar (#19) had recovered
completely. To assess virus transmission to susceptible animals, the
survivor was commingled with three sentinel wild boar (#1, #2, #3)
from day 50 post-initial inoculation. The sentinels were roughly the
same age and were purchased from a game park in Mecklenburg–
Western Pomerania. The trial ended at 96 dpi. At this day, the
remaining animals were euthanized and subjected to necropsy as
described above.
In all trial parts, all applicable animal welfare regulations, includ-
ing EU Directive 2010/63/EC and institutional guidelines, were
taken into consideration. The animal experiments were approved by
the competent authority under reference number 7221.3-2-023/15.
2.2 | Cells
Blood for the preparation of peripheral blood mononuclear cell
(PBMC)-derived macrophages was collected from healthy domestic
donor pigs. In brief, PBMCs were obtained from EDTA-anticoagu-
lated blood using Pancoll animal density gradient medium (PAN Bio-
tech, Aidenbach, Germany). PBMCs were grown in RPMI-1640 cell
culture medium with 4-(2-hydroxyethyl)-1-piperazineethanesulfonic
acid (HEPES) and 10% foetal calf serum (FCS) at 37°C in a humidi-
fied atmosphere containing 5% CO2. The medium was supplied with
amphotericin B, streptomycin and penicillin to avoid bacterial and
fungal growth. To facilitate maturation of macrophages, GM-CSF
(granulocyte macrophage colony-stimulating factor; Biomol, Ham-
burg, Germany) was added to the cell culture medium at 2 ng/ml.
2.3 | Laboratory investigations
2.3.1 | Processing of samples
Oropharyngeal swabs were soaked in 1 ml of medium (EMEM with-
out addition of FCS), vortexed for approximately 15 s, incubated for
1 hr at room temperature and decanted in microcentrifuge tubes.
Serum samples, which were obtained from native blood by centrifu-
gation at 2,500 g for 20 min at 20°C, were aliquoted and stored at
80°C until further use. Tissue samples of tonsil, spleen, salivary
gland, liver, lung and lymph nodes were collected at necropsy and
stored at 80°C. For qPCR and virus isolation (haemadsorption
tests), tissue samples were homogenized in 1 ml phosphate-buffered
saline (PBS) using a TissueLyser II (Qiagen GmbH).
2.3.2 | Virus detection
For qPCR, viral nucleic acid was extracted, using the QIAamp RNA
Viral Mini Kit (Qiagen) or the NucleoMag Vet Kit (MACHEREY-
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NAGEL) and the KingFisher extraction platform (Thermo Scientific).
Both extraction methods were slightly modified through the addition
of an internal control DNA. The nucleic acid extraction was per-
formed with 75 ll of whole blood and 150 ll of organ homogenate
and swab material. Subsequently, qPCR was performed according to
the protocol published by King et al. (2003) with slight modifications.
For confirmatory reason, the virotype ASFV PCR Kit (Qiagen) was
employed according to the manufacturer’s instructions. Results of
both qPCRs were recorded as quantification cycle (cq) values.
To detect ASFV in serum and tissue samples, a haemadsorption
test (HAT) was carried out using PBMC-derived macrophages accord-
ing to the slightly modified standard procedures (Carrascosa, Bustos, &
de Leon, 2011). In brief, isolated PBMCs were seeded into a 96-well
microplate with a density of app. 1.9 9 106 cells/ml. After 16–24 hr,
non-adherent cells were removed and cell culture medium containing
GM-CSF was replenished. The culture was then incubated for 24–
48 hr to allow initial maturation of macrophages. Subsequently, 20 ll
of serum samples and 30 ll of organ homogenate were added to each
well. Tests were performed in duplicates. When using organ homoge-
nates, cells were washed after 2 hr of adsorption time using lukewarm
PBS, whereas serum was left on the cells until the evaluation of the
test. After 24 hr of incubation, 20 ll of homologues 1% erythrocyte
suspension was added to each well. For read-out, cultures were anal-
ysed for haemadsorption phenomena over a period of 2 days. Virus
back-titration was performed by endpoint titration of the diluted
spleen suspensions. In this case, the PBMC preparation was seeded
into 96-well microplates, the test volume was 100 ll per dilution step,
and 20 ll of a 1% homologous erythrocyte suspension was added.
These samples were tested in quadruplicate.
2.3.3 | Antibody detection
For the detection of antibodies against African swine fever virus, two
commercial enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays (ELISA) were carried
out following the manufacturer’s instructions (Ingezim PPA COMPAC,
Ingenasa; ID SCREEN African swine fever virus INDIRECT, IDvet). The
Ingezim PPA ELISA detects antibodies directed against p72 in a
competitive format. The ID SCREEN is an indirect ELISA using antigens
p32, p62 and p72. All serum samples were tested in duplicate.
All data were recorded and evaluated using Microsoft Excel
2010 (Microsoft Deutschland GmbH) and SigmaPlot for Windows
version 11.0 (Systat Software, Inc.).
3 | RESULTS
3.1 | Clinical course and pathomorphological
findings
Following oronasal inoculation, all animals developed severe,
unspecific clinical signs starting from 4 to 6 dpi including general
depression, lack of appetite, huddling and respiratory distress. Three
animals reacted with some delay, namely animals #17, #18 and #19.
These animals were still very active and interested in food at day 4
and showed only mild signs on day 7. Between days 7 and 13, all
but one animal (#19) showed worsening clinical signs with dyspnoea
and ataxia and were euthanized in a moribund state or died over-
night spontaneously (#16). Wild boar #19 showed decreasing sever-
ity of clinical signs starting app. 14 dpi and completely recovered




F IGURE 2 Examples of gross pathological findings during necropsy of acute lethally infected wild boar upon infection with the ASFV strain
from north-eastern Estonia. (a) Haemorrhagic intestinal lymph nodes and striate bleedings in the gut. (b) Ebony-coloured, haemorrhagic lymph
nodes in the gastrohepatic area. (c) Lung oedema, fibrinous pleuritis and haemorrhages; (d) and (e) petechiae in the kidney; (f) kidney petechiae
and infarction
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During necropsy, typical ASF lesions of varying severity were
observed in all animals that succumbed to infection (for exemplary
findings, see Figure 2). Lesions ranged from slight lung oedema and
ebony-coloured gastrohepatic lymph nodes to multiple haemorrhages
in several organs, haemorrhagic and oedematous lymph nodes in all
parts of the body and severe lung oedema. Sporadic findings
included gall bladder oedema, renal infarction, gastritis and arthritis.
Severity of lesions increased with time in the experiment.
After commingling of the survivor with three sentinels, no clinical
signs were observed and all animals stayed in good health until the
end of the trial at day 96. No ASF-related lesions were observed
during necropsy.
F IGURE 3 Genome detection by qPCR in
blood (a), oropharyngeal (b) and faecal swabs (c).
Results are depicted as cycle quantification (cq)
values
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3.2 | Detection of virus and viral genome
At 4 dpi, seven of ten animals were positive in qPCR from EDTA
blood with cq values below 30 (see Figure 3a), and two additional
animals were weak positive (cq 34 and 41). Animal #17 was still neg-
ative at this time. In oropharyngeal swabs, five animals were found
to be positive by qPCR with moderate-to-low viral loads (cq 28–38,
see Figure 3b). Here, animal #17 was among the weak positives (cq
37), but the two other animals with a low genome load in the blood
and with almost no clinical signs were negative (see Figure 3b). The
qPCR from faecal swabs also yielded five but not completely congru-
ent positive results (see Figure 3c). Again, viral loads were low (cq
values ranging from 31 to 45). Haemadsorption tests from serum
were positive for all but animals #17 and #18. At 7 dpi, all available
blood and swab samples were positive in qPCR with moderate-to-
high genome loads in blood (cq 25–29, see Figure 3a), and moder-
ate-to-low genome loads in swabs (cq 30–37, see Figure 3b and 3c).
Here, only five haemadsorption tests were clearly positive, but the
positive results included samples from animals #17 and #18. The
remaining animals were all strong positive in qPCR from blood at
10 dpi (see Figure 3a), but only one oropharyngeal swab (#19) was
very weak positive (cq 41, see Figure 3b). Haemadsorption tests
from sera were positive for all animals. Spleen, tonsil, lung, salivary
gland and lymph node samples taken during necropsy of animals that
succumbed to infection were all positive in qPCR (see Table 1), and
all spleen samples reacted positive in haemadsorption tests.
Samples taken from the survivor and the sentinels during
necropsy at 96 dpi were all negative for ASF virus and viral genome
in two independent qPCR systems (see Table 1). Among the samples
were nine lymph nodes from all over the body (mandibular, paroti-
deal, lung-associated, renal, gastrohepatic, intestinal from the large
and small intestines, inguinal, popliteal).
3.3 | Detection of antibodies against ASFV
First, positive reactions were seen in both ELISA systems between
days 9 and 13 post-inoculation. At 10 dpi, #19 was found positive in
both test systems and #14 showed doubtful reactions in the Ingezim
PPA and positive reactions in the ID SCREEN African swine fever
virus INDIRECT. An additional doubtful result for the serum of ani-
mal #11 was found in the Ingezim PPA. At the respective end day,
only animal #19 (96 dpi) showed high antibody levels in the Ingezim
PPA ELISA. However, several animals were close to the cut-off. In
contrast, three animals were found positive (#14, 11 dpi; #17, 13
dpi; #19, 96 dpi) and one doubtful (#13, 9 dpi) in the ID SCREEN
African swine fever virus INDIRECT.
4 | DISCUSSION
African swine fever is no longer an exotic disease in several eastern
European countries. Since the introduction into the EU in 2014, ASF
has spread continuously despite enormous efforts towards
controlling the disease. The causative virus strains are of genotype II
and showed high virulence for both domestic pigs and European wild
boar under experimental conditions (Blome, Gabriel, Dietze, Brei-
thaupt, & Beer, 2012; Gabriel et al., 2011; Gallardo et al., 2015; Gui-
nat et al., 2014; Pietschmann et al., 2015). This would mean that
introduction into a free area would be expected to lead to obvious
clinical signs and mortality.
While mortality and virus-positive animals were observed in
Southern Estonia, this outbreak behaviour was missing in the north-
eastern outbreak area. One explanation could be local virus attenua-
tion.
In an attempt to understand the different outbreak characteris-
tics and to investigate the virulence of the local viral variants, an
animal trial was conducted with a re-isolated ASFV strain from
Ida-Viru.
In a nutshell, the ASFV strain from north-eastern Estonia was
still highly virulent for young wild boar, but nevertheless, one ani-
mal recovered completely. In direct comparison with previous stud-
ies (Blome et al., 2012; Gabriel et al., 2011; Pietschmann et al.,
2015; Tauscher et al., 2015), genome loads seemed to be slightly
lower and detectable antibody responses were observed more
often. However, as only cq values but not exact genome copy num-
bers could be compared, it cannot be ruled out that the differences
were only due to variability of PCR machines and extraction meth-
ods. The course of infection and the pathomorphological signs did
not differ for the animal that succumbed to infection. The virologi-
cal data suggest that at least one animal (#17) got infected later.
This confirms that oral infection is error prone and needs a quite
high dose. It was reported previously that for oral infection, virus
titres >104 HAU are usually necessary and that the ratio of viral
titres needed for infection of a susceptible animal via the intramus-
cular/intravenous inoculation versus the oral/nasal route is
1:140.000 with less than 1 HAU for the parenteral route (McVicar,
1984). The high dose needed for oral infection and the moderate
contagiosity of ASF without blood contact could be part of the
explanation why the epidemic in eastern Europe spreads rather
slowly.
The survival of one animal gave us the opportunity to study the
long-term fate of recovered animals and their potential of transmit-
ting the virus on a limited scale. So far, solid data are missing regard-
ing this issue and are needed to estimate the long-term effects of
ASF in the wild boar population. It was suggested that survivors will
become virus carriers (Sanchez-Vizcaıno, Mur, & Martınez-Lopez,
2012) and thus contribute to the long-term persistence of ASF in a
region. At least under our experimental conditions, the single sur-
vivor was able to eliminate the virus, and it did not transmit to sen-
tinels, even under conditions with slight hierarchical fights upon
introduction of the new animals. Consequently, a carrier state is not
an inescapable outcome for all surviving animals.
Hence, we did not find a clear explanation for the different dis-
ease dynamics in north-eastern Estonia. Additional data on viral
sequences, viral behaviour upon animal passaging and epidemiologi-
cal drivers are needed.
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A B S T R A C T
African swine fever (ASF) was first detected in the Estonian wild boar population in September 2014, while the
first domestic pig farm was affected in July 2015. In the present study, we aimed to analyse, retrospectively, the
epidemiology of the disease in all 26 outbreaks in domestic pig herds that occurred in Estonia during the period
2015–2017. Formal interviews were conducted to estimate the high-risk period for every farm, and to identify
the possible origin of the ASF virus and the mode of virus introduction. Furthermore, the clinical manifestation
of the disease as well as the course of the disease within the farm were investigated. Survival analysis was used to
calculate herd incidence and to estimate outbreak risk. A hierarchical Bayesian space–time model was used to
analyse the associations between outbreaks and ASF occurrence in wild boar. The spatial and temporal dis-
tribution of outbreaks was analysed to characterise the ASF epidemic in the Estonian domestic pig population
from 2015 to 2017.
The estimated high-risk period varied from seven to 20 days with a median of 11 days. On most of the affected
farms, the first clinical signs were mild and not specific to ASF despite the high virulence of the circulating virus.
Morbidity and mortality were often limited to a single pen or unit of the farm. The highest mortality (29.7%) was
seen on backyard farms with 1–10 pigs and the lowest (0.7%) on large commercial farms (>1000 pigs). The
spread of the virus within affected farms has been slow and the contagiousness of the virus has been relatively
low. Farms of all sizes and types have been at risk, including large commercial farms operating at a high bio-
security level. In none of the affected farms could the specific route of introduction be verified. However, the
findings suggested that virus introduction occurred via indirect transmission routes due to insufficient biose-
curity. The total herd incidence of outbreaks was similar across all three years, being 2.4% in 2015 and 2016,
and 2.0% in 2017. All outbreaks occurred from June to September, during the warmest period of the year. The
results suggest that the increase in ASF cases in local wild boar populations is the main risk factor leading to the
infection of farms; 88% of outbreaks occurred in areas where ASF virus was detected in wild boar prior to the
outbreak, within a radius of 15 km from the outbreak farm.
1. Introduction
Due to its serious impact on animal health and the pig industry,
African swine fever (ASF) is considered one of the most important and
dangerous viral diseases of pigs and wild boar. Highly virulent and
lethal ASF virus strains from genotype II have been circulating in
Eastern Europe since 2007, and in EU countries from 2014 (Blome
et al., 2012; Gallardo et al., 2015b; OIE and WAHID, 2017). However,
not enough reliable and comprehensive epidemiological field data
about domestic pig outbreaks is available. Although in recent decades,
different epidemiological data from ASF endemic countries in Africa
(Fasina et al., 2012; Penrith et al., 2013), the Italian island of Sardinia
(Mur et al., 2018), as well as from the Iberian Peninsula (1960–1995)
have been collected and made available, these results are often not
valid for Eastern and Northern Europe. The genotype of the virus, and
climatic, socio-economic and environmental conditions, as well as the
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structure of the pig industry and farming traditions are considerably
different from the aforementioned countries and regions. In Estonia, pig
production is highly industrialised and concentrated on large farms,
whereas the backyard sector and the number of smallholders became
relatively small in number and significance during the last decade. Pigs
are kept predominantly inside in weatherproof facilities and keeping
them outdoors has been the exception rather than the rule.
The first case of ASF in Estonia was diagnosed in a wild boar found
dead near the Latvian border at the beginning of September 2014. In
the Latvian wild boar population, ASF had already been present since
June 2014 (OIE and WAHID, 2017; Olševskis et al., 2016). In the fol-
lowing years, the virus spread through the entire wild boar population
in Estonia, leaving only some islands free of infection. The first ASF
outbreak in domestic pigs in Estonia occurred in July 2015 and was
followed by 16 outbreaks during the following nine weeks. Six out-
breaks were notified in 2016 and three in 2017. An overview of Esto-
nian ASF outbreaks in domestic pig herds and wild boar cases is given
in Table 1 (see also Fig. 2).
The aim of the present study was to analyse, retrospectively, the
epidemiology of ASF in domestic pigs, based on data from all Estonian
outbreak farms. More specifically (i) to estimate the high-risk period
and mortality risk, (ii) to analyse the characteristics of the affected
herds, (iii) to clarify clinical manifestation of the disease as well as
spread of the virus within the farms, (iv) to assess the virus transmission
and introduction pathways, (v) to estimate herd incidence and outbreak
risks, (vi) to assess temporal and spatial patterns of outbreaks, and (vii)
to analyse associations between the occurrence of ASF in wild boar and
domestic pig outbreaks.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. ASF outbreak detection
An outbreak farm was defined as a holding having an individual
identification number in the National Animal Register (NAR) and
meeting the criteria of infected herd as defined in Council Directive
2002/60/EC (European Commission, 2002). All ASF outbreaks were
confirmed by virus genome detection in accordance with the EU diag-
nostic manual (European Commission, 2003). Tissue and blood samples
were collected from all or selected dead or sick animals, depending on
the clinical course of the disease on the farm in question. The laboratory
analyses were performed at the Estonian Veterinary and Food
Laboratory, which is also the national reference laboratory for ASF
(NRL).
The ASF virus genome was detected by real-time PCR according to
the protocol published by Tignon et al. (2011). In addition, the presence
of ASF-virus-specific antibodies was analysed using a commercial
blocking ELISA (INGEZIM, PPA COMPAC K3, INGENASA, Madrid,
Spain) and/or indirect immunoperoxidase technique (IPT) provided by
the European Union reference laboratory for ASF (Gallardo et al.,
2015a; European Unión Laboratory for African Swine Fever et al.,
2014).
2.2. Outbreak investigations
Epidemiological investigations were conducted on all farms in
which an ASF outbreak had been reported (18 farms in 2015, six farms
in 2016 and three farms in 2017). However, a positive diagnosis of ASF
was not confirmed in follow-up investigations of one of the herds in
2015, where all 15 pigs tested after culling were found to be negative
for ASF.
Epidemiological investigations were conducted either by the local
veterinary officers responsible for management of the outbreaks or
by the epidemiology team of the Estonian University of Life Sciences
in compliance with Council Directive 2002/60/EC (European
Commission, 2002). In principle, epidemiological enquiries dealt with
the following: (i) the length of time that the ASF virus may have existed
on the holding before the disease was notified or suspected, (ii) the
possible origin of the ASF virus at the holding and mode of introduc-
tion, (iii) the identification of other holdings at which pigs may have
become infected from the same source.
Formal interviews using a structured questionnaire were conducted
with farm managers, farm veterinarians and farm workers, focussing on
farm management, herd data, animal movements, vehicle movements,
feeding and bedding management, biosecurity measures and human
activities, all of which might have facilitated virus introduction and
spread. Furthermore, investigations were conducted focussing on clin-
ical and pathological data and laboratory findings.
2.3. Biosecurity level of outbreak farms
The level of farm biosecurity was judged by a group of three experts
as a consensus judgment based on interview data and from observations
made during farm visits. The first step involved evaluating farms based
Table 1
Number of detected ASF cases in wild boar and ASF outbreaks in domestic pig herds in Estonia from 1st September 2014 to 31st December 2017.
2014a 2015 2016 2017
County WBb cases DPc outbreaks WB cases DP outbreaks WB cases DP outbreaks WB cases DP outbreaks
Harju 0 0 0 0 46 0 87 0
Hiiu 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ida-Viru 4 0 36 0 40 0 14 0
Jõgeva 0 0 60 2 192 3 15 0
Järva 0 0 102 1 117 1 9 0
Lääne 0 0 0 0 58 0 119 1
Lääne-Viru 0 0 91 1 198 1 64 0
Põlva 0 0 233 0 190 0 14 0
Pärnu 0 0 27 0 95 0 87 1
Rapla 0 0 6 0 203 0 90 0
Saare 0 0 0 0 98 1 305 1
Tartu 0 0 124 2 192 0 40 0
Valga 13 0 124 4 24 0 8 0
Viljandi 47 0 174 5 61 0 9 0
Võru 9 0 118 2 56 0 6 0
Total 73 0 1095 17 1570 6 867 3
a From 1st September.
b Wild boar.
c Domestic pig.
I. Nurmoja, et al. Preventive Veterinary Medicine 181 (2020) 104556
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on their compliance to basic biosecurity requirements enforced by na-
tional legislation, and classifying them as compliant or non-compliant
(Teataja, 1999, 2004). In the second step, the herds were divided into
five categories based on their biosecurity level as shown in Table 2.
2.4. High-risk period of outbreak farms
The length of time that ASF virus may have existed on a farm before
it was suspected (high-risk period: HRP) was estimated based on mor-
tality data, and clinical and laboratory findings. In cases where anti-
body-positive animals (detected by ELISA test) were found in an in-
fected herd, it was concluded that the virus had been circulating in the
herd for at least two weeks. In cases where sampled animals were only
virus-positive, the time of virus circulation was considered to be one
week or less. By combining mortality data, and clinical and laboratory
findings, the HRP was established.
2.5. Pig herd data
A database on pig herds in Estonia for the period 2015–2017 was
compiled using the information available from the NAR of the Estonian
Agricultural Registers and Information Board and from the Veterinary
and Food Board (VFB). According to Estonian law, all pig herds must be
registered in the NAR and the number of animals in the herd must be
reported by owners at least once a year by 1st May. However, during
the second half of the years 2015 and 2016, the VFB conducted an
inspection of all pig holdings and updated the NAR database with actual
number of pigs in herds at the time of inspection. Where needed, the
VFB added the holdings not yet registered in the NAR to the database or
removed those holdings that no longer kept pigs. The final database
included all farms and households that had kept pigs during the year of
observation; the total number of pigs in a herd was counted as the
largest number registered in one of the source databases (NAR or VFB).
An epidemiological unit was defined as a group of pigs kept in one
building or area (one out-door herd) and having an individual identi-
fication number in the NAR. One owner may have one or several pro-
duction units (herds) registered in the NAR. Herds belonging to the
same owner were considered as connected herds (epidemiological
units).
Holdings were grouped into four size categories according to the
total number of pigs (piglets, weaners, growers, fatteners, gilts, sows
and boars) in an epidemiological unit: 1–10 pigs (G1); 11–100 pigs
(G2); 101–1000 pigs (G3); >1000 pigs (G4). G1 holdings were classi-
fied as backyard or non-commercial farms where pigs were kept mainly
for the farmers own consumption. G2–G4 holdings were classified as
commercial farms.
The herd type (farrow-to-finish, multiplier, fattener or grower) was
identified based on the information available from the NAR. Herds
consisting of only breeding animals and piglets (up to weaning age)
were considered to be multiplier herds, herds with fatteners or growers
were classified as fattening herds, and herds with all categories of pigs
as farrow-to-finish herds.
The type of pigs kept on a farm (domestic pigs, wild boar, or
crosses), as well as the location of the farm (including the coordinates),
were taken from source datasets and included in the final database.
The total number of herds and pigs in different herd-size categories
are presented in Table 3.
2.6. Wild boar ASF surveillance and hunting data
ASF surveillance data for wild boar from September 2014 until the
end of 2017, including date and location (coordinates) of each ASF
case, were obtained from the VFB. For the year 2015, data on ASF wild
boar cases in Latvia were drawn from the Animal Diseases Notification
System database (ADNS, 2017). For 2016 and 2017, Latvian ASF cases
were not relevant for the analyses as all Estonian outbreaks in domestic
pig farms occurred further away from the Latvian border.
The date and location of the closest wild boar case(s) to each
Table 2
Basic criteria for assessment of farm biosecurity level in ASF outbreak herds in Estonia, 2015–2017.
Criteria Biosecurity level
Compliant Non-compliant
very high high moderate low very low
Indoor keepinga + + + + One or more require-ments not fulfilled
Fence surrounding the farm boundaryb + + + +
Disinfection barriers at entry points to the farm boundary for vehicles and humans + + + +/-c
Disinfection barriers at entrances to farm buildings for humans and vehicles + + + +/-
No swill and/or grass feeding + + + +
No other farm and/or pet animals in pigsties + + + +
Number of deficiencies in biosecurity proceduresd 0 1 2 > 3
a One outdoor farm had special permission to keep pigs in a double-fenced area and was not automatically classified as “very low” – assessment was based on
evaluation of all aspects of biosecurity.
b Farms without a fence were not automatically classified as “very low” – assessment was based on evaluation of all aspects of biosecurity.
c Partly fulfilled.
d Functional infrastructure and procedures for disinfection; adequate procedures for entry of animals, humans, vehicles, equipment and materials; secure storage
and handling of feed, and bedding material; existence of biosecurity plan.
Table 3
Total number of pig herds and pigs in Estonia in the period 2015–2017.
2015 2016 2017
Herd-size category No. of herds No. of pigs No. of herds No. of pigs No. of herds No. of pigs
G1 (1–10) 488 1626 94 418 25 83
G2 (11–100) 94 2560 54 1665 37 735
G3 (101–1000) 37 15,034 29 12,498 24 7516
G4 (>1000) 82 360,307 71 320,511 67 278,572
Total 701 379,527 248 335,092 153 286,906
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outbreak farm were identified. The Euclidean distance between each
affected farm and the closest wild boar case within a year before the
outbreak was recorded, to characterise the infection pressure from wild
boar.
Wild boar hunting data, as well as data regarding number of hun-
ters, feeding sites and hunting hounds, were provided by the Estonian
Environment Agency (Nature department) and based on regular reports
submitted by regional hunting societies to the Environmental Board.
2.7. Statistical analysis and maps
2.7.1. Herd incidence and outbreak risk estimates
Survival analysis was used to calculate herd incidences. The out-
break risk estimates were based on incidence values.
The dataset included all pig farms recorded in source databases in
2015, 2016 and 2017. The observation period started from 1st January
each year for those herds that were in the database. The date of start of
pig keeping in new herds registered during the year of observation was
not known, and such herds were not included in the analysis of the
respective year. The observation period lasted either until the day that
production ceased (removal of pigs from the farm), the end of the year
(right censoring), or until the outbreak of ASF.
The data were declared as survival-time data by specifying the start
of the observation period as the ‘enter’ option in the ‘stset’ command in
Stata MP14®. The event of interest was the outbreak of ASF in a do-
mestic pig herd and was specified as the ‘failure’ option in the ‘stset’
command. Incidence rate, together with 95% confidence intervals, was
calculated for each of the study years as well as for the period between
1st January 2015 until 31st December 2017 using the ‘strate’ command.
A Cox proportional hazard random-effect model was applied to
detect significant differences in ASF infection hazard across farm types,
herd-size categories and the three study years. A Cox regression model
(‘stcox’ command in STATA®) was applied to detect the significance of
the association between variables and the event of interest. The model
specified a Breslow method for handling ties, and also included county
as a random effect in the ‘shared’ option.
Variables significantly associated with the event of interest
(p< 0.05) were retained in the multivariable model. Akaike informa-
tion criterion (AIC) values were used to compare the models in terms of
their quality (Dohoo et al., 2009).
The assumption of proportional hazards was checked graphically by
creating log–log plots of survival, and by a statistical test using
Schoenfeld residuals (Dohoo et al., 2009).
2.7.2. Mortality calculations
Mortality risk (cumulative incidence) was calculated for the fol-
lowing: (i) for each outbreak herd, and (ii) for affected groups within
the herd for the period including the HRP and the timespan from no-
tification to culling. The affected group was defined as a physically
separated unit of a building containing one type of pig (sows, fatteners,
weaners etc.).
2.7.3. Spatio-temporal analysis
A hierarchical Bayesian spatio-temporal model (Varewyck et al.,
2017) was used to assess the association between the occurrence of ASF
cases in wild boar and ASF outbreaks in domestic pigs. No additional
time or space–time interaction effects were included in the model; thus,
priors were considered to be uninformative. Temporal resolution of the
model was set at one month. Spatial resolution for the analysis was
based on hunting district (an area allocated to one hunting club for
hunting, n= 344) as this was the lowest spatial unit for which cov-
ariate data was available. Areas that shared boundaries were con-
sidered to be neighbouring, and the model assumed dependency of
values between them. One hunting district (334EE–Naissaar) was
dropped from the spatio-temporal analysis as it did not have any ob-
servations. The implications of this exclusion were considered minimal
as it is a small islet off the northern coast, with no direct connections to
any other hunting districts.
The response variable was ‘ASF outbreak in domestic pigs in
hunting district’ (set as binary). Covariates included by month were:
‘total no. of ASF PCR-positive wild boar’ (from September 2014 to
November 2017), and ‘total no. of wild boar hunted’ (from March 2015
to November 2017). Covariates included by year (2014–2017) were:
‘total no. of hunters’, ‘total no. of wild boar feeding sites’, and ‘total no.
of hunting hounds’. These latter three covariates were chosen as they
were expected to reflect hunting intensity in a hunting district. The
model was checked for convergence.
2.7.4. Maps
Descriptive maps were generated using ArcGIS ArcMap 10.3.1
(ESRI, Redlands, CA, USA).
3. Results
3.1. Reporting and laboratory findings
ASF was immediately suspected on 12 out of the 26 farms, while on
the other farms the first suspicion was feed poisoning (n= 7), er-
ysipelas (n= 3), pneumonia (n=3), salmonellosis (n= 1) and heat or
stress (n=2). The reason for reporting was sickness (n= 19) or death
(n= 7) of one or several animals. In addition to outbreak farms, ASF
was suspected and samples were submitted to the NRL for analyses from
18 other farms in 2015, from 28 other farms in 2016 and from 38 other
farms in 2017.
On all outbreak farms, PCR-positive animals were detected. In ad-
dition, on seven farms, animals with ASF-virus-specific antibodies were
detected by ELISA. All antibody-positive animals were also PCR-posi-
tive.
The estimated HRP varied from seven to 20 days with a median of
11 days (Fig. 1).
3.2. Characteristics of affected farms
The number of outbreaks across farms of different type and size
categories is shown in Table 4.
Twenty-four outbreaks were classified as primary outbreaks, while
two outbreaks were considered to be secondary outbreaks due to close
contact with infected herds (common ownership and movements of
farm workers, vehicles and equipment between farms). There was no
movement of animals between these connected outbreak farms during
the high-risk period.
3.3. Clinical signs and virus spread within farms
The first clinical signs in pigs were often mild and not specific to
ASF. Cases of a severe course of the disease (excluding sudden deaths)
Fig. 1. Length of estimated high-risk period (the length of time that ASF virus
may have existed on the farm before it was suspected) on 26 pig farms affected
by ASF in Estonia, 2015–2017.
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were recorded on 13 farms, often after longer circulation of the virus on
the farm. On nine out of 12 farms where sows were kept, morbidity
occurred firstly among pregnant or nursing sows. Skin haemorrhages or
cyanosis were reported in pigs on 11 farms and sudden death on 14
farms, often occurring in a few animals only. A summary of recorded
clinical signs in pigs on affected farms before and after reporting is
given in Table 5.
In Table 6, the observed mortality estimates are presented. The
average mortality was strongly dependent on the herd size, being the
lowest in the largest herd-size category (0.7%) and the highest in the
smallest one (29.7%).
3.4. Probable routes of virus entry into farms and biosecurity level of the
outbreak farms
On all 26 outbreak farms, the virus was most likely introduced by
some indirect transmission pathway. In none of the affected farms could
the specific route of introduction be verified. However, the findings
suggest that on two farms (one commercial outdoor herd and one non-
commercial herd with an outdoor walking area), direct (through fence)
contact with infected wild boar could not be completely excluded. On
eight non-commercial farms with no or very low biosecurity, virus in-
troduction might have occurred via several pathways (e.g. via
Fig. 2. Location of ASF domestic pig outbreak farms and virus-positive wild boar cases in Estonia in 2015, 2016 and 2017.
Table 4
Distribution of Estonian ASF-positive domestic pig farms across herd type and size, 2015–2017.
Herd-size category (no. of pigs)
Production type G1 (1–10) G2 (11–100) G3 (101–1000) G4 (>1000) Total
Multiplier 0 0 1 2 3
Farrow-to-finish 1 1 3a 5 10
Fattening 7 0 1 5 13
Total 8 1 5 12 26
a Two herds with crosses of wild boar and domestic pigs (one kept outdoors) and one organic pig farm.
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contaminated feed, grass, clothing, vehicles, other farm animals or pets
on the farm, and kitchen waste). The cause of virus introduction for
these herds was defined as “lack of/insufficient biosecurity measures”.
For commercial herds, possible pathways of virus introduction were
identified more specifically by the epidemiology team who analysed the
data collected during outbreak investigations. The results of the ana-
lysis are presented in Table 7.
It appears from the presented data that on all affected commercial
farms the virus was introduced by indirect transmission routes. On the
majority of commercial farms (n=11), the virus was most likely in-
troduced by means of contaminated fomites (vehicles, people, tools) as
a result of errors in execution of biosecurity procedures.
The biosecurity levels of affected farms across herd-size categories
are shown in Table 8.
The biosecurity measures required by national legislation as de-
scribed in Table 2, at least at a minimum level, were in place for 13
(50%) outbreak herds. In 10 herds (38%), the measures were im-
plemented at least at a moderate level, and in three outbreak herds
(12%) a high or very high biosecurity level was in place.
The biosecurity level on all eight non-commercial (G1) farms was
low or very low. On commercial farms (G2–G4), the biosecurity level
was generally higher. Biosecurity level of six (33%) commercial farms
was estimated as very low because of multiple deficiencies in the ful-
filment of biosecurity requirements presented in Table 2.
3.5. Herd incidence
The data on occurrence of outbreaks, as well as the cumulative herd
incidences (presented as outbreak risk estimates), for the years 2015
and 2016 per farm type and size category are given in Tables 9 and 10.
In 2017, all outbreaks occurred in G4 herds (outbreak risk= 4.5%, 95%
CI 1.5; 12.4), and the overall outbreak risk in all herd-size categories
was 2.0% (95% CI 0.7; 5.6).
The total herd incidence rates per year and for the whole three-year
period obtained from survival analysis are presented in Table 11.
The overall yearly incidence rates did not differ significantly
(p> 0.05) from each other.
In a univariable Cox proportional hazard random-effect model (in-
cluding county as a random effect), the multiplier and farrow-to-finish
herds had a significantly higher hazard of experiencing an outbreak
compared to fattening herds in 2015 (data not presented). In the model
that included the data from three years (2015–2017), a similar trend
could be observed although the association was not statistically sig-
nificant (p= 0.064). Including the variable ‘year’ in the model did not
improve the model fit. Thus, only the variable ‘herd-size category’,
adjusted for the random effect ‘county’, was included in the final model.
Compared to the two smaller herd-size categories (G1, G2), larger herds
(G3, G4) had a significantly higher risk of becoming infected with the
ASF virus (Table 12).
3.6. Spatial and temporal distribution of outbreak farms
The geographical locations of outbreak farms changed during the
epidemic. As shown in Fig. 2, domestic pig outbreaks appeared in those
areas where ASF virus was circulating actively in the wild boar popu-
lation.
Of 26 outbreaks, 23 occurred in regions where the disease was also
present in the wild boar population within a radius of 15 km from the
affected farm. The distances between the outbreak farm and the nearest
case of ASF in wild boar within a year before an outbreak are shown in
Fig. 3. In ten cases, the closest wild boar case was found less than one
month before the outbreak, in six cases between one and four months
before the outbreak, and in seven cases over four months before the
outbreak.
All ASF outbreaks were detected during the warmest period of the
year, between June and September. Most of the outbreaks (81%) were
detected in July and August (See Fig. 4).
3.7. Results of the hierarchical Bayesian spatio-temporal model
The results of the model analysis are presented in Table 13.
The results of the analysis indicate a significant positive association
with the total number of ASF-positive wild boar detected per month in a
hunting district. The total number of wild boar hunted, number of
hunters, feeding sites and hunting hounds in a hunting district were not
significantly associated with outbreaks in domestic pigs.
4. Discussion
4.1. Reporting and laboratory findings
ASF occurrence on Estonian domestic pig farms was generally
Table 5
Clinical signs in pigs recorded before and after reporting on 26 ASF outbreak
farms in Estonia, 2015–2017.
Clinical manifestation No. of farms
Loss of appetite 19
Listlessness 19
Sudden death without prior signs in animal 14







a On six farms, fever was not detected; on 10 farms, temperature was not
measured.
b Vomiting (n=2); decrease in milk yield of sows (n= 1); diarrhoea
(n=1); blood in urine (n= 1).
Table 6
Estimated ASF mortality in affected domestic pig herds in Estonia, 2015–2017.
Herd-size category Mortality in the herd Mortality in the affected group
n Average Min Max Average Min Max
G1 (1–10) 8 29.7% 0.0% 100.0%a NA NA NA
G2 (11–100) 1 25.0%b NA NA NA NA NA
G3 (101–1000) 5 7.5% 0.4% 25.0% 13.8% 3.8% 25.0%c
G4 (>1000) 12 0.7% 0.04% 2.5% 7.2% 0.1% 43.6%d
NA – not applicable as pigs were kept in one group.
a Mortality in a backyard farm with one pig.
b At the moment of outbreak there were four pigs on the farm.
c Herd of 126 crosses kept in one group.
d Mortality in a group of 39 nursing sows.
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reported within the first week after the appearance of clinical signs,
therefore at a relatively early stage of the outbreak. This was confirmed
by the fact that no seroconverting (antibody ELISA positive) animals
were found in most herds and the spread of the disease within farms
was limited. In seven cases, reporting was delayed for two weeks after
appearance of the first disease signs in animals. In these herds, ASF
antibody ELISA positive pigs were present. However, all these animals
were PCR-positive as well, which indicates that the virus should not
have been present in the herd for more than four weeks (Nurmoja et al.,
2017; Gallardo et al., 2018; Zani et al., 2018). The speed of reporting
was not dependent on whether the herd was commercial or not.
In more than half of the outbreak herds, diseases other than ASF
were suspected at first. This can mainly be explained by non-specific
signs of ASF at the beginning of the outbreak, particularly due to a lack
of characteristic pathological post-mortem findings (data not pre-
sented).
4.2. Characteristics of affected farms
Outbreaks occurred in herds of all production types and size cate-
gories. The proportion of herds with breeding animals among outbreak
farms (50%) exceeded the proportion of these herds in the general
population (28%), and there was a trend in the data towards a higher
risk for outbreaks in herds with breeding animals. This may be ex-
plained by differences in the management of breeding pigs compared to
growers and fatteners (more human interaction with breeding pigs).
Furthermore, pregnant and nursing sows may be more susceptible to
the virus due to immune suppression, and so lower doses of the virus
might be able to initiate the infection. Sows in heat may also attract
male wild boar (including infected ones), and as a consequence the
surrounding environment of breeding farms may become more con-
taminated with the virus, increasing the likelihood of transmission with
fomites onto the farms.
The number of ASF outbreaks in commercial herds exceeded the
number of outbreaks in backyard farms. This can partly be explained by
the rapid reduction of backyard pig holdings due to strict biosecurity
requirements, which are equal for all pig farms in Estonia. This brought
the number of backyard pig farms down from 696 in 2014, to 25 by
2017. On the other hand, it may also indicate that large commercial
farms are more exposed to the virus due to more frequent and intensive
contact with the external environment through movement of people
and vehicles.
4.3. Clinical findings and spread of the virus on farms
Although ASF is described as a severe, haemorrhagic disease that
causes up to 100% morbidity in naive pig herds and can result in very
high mortality (Sánchez-Vizcaíno et al., 2009; Costard et al., 2013),
under field conditions we often found ASF cases with mild clinical
signs. Severe clinical signs, as well as the haemorrhagic form of the
disease, were seldom observed, and often limited to a few animals only.
This can be explained by the relatively early detection of outbreaks, as
most were reported within seven days of the first observation of disease
signs. A severe clinical course and higher morbidity were seen in
pregnant or nursing sows, or in the case of longer virus circulation on a
farm.
The spread of the virus within affected herds was generally slow,
Table 7
Most probable pathways of ASF virus introduction to commercial pig farms in Estonia, 2015–2017.
Herd-size category (no. of pigs)
Introduction pathways G2 (11–100) G3 (101–1000) G4 (>1000) Total
Multiple errors in execution of biosecurity procedures (introduction by fomites) 1 0 4 5
Inadequate disinfection of vehicles 0 0 2 2
Minor errors in execution of biosecurity procedures (introduction by fomites) 0 0 2 2
Movement of people or vehicle from an infected farm (secondary outbreak) 0 1 1 2
Contamination of cereal feed during storage or processing 0 3 2 5
Feeding of grass 0 1 0 1
Contamination of bedding material 0 0 1 1
Total 1 5 12 18
Table 8
Biosecurity levels of Estonian ASF outbreak farms according to herd size,
2015–2017.



























Number of ASF outbreaks and cumulative herd incidence (outbreak risk) in different farm types and herd-size categories in Estonia in 2015.
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Multiplier 18/ 0 11/ 0 1/ 1 5/ 2 35/ 3 8.6%
(3.0–22.4)
Farrow-to-finish 13/ 0 44/ 1 22/ 3 31/ 3 110/ 7 6.4%
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Fattening 456/ 4 39/ 0 13/ 1 46/ 2 556/ 7 1.3%
(0.6–2.6)
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meaning that the contagiousness of the virus was low. Even in affected
pens, some pigs were still ASF-virus-negative at the time of reporting,
and in most outbreaks the infection was detected only in one unit or
even in one pen. Similar findings were reported by Olševskis et al.
(2016) in Latvia.
The estimates of mortality risk reported here are arbitrary as the
time-periods for calculation of the mortality risk for every affected herd
differed considerably (reporting 0–14 days from first symptoms, culling
1–3 days after reporting). Nevertheless, in the two largest farm-size
categories (G3, G4), the herd-level and production-unit-level mortality
risks were generally low. This indicates that in larger herds (G3, G4) the
monitoring of general mortality is not suitable for early detection of an
ASF outbreak. In smaller herds (G1, G2), the average mortality risk was
considerably higher, as every case of death influenced the risk estimate
markedly. However, the case fatality rate can be considered high, as
most of the affected pigs died 1–5 days after the appearance of the first
clinical signs, which means that an ASF epidemic may result in high
mortality if there is enough time for the virus to spread within the herd.
Nevertheless, in affected and endangered regions, every sudden
death of a pig with an unclear cause should be considered a possible
case of ASF, and “high mortality” should not be expected at the start of
an outbreak.
4.4. Probable routes of virus entry into farms and biosecurity level of the
outbreak farms
Based on the collected epidemiological information, the introduc-
tion of the virus into domestic pig herds is likely to have occurred
mainly by indirect transmission routes. None of the outbreaks could be
linked to the introduction of infected pigs. Direct contact with poten-
tially infected wild boar could not be completely excluded in two herds
– one outdoor farm of crosses with double fencing, and one organic
farm using a single fence with a walking area connected to the barn.
However, even in these herds, direct contact was considered unlikely.
The fencing of the outdoor farm was checked during the outbreak in-
vestigation and no damage was discovered. The organic farm was lo-
cated in an open area (no forest nearby) and no direct signs or evidence
of wild boar entering the farm could be identified.
Feeding of contaminated swill has generally been considered one of
the main risk factors for indirect transmission of ASF (FAO, 2013; Gogin
et al., 2013; Oganesyan et al., 2013). In Estonia, the feeding of swill to
pigs is illegal and could be excluded as a route of virus introduction on
all affected commercial farms. On backyard farms, the feeding of
kitchens leftovers could not be excluded. However, swill feeding was
not considered the main possible route of virus introduction, as the
owners mainly consumed pig meat from their own pigs. Introduction of
the virus to these farms with purchased meat products (ham, sausages
etc.) from local shops would assume hidden circulation of the virus in
Estonia or contamination of imported products. This was considered
unlikely. According to the interview results, none of the farmers or farm
workers had contacts with affected non-EU countries. Thus, the in-
troduction of contaminated pig meat or products from these countries
to outbreak farms was also considered unlikely. Another possible source
of infection is contaminated wild boar meat. Limited circulation and
use of uncontrolled wild boar meat cannot be excluded in Estonia.
Table 10
Number of ASF outbreaks and cumulative herd incidence (outbreak risk) in different farm types and herd-size categories in 2016.

















Multiplier 8/ 0 9/ 0 1/ 0 3/ 0 21/ 0 0.0%
NC
Farrow-to-finish 6/ 1 24/ 0 17/ 0 28/ 1 75/ 2 2.7%
(0.7–9.2)
Fattening 80/ 3 21/ 0 11/ 0 40/ 1 152/ 4 2.6%
(1.0–6.6)















The herd incidence rates of ASF outbreaks among domestic pig herds in Estonia










2015 17 646.7 2.6 1.6–4.2
2016 6 229.8 2.6 1.2–5.8
2017 3 140.2 2.1 0.7–6.6
2015–2017 26 1016.7 2.6 1.7–3.8
Table 12
The results of the Cox proportional hazard random-effect model showing the
effect of herd size on the incidence of ASF outbreaks in Estonian domestic pig










G1 (1–10) 607 (8) 1 X X
G2 (11–100) 185 (1) 0.36 0.342 0.05–2.92
G3 (101–1000) 90 (5) 4.22 0.013 1.36–13.14
G4 (>1000) 220 (12) 4.31 0.002 1.72–10.80
Wald Chi squared= 14.71 (p=0.002).
a Number of herds after splitting the observation period into three years.
Fig. 3. The distance between domestic pig outbreak farms and the closest tested
ASF-positive wild boar case within a year before an outbreak in Estonia,
2015–2017.
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However, evidence of the use of wild boar meat in affected backyard
herds could not be established except for in one case, where the owner
was a hunter. Thus, most likely, the virus has entered affected herds by
means of contaminated fomites – clothing, vehicles, feed and bedding
material – due to inadequate biosecurity measures or errors in the
implementation of these measures.
For most outbreaks, there was no single obvious cause or event that
could be linked with the introduction of the virus. In most affected
backyard farms, there were several biosecurity gaps at the time (e.g.
lack of functional disinfection barriers, no separation of inside and
outside zones, pet access or housing other farm animals together with
pigs, feeding grass to pigs, unsafe storage of bedding material and feed
etc.). It is difficult to single out one particular cause. In commercial
herds, which followed relatively high biosecurity protocols, the route of
virus introduction was difficult to trace. Seemingly minor errors in the
implementation of (generally adequate) disinfection procedures must
have led to the introduction of the virus.
The majority of outbreaks occurred on farms with either a low or
very low biosecurity level. However, looking at commercial farms se-
parately, it appears that those farms with at least a moderate biose-
curity level experienced outbreaks to the same extent as those with low
and very low biosecurity levels. It is generally assumed that low bio-
security level farms are at higher risk of introduction of infections.
Based on available data, it was not possible to estimate whether herds
with a low biosecurity level were at higher risk or not as information
about the distribution of biosecurity levels for the whole population is
lacking. However, assuming that the biosecurity level is in general
higher on commercial farms than on backyard farms, our data on herd
incidence do not support the general opinion that a higher biosecurity
level ensures a lower risk of ASF introduction (see below). This may
mean that the biosecurity measures applied so far (physical and
disinfection barriers) are not fully effective in protecting against the
incursion of ASF virus.
4.5. Herd incidence
The herd incidence estimates are dependent on the accuracy of re-
porting. The observed herd incidence risk was significantly higher in
the group of commercial herds in years 2015 and 2017 and did not
differ significantly from the incidence risk in non-commercial (back-
yard) herds in 2016. One may question whether the reporting in the
group of backyard farms was as good as for commercial farms or not.
Considering the availability of veterinary services in Estonia (there are
veterinarians available for every animal keeper), and the usual habits of
smallholders to invite a veterinarian to check diseased animals, we
would assume, at worst, only a slightly lower level of reporting in
backyard herds compared to commercial farms. Surveillance (including
serological and PCR testing) of herds located in restriction zones (areas
where infection in wild boar or domestic pigs has been detected) has
not revealed any case of undetected infection in domestic pigs (data not
shown).
The observed herd incidence risk in commercial herds (G2–G4)
decreased significantly in 2016 and 2017, compared to 2015. This is
likely the result of improvements in biosecurity measures on farms, and
more stringent surveillance by the veterinary authorities regarding the
fulfilment of legal requirements on biosecurity. Interestingly, the total
herd incidence across all herds did not change significantly. However,
we might expect that there was some reporting bias for the group of
backyard herds (G1) in 2015 as the owners might have not recognised
or reported the disease if it was limited to the sudden death of just one
or two pigs.
Fig. 4. Occurrence of ASF outbreaks in Estonia from June 2015 to September 2017.
Table 13
Fixed estimated parameters of the hierarchical Bayesian spatio-temporal model on a natural logarithmic scale.
Prediction interval (quantile)
Variable Mean SD 2.5% 50% 97.5%
Intercept −6.775 0.41 −7.598 −6.764 −6.012
No. of wild boar hunted (monthly) −0.024 0.026 −0.081 −0.022 0.022
No of ASF PCR-positive wild boar detected (monthly) 0.132a,b 0.058 0.002 0.138 0.230
No. of hunters in a district (yearly) 0.012 0.009 −0.006 0.012 0.029
No. of feeding sites (yearly) 0.015 0.024 −0.036 0.016 0.058
No. of hunting hounds (yearly) 0.015 0.067 −0.122 0.017 0.141
a Prediction intervals in bold indicate statistically significant parameters.
b Mean effect of ASF-positive wild boar detection in a hunting district on the occurrence of a domestic pig outbreak on the territory of a hunting district was
estimated to be 0.132. It means that for a one unit increase in ASF-positive wild boar detection the log odds of having a domestic pig outbreak increases by 0.132
(95% prediction interval= 0.002–0.230).
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4.6. Spatial and temporal distribution of outbreak farms and associations
between ASF outbreak farms and wild boar
Similarly to Latvia in 2014 (Olševskis et al., 2016), the vast majority
of outbreaks in Estonian domestic pigs occurred in areas where ASF had
been found in wild boar prior to detection of the virus in domestic
herds. In 23 outbreaks, the virus had been circulating among wild boar
within a radius of 15 km from the affected farm, and in 16 outbreaks,
within a radius of 5 km from the affected farm. On the island of Saar-
emaa, the infection was first discovered in a domestic pig herd. How-
ever, a couple of days after the reporting of this case in domestic pigs,
two infected wild boar carcasses were found 3 km and 10 km respec-
tively from the outbreak farm. The age of these carcasses indicates that
the virus was present in the wild boar population for some time before
the outbreak in domestic pigs occurred.
According to the spatio-temporal analysis, the occurrence of out-
breaks in domestic pigs was associated with the intensity of the infec-
tion in the wild boar population – the outbreaks occurred in areas
where there were more virus-positive (as detected by PCR) cases in wild
boar registered prior to the outbreak. There was no significant asso-
ciation with hunting intensity; this might be since there is minimal
interaction between hunters and pig producers.
The introduction of ASF virus into domestic herds has been strictly
seasonal in Estonia and associated with the warmest period of the year –
June to September. Most of the outbreaks (81%) were detected in July
and August. A similar seasonal trend has also been observed in other
infected EU countries (Olševskis et al., 2016; EFSA (European Food
Safety Authority) et al., 2017). One explanation for this seasonality
might be that during the summer months, contact between farms
(people and vehicles) and the wild boar in the surrounding environ-
ment is much more frequent because of the seasonal nature of field
work. The high-risk period for introduction of the virus into domestic
pig herds coincides with the harvest period, when wild boar also move
to feed in the fields. This is also the period when wild boar density is
highest (period after breeding season), and additionally, the number of
infected wild boar is also at its highest, which indicates infection
pressure. All these factors may increase the probability of transmission
via contaminated fomites.
The high season of ASF outbreaks in domestic herds also coincides
with the high season of blood-sucking insects in Estonia, suggesting
their potential role in transmitting the virus from wild boar to pigs.
However, there is very little scientific evidence regarding the capacity
of mechanical insect vectors to transmit the ASF virus. Furthermore, if
this was to be an important transmission route, many more outbreaks
should be expected in domestic herds, as should a faster spread of the
infection within herds. Nevertheless, the role of insect vectors in
transmission of the virus is still not clear and needs further investiga-
tion.
5. Conclusions
The results of this study suggest that the presence of ASF virus in
wild boar populations is the main risk for domestic pig farms becoming
infected. Farms of all sizes and types are at risk, including large com-
mercial farms operating at a high biosecurity level. Farms with
breeding animals seem to be at higher risk of becoming infected.
Despite the high virulence of the circulating virus strain, the clinical
manifestation of the disease has initially been unspecific and mild in
most herds. The spread of the virus within farms has been slow, and the
contagiousness of the virus has been relatively low.
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